Is It 'All Change' in the Middle East -- Again?

 

The Middle East has long been the place where well ordered, ‘reasonable’, plans conceived in the comfortable, air-conditioned rooms in Washington, London or other capitals of Europe go to die. Such has been the fate of all plans since the post-World War I divisions, the disastrous British or French mandates, military coups, clumsy attempts at ‘regime change’, recurring Israeli/Palestinian hostilities, western intervention, and on, and on, and on.

  But the situation on the ground has changed with the sudden Iranian weakness, withdrawal of Russia, powerful Israeli aggression and determination to re-shape the region, the near destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the unending plight of Palestinians once again mere pawns in a vicious game they can’t possibly win.

 Now there is a great deal of chatter about possible new outcomes., new shape of the Middle East. Will the Iranian regime change? If so, will that change come internally or be imposed by military might?  Will Iran continue with its nuclear program? Will the nationalist/religious zealots in Israel achieve their goal of ripping all the Palestinians from their now-diminished homeland and expelling them to distant lands? Who will fill the apparent vacuum in Syria? What role, if any, will Trump’s America play in the re-configuration of the region? And what will happen in Israel itself?

Pre-WW I Middle East

 There is nothing new about turmoil in the region, however, something is different this time. Strong regional players like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Turkey seem unwilling to let outside forces determine the shape of the region. According to conversations I have had with people who know the region well there is a new, strong desire and ability to take matters into their own hands. Doubt they could do much worse than the Western economic/political/military interventions for the last 100 years.

Current Middle East 

 Included in these discussions is speculation about whether the hard-line, uncompromising nationalists in Iran could yield to more pragmatic forces – still very nationalistic but willing to make certain difficult compromises to bring Iran in from the cold. Reconstruction of the Iranian economy will require large infusions of cash and talent. In addition to Western companies that may have a role to play, it is also possible that Turkey and the Gulf countries could supply the required talent and money. What price would Iran be willing to pay to achieve this? Iran would probably have to give up its nuclear weapons goal and remove support for forces like Hezbollah and Hamas. Unlikely? Improbable? Perhaps. But at least such possibilities are on the table.

 The same goes for reconstruction of Syria. None of the regional players would like see groups like ISIS fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the Assad regime. And no one wants a repeat of the chaos that followed the downfall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Very difficult to see any serious reconstruction in Syria going forward without a large Turkish presence. One extremely knowledgeable friend said discussions between Turkey and Saudi on the reconstruction of Syria are already underway. Turkey’s involvement in Syria becomes easier now that the Kurdish guerilla group PKK has surrendered its arms and vowed to give up hostilities against Turkey launched from Syria or Iraq.

 What could any rapprochement between the Arab states and Iran mean for Israel, especially an Israel controlled by Netanyahu and his nationalist allies? Such a rapprochement is probably something they would not like to see because it would present a more unified and stronger counterforce than the country has ever faced. It is difficult to see this new configuration in the region willing to have much to do with an Israel that has larger regional aspirations and that has driven millions of Palestinians out of their homeland. The current Israeli policy of making Palestinian life so miserable that they would welcome expulsion to countries like Libya or South Sudan does not help any possible reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbours. In some way, the deportations of immigrants from the United States to South Sudan can be seen as a test run for any later Palestinian ‘relocation.’

Will Israel re-claim the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza?

 There’s not much the Arabs can do to stop such an expulsion – similar to the Nazi effort to find a new homeland – some place like Madagascar - for German Jews before the Holocaust. Arab states are unable and unwilling to intervene militarily. But they can freeze whatever relations they have now, effectively isolate Israel and await developments within Israel. The internal divisions in Israel are deep and who knows how the political struggle will play out. Will Netanyahu stay in power? Will his many opponents compromise with each other create a realistic alternative? There is a great deal of noise inside Israel right now but not much clarity.

 What role, if any, will the United States play? Is it willing to stand aside and let the Arabs and Iranians determine their own fate? Again, very hard to say. The Trump administration’s general ambivalence toward international relations in general and the fear of getting dragged into another no-win Middle Eastern quagmire suggest that Trump would be happy to pass the torch to regional powers. But he is nothing if not mercurial. And only the very foolhardy would attempt to predict anything.

 All one can safely say now is that the situation is more fluid than ever and that the major powers like Russia and United States have reduced influence. It remains to be seen if the local players can indeed shape a new Middle East, one that finally after more than 100 years determines its own course.

Sometimes Reality Really Is Stranger Than Fiction

 

The recent Israeli attacks on Iran and the continuing brutal war against the in Gaza demonstrate that sometimes truth really is stranger than fiction.

 I recently published what the trade calls a ‘thriller’ set in Syria, Israel, Cyprus and Greece. The plot revolves around an attempt by the former Syrian dictator Bashir al-Assad to create a deadly bio-chemical weapon in a massive Crusader fortress. The sub-plot involves shadowy groups within Israel and the United States who want to use this weapon to create a larger regional war. While some of the characters are based on people I have encountered during my years in the region the plot is complete fiction.

 

The book is called Deniable and is available on either the publisher’s website https://troubador.co.uk/bookshop/crime-and-thrillers/deniable or as an ebook or paperback on Amazon:

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Deniable-David-Edgerly/dp/1836283601/ref=sr_1_2?crid=3KBPZ27NGOB78&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.b5vsX61BiHbLYCopPG5x4-u2t9a_Z74nZ9vokNeI3sFEQF0C9hCwN9O94RW2YiP8441wloEdmEp44A0ynzTgGPo8SJnAK-Jp3a4kA8I9IwMFZDWxlQHdlvyDdSKgRDu4lvXrwKdttegCcCp84yDVpaoGzY4ivroQ-Dhin_xmyngUX1VRaGbb2u3ySLsssEQ1gxZQ3q2ZNWR78Glqafqqiid8VVIgHQ4zslY90U8o62Q.OLRHKn1IGu26Mu_cgQqQDE5qaBBbp6HLktidFoioLe4&dib_tag=se&keywords=deniable&qid=1749883399&sprefix=deniable%2Caps%2C166&sr=8-2

 If I had included a hypothetical attack on Iran or ill-disguised efforts to dislodge Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza the editor would most likely have thrown the manuscript right back at me with snarky remarks about pushing fantasy theories.

Leaving aside questions of fantasy or reality these attacks do raise the question of Israel’s endgame. What exactly does it want to accomplish with the Iranian attacks or attempts to expel Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank? Taken at face value – something people with any experience in the Middle East find very hard to do – Israel wanted to destroy Iran’s ability to make nuclear weapons and to decapitate the Revolutionary Guard. Or is the ultimate aim something much more ambitious, hitherto unthinkable, -- regime change in Tehran? Or did Israel merely wish to send a deadly message: ‘We can do this anytime we want. If you continue with the nuclear weapons program or using proxies to attack Israel, we will hit you time and time again until you get the message.’ While the attacks certainly took out the leader of the Revolutionary Guards and did indeed damage Iran’s nuclear facilities it remains to be seen if the damage is permanent or temporary.

 Other militant leaders can be found who might be a bit more careful about their personal security. Early reports indicate that the nuclear facilities were damaged but not destroyed. Most of them are apparently deep underground and it’s not clear how far Iran’s nuclear program was set back. As for regime change – I believe it is much harder than anyone thinks. Iranians may not love the Islamic regime but from what I have experienced they are very proud of Iran’s glorious history and would rather choke on sand before bowing to external pressure – especially from what they consider an upstart like Israel.

 The route that the Israeli jets took to get to Iran provides an interesting commentary on just how far the Middle East has changed in the last two years. The Israelis apparently flew over Syria and northern Iraq to reach Iran – very careful to avoid embarrassing Jordan or Saudi Arabia by using their air space. When Assad was in power and the Russians were firmly entrenched in Syria it would have been unthinkable for Israel to violate Syrian airspace with such impunity. The new regime in Syria is in no position – yet - to threaten Israel, and Russia is a non-factor after beating a hasty retreat from the region. Iraq is, well, Iraq, still beset with sectarian feuds. It cannot challenge Israeli jets momentarily violating its air space in the far north of the country where the central government has limited authority. The Israelis also took care to avoid Turkish air space. The Turks have a serious air force and would have strongly resisted any violation of their air space.

 The Iranian attacks momentarily shifted the attention from Gaza and the West Bank. Here, again, it is fair to ask about Israel’s end game. Israel is now almost impregnable with the strongest military in the region. It really has created the Iron Wall envisaged by one of the state’s early leaders Ze’ev Jabotinsky. No Arab state has the ability or desire to attack Israel. Iran is another matter, but Iran is not Arab and its ability to match action with its bellicose rhetoric currently is limited. Non-state actors like Hamas or Hezbollah – or their followers – will always be a threat. But perhaps the Israeli intelligence services will be better prepared than they were on Oct. 7, 2023.

 What sort of Israel do the religious/nationalist supporters of Prime Minister Netanyahu plan when the shooting is over? They have made no secret of their desire to annex both the West Bank and Gaza. Then what? What happens to the five million Palestinians living in those areas? The far right in Israel would like to encourage or force the Palestinians to leave. The open warfare in Gaza is one such form of ‘encouragement’. The relentless pressure of ever-expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the sporadic violence against Palestinian residents can be seen as another attempt to squeeze the Palestinians out by creating unbearable conditions on the ground.

 There is one major problem with that plan. Where, exactly, will the Palestinians go? Neighbours like Jordan and Egypt have made it clear they will not accept millions of additional Palestinians in their country for fear of creating internal instability. Syria? Lebanon? Sudan? Libya? Not too likely. I wonder if the far right in Israel is aware of the tragic irony with this issue. It was the Nazis in the 1930s who searched hard for someplace to deport the Jews in Germany. Failing in that effort they resorted to extermination.

 Assuming a two-state solution is no longer feasible, annexation of the West Bank and Gaza with most of the resident Palestinians creates a major problem for Israel. The Palestinians and Moslems who are Israeli citizens will then outnumber the Jewish population of Israel. What then? Will Israel become a heavily armed, isolated, apartheid state to protect its identity? Or will some as-yet unknown genius develop a workable, loose system of cantons where Palestinians are guaranteed security and some form of self-government in return for leaving foreign relations and external security to the Israelis? This problem has festered for more than a century as numerous statesmen, countless ‘white papers’, conferences and UN resolutions have failed to find an answer. Is it possible that the current military cataclysm will cause both sides to recognize that continued conflict solves nothing at all and perhaps the time has come for serious negotiation? It is far too early to tell. But one can at least hope.

Time For Change On Cyprus? Maybe, Just Maybe.

Few places better than the island of Cyprus demonstrate the futility, the touchingly naïve earnestness, embodied in the English word ‘should’.  Given the climate, resources, relatively well educated population and rich history the Eastern Mediterranean island should be a shining example of harmony and prosperity. It isn’t.

In addition to the recent, largely self-inflicted, financial collapse the island suffers from a long-standing division between the 800,000 Greek Cypriots in the southern part of the island and the roughly 300,000 Turks who live in the politically and economically isolated northern part of the island. About half of the Turkish population is native Turkish Cypriots while the others are immigrants from Anatolia.

This island 'should' be a paradise

 The Greek part of Cyprus is the internationally recognized and European Union member Republic of Cyprus. The self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognized only by Turkey. It survives largely on casinos, tourism and about $600 million in annual subsidies from Turkey. Until recently the Republic of Cyprus enjoyed a much higher income than its northern counterpart. With the collapse of the Cypriot banking bubble this difference has narrowed sharply.

Reasonable people might think that this is the perfect time for the two groups on the island to overcome their past differences, re-unite and build a prosperous island that begins to fulfil its potential. Unfortunately, as is often the case in this part of the world, such people are simultaneously right and wrong. They are right to believe that a unified island would be much stronger than a divided island. They are wrong to think this is going to happen any time soon. Cyprus is very close to the Middle East, and in that part of the world the mere fact that such a move would make sense is absolutely no guarantee that it will happen.

Why not? How much time do you have? The tangled history of Cyprus involves centuries of invasion, co-habitation, the sometimes malevolent influence of religion, colonization, communal strife and, above all, a deeply ingrained sense of grievance and victimhood.

However, there are changes in the wind that, according to one astute observer, could change the narrative, the frozen paradigm of the divided island. Metin Munir, a native of Cyprus and formerly a prominent columnist with the Turkish daily newspaper Milliyet, has long been sceptical of the real chances of reunification. Now, however, there are changes that might, just might, in time help bring the island together.

“The economic difference between the two sides is diminishing. In addition, Turkey  is bringing water to the island from the mainland and will soon be bringing electricity for much less than it costs to generate it on the island. The rapprochement between Turkey and Israel also has the potential to change the situation. If Israel ships its gas through Turkey via a pipeline there could be a great deal of pressure on Cyprus to do the same for its offshore gas, or at least sell its gas to Israel who in turn would use the pipeline to Turkey. The alternative is to build a very expensive LNG plant on Cyprus. It is difficult to see right now who would spend the $7 - $8 billion for such a plant when a much cheaper pipeline alternative (Turkey is only 40 miles away) is available.

Turkey is so close and so far away

“Nothing is going to happen immediately, but the potential for change is emerging. For one thing there is a lot of sympathy on this side of the island for what the Greeks are going through right now. One major obstacle is what the Greeks perceive as Turkey’s belligerent approach to Cyprus. Turkey has to change its tune, and then we will see what happens.”

He has a point. No one can accuse Turkish foreign policy of being subtle. Why use a scalpel when a sledge hammer will do? There is a certain aggressive, chip-on-the-shoulder attitude in the comments of many Turkish politicians that make it difficult to create a win-win rather than an I-win-you-lose situation. A recent example is Turkey’s heavy-handed threats against the Cypriot development of the offshore natural gas deposits without including the Turkish part of the islands.

To be fair to Turkey, the internal timing for any concessions on Cyprus couldn’t be worse. The Turkish government is already in tense negotiations with the Kurds to end decades of conflict. This is prompting outrage on the part of Turkish nationalists who see any move to accommodate the Kurds as a betrayal of the very concept of a Turkish nation. Any concessions on Cyprus would send this outrage off the charts and stir up the old cries of ‘selling out’ their brothers on the island.

The best chance for a settlement on the island was in 2004 when negotiations under the auspices of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan produced a plan that was overwhelming approved by the Turkish population on Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots, however, already promised a place in the European Union and prompted by the Archbishop of Cyprus who called the plan ‘the work of the devil’, rejected the plan.

Despite this history, calls for a radical re-think are growing. Former Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis recently expressed her support for reconciliation on the island.

“We need a solution in Cyprus. This will also be the answer tocooperating for a solution to the gas exploration,” said Bakoyannis at the 16thEurasian Economic Summit held in Istanbul on Wednesday.

Will these discoveries prompt settlement or strife?

It is too early to tell if the faint signs of reconciliation and common sense will prevail over long-held and possibly no-longer-relevant grievances. But the world, and more particularly Cyprus, has changed dramatically in the last few decades. It may just be time to dust off those under-utilized negotiating skills

Cyprus Badly Misplayed Its Hand

Cyprus has just learned a very old lesson the very hard way – nations don’t have friends, they only have interests. Assuming protection for the last decade from its membership in the European Union, the Euro zone, and close ties to Russian oligarchs Cyprus tried to remake itself as a global financial service center and a significant regional political player. Whatever productive businesses it had were wound down in favor of a service-based economy. Cypriot politicians mistakenly thought their consistent support of Russian stances on issues like Kosovo and Syria would earn them Russian protection when times got hard.  Wrong.

Cyprus just learned a hard lesson

These delusions were brutally punctured when a remorseless European Union led by Germany forced a complete restructuring of the island’s unsustainable banking system in return for helping rescue the country’s battered finances. This restructuring will lead to failed businesses and large losses for many savers, including thousands of Russians who thought Cyprus was a safe place to stash their funds protected by the notoriously incurious Cypriot financial regulators. Essentially, the island’s economy is back to Square One.

Cypriots were ‘shocked, shocked’ that their fellow EU members would do this to them. They were even more shocked when the Russians, demonstrating a bit of real politick, showed they valued their relations with the EU more than their Cypriot ties and refused to help, leaving the island nation well and truly in the lurch.

This plea fell on deaf ears

The Cypriots badly misread their presumed support from the EU. The reality was that many EU countries deeply resented Cypriot membership in the first place and were increasingly annoyed at the lax financial regulation on the island. In 2004 Greece essentially threatened to veto the entire EU expansion project unless Cyprus was included. Greece and Cyprus won the short-term game, but lost longer term support. No one likes being blackmailed. The Germans in particular did not want to accept a country that was divided by the break-away Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the north and the Republic of Cyprus in the south.

The Cypriots did not help their reputation when they overwhelming rejected a plan to unify the island just before they were admitted to the EU. Cyprus further overplayed its hand by consistently blocking any closer relations between the EU, NATO and Turkey. What began as a major victory for Hellenism in 2004 has sadly turned to dust as both Greece and Cyprus, largely through their own doing, are now little more than wards of the humourless northern Europeans.

In a twist that only the gods could arrange, Cyprus’s implosion has coincided with major strides forward by its arch-enemy Turkey. While Cypriots leaders were desperately shuttling between Nicosia, Brussels and Moscow seeking bail out money Turkey not only made a major breakthrough in the peace process with the Kurds but succeeded in amending its torn relations with Israel. At a stroke, the geopolitics of the Middle East changed. Turkey, whose economy is humming along quite nicely, re-established itself as a credible, powerful force in the ever-changing dynamics of the Middle East.

The implications of these developments for Cyprus are mixed at best. Israel now could be much more interested in shipping the gas from its offshore field to Turkey rather than Cyprus. Turkey has long protested that Cyprus should not develop its own gas fields without taking into consideration the Turkish population of the island. Now that Turkey is finally living up to its potential as a regional power more countries and major oil companies could be willing to consider the Turkish position before doing more work on the offshore Cyprus gas fields. Certainly countries like Germany and Russia have many more strategic interests in Turkey than they do in Cyprus. And they most likely would not like to jeopardize those interests for the sake of Cypriot gas.

Cyprus is in a tough neighborhood

There is at least one step Cypriot leaders could take that could restore their credibility and possibly lay the foundation for recovery. They could think the unthinkable and work out a deal to re-unify the island. After nearly 40 years of division following the Turkish military incursion this will by no means be easy. One of the more thankless jobs for any diplomat since 1974 has been to seek peace between the two sides of Cyprus. The best chance came in 2004 when a plan supported by former United Nations General Secretary Kofi Annan was overwhelmingly supported by the Turkish side and just as overwhelmingly rejected by Greek Cypriots after a vigorous ‘No’ campaign led by former president Tassos Papadopoulos.

Such reunification talks would undoubtedly be challenging. Much has changed over the last several years on the island and the two sides no longer have much in common. Cyprus also would be negotiating directly with Ankara rather than with just the Turkish Cypriots. Touchy issues include the presence of the Turkish military that by now has built up a substantial infrastructure on the island, restitution of Greek Cypriot property seized in 1974, the status of the thousands of immigrants from the Turkish mainland that have been settled on the island, and many, many others. But Turkey has reasons of its own for wanting a settlement. Currently it spends about $600 million a year to support the Turkish part of Cyprus, money it can ill afford to spend. It has been unable to get a single country to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and its negotiations with the EU have been hindered by Cyprus for several years. Also, the Turkish military is in a much weaker position than it was in 2004. It is no longer in a position to block a settlement and pretty much does whatever Prime Minister Erdoğan says.

The economic and political benefits of a unified island just might push the parties toward the negotiating table. Now that the former Cypriot economic model is broken beyond repair the political leaders might be willing to re-think the unification issue. This would require leadership and statesmanship that so far have been in short supply. But in this case necessity might just the catalyst for welcome change.

What Is The End Game?

What does Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu want to do with the West Bank that Israel has occupied since 1967? He pays disingenuous lip service to the internationally-approved goal of a Palestinian state. But all his actions on the ground indicate that he has no intention whatsoever of moving ahead with the so-called two-state solution to cure the open sore of Palestinian/Israeli relations.

For those who don’t recall the pre-1967 situation, the west bank and about half of Jerusalem was controlled by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan until the six-day war in June 1967 when Israel wound up occupying the West Bank and all of Jerusalem. The West Bank, with its 2.6 million Palestinian Arabs, remains under firm Israel control. There is a nominal Palestinian Authority government, but it can take few actions without Israeli permission.

The Palestinian Authority cannot even defend its land from the pervasive encroachment by Israeli settlements. There are now more than 300,000 Israeli ‘settlers’ in the West Bank fanatic in their belief that what they call Judea and Samara are an integral part of Israeli heritage. Just read the polemic that Dani Dayan, a leader of the extremist settlement movement wrote in the New York Times last summer. He insists that the settlers are fully justified in pushing the Palestinians into an ever smaller enclave because Israel won the land in battle. He ignores completely the disastrous economic, political and social implications for Israel of such a move.

Sadly, Netanyahu is also a believer in the settlements. With an election due early next year he feels he cannot afford to appear soft on the settlement issue. He justified the latest move to completely encircle Jerusalem with Jewish settlements as a pay-back to the Palestinians for having the nerve to assert themselves in the United Nations. He is also threatening to cut off any financing for the Palestinian Authority.

It is fair to ask at this point just what his ultimate goal for the West Bank really is. The options are not infinite. He either thinks like Dani Dayan and wants the West Bank incorporated into Israel proper or he agrees to the much debated two-state solution. The only other possible alternative is to muddle along constantly creating new facts on the ground with additional settlements until there is nothing left of Palestine as such. The only problem with that are the 2.6 million Arabs currently living in the West Bank. What precisely does he envisage for them? Absorbing them into Greater Israel could, in the not-too-distant future, spell the end of a democratic Jewish state. Together with 1.6 million Arabs already living in Israel the total Arab population of Greater Israel would be 4.2 million – not far behind the 5.9 million Jewish population.

The West Bank

Given the higher birth rate among the West Bank Arabs they could easily outnumber the Jewish population in a few years, especially if you include the Palestinians in Gaza. Will Israel curtail the democratic rights of its non-Jewish citizens? Will it treat them as second-class citizens condemned to live in what amounts to Arab ghettos with limited voice in government? Will the extreme settlers get their wish and have the Arabs expelled from the West Bank? To where, exactly? Given their own horrible experiences of discrimination in Europe before and during the Holocaust one would think the Jewish population of Israel would be particularly sensitive to these issues.

Netanyahu often relies on the old excuse of protecting Israel’s security. This wears thin on a number of points. One, the West Bank Palestinians have not threatened Israel’s existence. Yes, the intifada was a strong protest. But in itself it was no real military challenge to Israel. Two, the West Bank is not Gaza. The relatively mild Palestinian Authority should never be confused with hard-line Hamas that controls Gaza. The quickest way to spread the influence of Hamas into the West Bank is for Israel to continue with its current policies. Three, Israel faces no, repeat, no serious military threat from any of its immediate neighbours. Israel is by far the strongest military presence in the region. It faces the threat of rocket attacks from Hizbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Gaza, but these are no real challenge to the weight of Israel’s military machine.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu

Netanyahu refuses to accept that his reluctance to deal constructively, or even honestly, with the Palestinians is a major roadblock to regional peace. But does he really believe any Arab government can afford to engage closely with Israel while the Palestinian issue festers? He can’t be that tone deaf. The only possible external influence on Netanyahu is the United States. Relations between him and President Obama are frosty at best after his ill-disguised desire to defeat the president in the recent election. President Obama owes Netanyahu no favors, and it would be encouraging to see a timely, sharpish, reminder that a long-overdue equitable solution to the Palestinian issue is in everyone’s interest – even Israel’s.

Time To Recognize New Realities

With much of the world’s attention focused on the expanding war in Syria and increasing tensions with Iran it is easy to ignore the serious potential for major problems in an area largely overlooked for the last 30 years – the Sinai Peninsula. The scene of at least four major conflicts between Israel and Egypt from 1948 to 1973 this 61,000 km2 triangle of desert, jagged mountains, glittering tourist resorts and deep biblical significance has once again become a flash point in a region that does not need any more flash points.

The Sinai Peninsula

In a paper published last month by Chatham House (The Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs) Nicolas Pelham, The Economist’s correspondent in Jerusalem, notes that the Sinai used to serve as a buffer ‘cushioning the geopolitical aspirations of Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinians.’ Now, however, he cautions that that buffer has eroded as new players have asserted themselves in the vacuum created by the collapse of the old Egyptian regime of Hosni Mubarak.

For more than 30 years the Sinai was more or less ruled according to the so-called Camp David Accords signed by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel in September 1978. Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai that it had conquered in 1967, evacuate 4,500 civilians, guarantee freedom of passage between Egypt and Jordan, and return the oil fields in the western Sinai. Egypt agreed to limit its forces in the Sinai, and guarantee freedom of passage for Israeli ships through Suez Canal and the straits of Tiran. The two antagonists opened formal diplomatic relations in 1980.

As Pelham notes, however, “the old accords underpinning regional stability have failed to keep pace with the changing times.” These accords were created when Egyptian and Israeli security forces ruled supreme. Now the emergence of the Hamas government in Gaza, newly assertive indigenous Bedouin tribes, jihadis, and other ‘non-state’ players in the region coupled with the weakened central control of the Egyptian government in Cairo has created a volatile situation filled with conflicting interests just waiting for the right fuse.

These simmering tensions have resulted in repeated attacks on the gas pipeline from Egypt to Jordan and Israel. More serious was the attack in August 2012 on an Egyptian military base in which 16 soldiers were killed. On top of these incidents have been the cross-border raids where militants killed several Israelis. There was also a missile attack on Eilat on the eve of the 2012 Passover holiday. Israel has responded in predictable fashion by moving additional troops into the area and building a high wall along the 240 kilometre border with the Sinai. Tourism in the area was hit by attacks on the Gold Coast of Sharm al-Sheikh. Egypt’s response to the August 2012 attack was to move against the vast tunnel system used to transport goods and weapons into Gaza from Sinai.

The key tourist town of Sharm al-Sheikh

 Local Bedouin tribes in the area have long been frustrated by wide-spread discrimination against them by the Egyptian authorities in everything from employment to land titles. Pelham notes that the rampant development of the ‘Red Sea Riviera’ in the 1990s and 2000s that was protected by a military cordon created a great deal of resentment as local Bedouin were pushed away from the southern coast. Since the fall of Mubarak these tribes have seized the opportunity to create new facts on the ground.

Relations between the Hamas government of Gaza and the Mubarak regime had been marked by mutual suspicion. Egyptian suspicion of Hamas’ anti-regime activities led to frequent closure of the Gaza-Sinai border and arrest of Hamas members accused of helping the militant bombings of the southern Sinai tourist resorts. With the election of the allied Moslem Brotherhood government in Egypt Hamas has attempted to show that it can be a force for regional stability rather than a home for militant Islamist attacks on Egypt as well as Israel. Hamas has pledged not to use Egyptian territory for back-door attacks on Israel and has curtailed the operational freedom it had given to some Islamist groups for actions against Israel.

Part of the elaborate tunnel system between Sinai and Gaza

Many in the United States Congress want to know if the new Egyptian government will continue to honor the Camp David Accords. A much better question is how to bring these accords in line with realities that did not exist in 1978. The time has come for some fresh thinking on how to bring stability to this region before it erupts even more. A good place to start would be Pelham’s suggestions of formally including Hamas in discussions of regional stability, fully integrating the Bedouin into formal structures of Egyptian rule in the Sinai, and formalize the access and trade relations between Gaza, the Sinai and Israel. Bringing these disparate groups inside the tent may be unwieldy and distasteful to many. But maintaining the fiction that they exist only at the margins will only lead to more unrest for all concerned.

Let's Not Rush To War, Again

The New York Times ran a story today highlighting the eerie similarities between the 2003 distortions, hyper-ventilating, and misuse of intelligence data that led to the disastrous Iraq war and what we are experiencing now regarding a possible war with Iran. The major difference now is that the United States now has a president and military establishment that seem far less eager than the Bush administration to rush headlong into another yet Middle Eastern quagmire.

Of course many members of Congress and some of the neo-cons are banging the drums for more resolute action (read military) against the potential Iranian nuclear threat. This being an election year Republicans  love accusing Obama of being weak in the face of the Iranian threat. This plays well to the Republican right wing that actually believes this kind of force makes American ‘look strong’. It would be gratifying if such people recognized that the Iraq war combined with the economic/financial mismanagement leading to the 2008 blow-up did more to create the widely accepted notion that America is on the downhill slope than anything Obama could possibly do, or not do. The fact that the US is using force intelligently for once (Libya, Osama bin Laden, and Anwar al-Awlaki) seems lost on the critics who won’t be happy until the 81^st Airborne Division is descending on Teheran.

Some of the loudest voices for a pre-emptive strike against Iran are coming from Israel where government officials waste no effort to paint the nuclear situation in Iran in the most frightening way possible. Israel has legitimate fears of a nuclear-armed Iran whose leaders make even the North Koreans look reasonable. But is war the only answer, and, more specifically, should the United States be dragged into a war on the basis of Israeli intelligence that might , just might be tailored to frighten an uniformed American public and swing votes to jingoistic Republican presidential candidates trying to demonstrate their ‘toughness’?

The current Israeli government really has two fears: a justified fear of Iran with nuclear weapons and a lesser fear of the re-election of Barrack Obama. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu would love to see a friendly Republican replace a highly critical Obama after the election next fall.  He would love to be rid of Obama with his constant criticism of the West Bank settlements and Netanyahu’s steadfast refusal to enter into serious negotiations with the Palestinians. Republican hopefuls like Newt Gingrich already claim that the Palestinians are an ‘invented´ people. The other GOP candidates have fallen in line with the ‘Obama is timid toward Iran’ theme. Netanyahu’s only problem is that none of the current crop of Republican candidates looks capable at this point of beating Obama. And with a second-term Obama Netanyahu can expect even more criticism and pressure to do a deal with Palestinians.

There are serious doubts that Israel could actually pull off an effective attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities on its own. It’s a long way from Israel to Iran and the Israelis would have to get permission from people like the Jordanians and Iraqis to fly over those countries. Hard to see this happening. Even if they did get this permission, would Israeli planes have enough fuel for the long trip, dodging Iranian air defenses, and time over the target to knock out the facilities? If they could convince the United States to help the problem becomes much easier.

Of course there is another way, but Netanyahu shows no signs of even trying this. Israel could make common cause with a number of Arab countries – Saudi Arabia for a start - that also fear and loath Iran. But no Arab country would dare do this unless and until Israel reaches a reasonable agreement with the Palestinians that leads to a real Palestinian state. Among other things this would mean giving up the idea of Greater Israel incorporating the West Bank and agreeing to halt the settlements. The Israeli government may actually believe that the settlements are not a major issue, but every Palestinian and most of the other Arabs do. It is very difficult seeing how any Arab government would risk its very existence by forming an alliance with Israel until this situation is resolved. Until that time the Arabs will rely on American protection from any Iranian threat.

So far the US administration is keeping its cool. Intelligence analysts tell Congress that Iran has not reached the point of building a bomb. The U.S. Chief of Staff recently told his Israeli counterparts that an attack right now would not be ‘prudent.’

Given the nature of the Iranian government and the near-universal disbelief of its claim to be building plants for nuclear energy and not a bomb it is entirely possible that the situation may deteriorate into armed conflict. But right now we don’t know just how the Iranian regime will react to tougher sanctions. Nor, according to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, has Iran reached the point of no-return on the development of a nuclear weapon. If we do have to fight another war with unknown and potentially widespread, damaging consequences let’s at least be  sure we do so on the basis of real knowledge and commitment to avoid Iraq II.

Good Theatre -- Bad Politics

The move by the Palestinian Authority unilaterally to declare a state is an understandable, theatrical, and ultimately self-defeating gesture. Understandable in the face of the combination of rigid Israeli intransigence and ignorance and cowardice on the part of the American political establishment. The Palestinians have always been good at political agitprop, and have often confused great coups on the global stage with real progress in the daily lives of struggling Palestinian citizens.


The gesture is self-defeating because it will only further alienate the Americans and make the job of potential allies in the United States much harder. The response to this problem may well be a resounding ‘So What? Exactly what have the Americans and Europeans done for us so far?’ True enough in that the Americans have actually come through with very little. Israel, confident in the support of a wilfully ignorant Congress, has safely ignored any American pressure for sincere negotiations with the Palestinians or even slowing down the construction of settlements on Palestinian land. No American administration, especially in an election year, is willing to challenge Congress and the powerful American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) that does so much to misdirect American policy toward this issue. However, by embarrassing the Obama administration and forcing it use its veto in the Security Council to block the statehood claim, the Palestinian leadership has just made it even more difficult to get any, repeat any, support from the United States in the future. This move even could reduce what little funding the Palestinian Authority receives. Who will fund a group that just wants to rub your face in your own weakness?

Embarrassing Relative

But the main conclusion of this train-wreck is to demonstrate just how isolated Israel has become. Israel has so few friends that it will not be difficult for the Palestinian Authority to get the required votes in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Without the American veto the statehood claim would very likely pass the Security Council. How has Israeli gone from being the ‘plucky, valiant little country defending itself against the Arab hordes’ to the embarrassing relative everyone hopes will stay away from Thanksgiving.

Under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu and his combative foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, Israel has lost much of the support it used to enjoy. As Carlo Strenger, a professor at Tel Aviv University, notes in a column in The New York Times, Lieberman runs a small, right-wing hyper-nationalist party that keeps Netanyahu’s fractious coalition in power. His role model is not the liberal democracies of the West that he openly disdains. He looks to the autocrats of China and Russia as his role models. It was Lieberman who helped destroy Israel’s relations with Turkey by preventing Netanyahu from apologizing for the killing of nine Turkish citizens in the now-famous Mavi Marmara incident. Whatever, the rights and wrongs of that incident, a simple apology from Israel could have avoided a breakdown in the important relationship with Turkey.

Israel also lost badly when the autocrats in Egypt and Tunisia fell before the popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. Those autocrats gave only lip service to the Palestinian cause, and Israel was left free to do what it wanted. The people now running Egypt take the Palestinian issue much more seriously. When the prime minister of Turkey visited Egypt he was greeted like a conquering hero because of his uncompromising stand against Israel. Israel seems unaware that the equation in the Middle East has changed dramatically.

Netanyahu is counting on the continued support of a clueless American Congress. But do these congressmen know or even care what kind of Israel they are supporting? Is it the Israeli myth so well propagated by AIPAC or the reality so evident to anyone who cares to look? American supporters of Israel should ask themselves if they really want the intolerant, illiberal, autocratic Israel of people like Avigdor Lieberman. Or do they want a country that honours its liberal traditions, recognizes it is actually part of the Middle East and works to end its isolation by sincerely dealing with its neighbours?

As Strenger notes, Netanyahu also believes that Obama will be defeated in 2012 and that he will have more luck essentially blackmailing a gullible Republican than a much more sceptical Democrat. If his calculations are wrong and Obama does indeed win a second term he could be in for a rough ride. In a second term Obama might actually act on some of the fine words about peace and dignity that he has spoken about.

So yes, the Palestinian claim to statehood will be good theatre but terrible real politik. But the real tragedy is the transformation of Israel into the very caricature of the implacable, intolerant, and aggressive country long feared and despised by its neighbours. One fears that the reaction of the current Israeli government to developments at the UN will be to rely even more on military power in an attempt to contain the Palestinian movement. This will be difficult.

Why Now?

Turkey is learning the first lesson of all aspiring premier league countries – ignore international organizations when you don't like their decisions.

The United States simply ignored the United Nations when it failed to win the UN’s support for invading Iraq in 2004. Germany and France simply ignored the Maastricht Treaty when their budget deficits exceeded the rules of the treaty. And now Turkey is ignoring a United Nations’ report that didn’t agree with Turkey’s claims on the Israeli blockade of Gaza.

The United Nations had a commissioned a report on the incident that occurred in June 2010 when a Turkish ship commissioned by a group that some consider a terrorist organization tried to run the blockade and deliver its cargo directly to Gaza. The Israelis intercepted the ship in international waters, boarded it, and wound up killing nine Turks in the ensuing fight. Turkey protested vigorously while Israel said it had every right to maintain the blockade to stop potential weapons smuggling to Hamas-controlled Gaza.

Turkey reacted to the report with all the self-righteous indignation it could muster. They sounded as if Turkey were the only country with a right to self-interest. The prime minister said the report had no basis and that Turkey would reduce its diplomatic ties with Israel to the bare minimum. Other Turkish ministers huffed and puffed and made thinly veiled warnings about increased Turkish naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Just what this already explosive area needs.

The fact that Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan simply does not like Israel or its equally combative Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is already well known. But why the explosion now? After all, the incident in question happened over a year ago. Why is Turkey all of a sudden making all sorts of veiled threats about events in the Eastern Mediterranean? While the death of nine Turkish citizens is indeed lamentable, it is far less than wholesale slaughter of innocents in neighbouring Syria. Syria gets a slap on the wrist while Israel – and Cyprus – get dark warnings of military intervention.

Oil and Gas

One possible explanation could be Turkey’s annoyance at being left out of the promising oil and gas exploration in the waters between Cyprus, Israel and Lebanon. Cyprus intends to explore the famous Block 12 in its southern territorial waters close to where the Israelis have made a major discovery. Turkey has objected vehemently to the Cypriot exploration. Turkish officials say that internationally-recognized and European Union member Cyprus has no right unilaterally to explore for hydrocarbons in its own territorial waters. According to them this exploration would somehow have negative implications for the isolated, economically struggling self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that occupies about one-third of the island and is recognized only by Turkey.

Try as it might Turkey has been unable to get a single other country to join it in recognizing the Turkish part of Cyprus. This must be frustrating, especially as a group like the Sovereign Military Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta without a square meter of land has diplomatic relations with more than 100 countries.

But beyond the frustration and embarrassment, Turkey is desperate for oil and gas. The country has only negligible hydrocarbon resources and spends upwards of $90 billion/year importing almost every drop of oil and gas its rapidly growing economy needs. It most certainly wants to be included in the promising exploration in the Eastern Med. But this is not going to be easy.

The areas currently being explored are nowhere near Turkish territorial waters, and it is not at all clear what the legal basis would be to object just because the perceived rights of an unrecognized entity like the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would be ignored. This could change if a few other countries would join Turkey in recognizing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, but for the moment this possibility seems remote.

The smoothest option would be for the troubled island to find a way to re-unite and bring the Turkish north into the international and European Union fold. Unfortunately, reunification seems more remote than ever. The Greeks in the south see no point in bringing in the poorer northern part of the island, and Turkey has shred all pretence of an independent northern Cyprus by imposing harsh conditions for any potential reunification - - regardless of what the native Turkish Cypriots might want.

So far the Republic of Cyprus has ignored Turkish objections to the exploration, and supported by the European Union, Russia, the United States as well as several other countries it is unlikely to stop looking for major oil and gas reserves.
Turkey is becoming much more adventuresome in its foreign policy, but will it risk serious confrontation by using military force to intervene in the oil and gas exploration by another sovereign country? Under previous governments I would definitely say no. But Prime Minister Erdoğan is taking the country in a new, assertive and aggressive direction. It remains to be seen just how far he will push Turkish claims in this region.

So Much For 'Zero' Problems

All of a sudden Turkey’s famous ‘Zero Problems’ diplomatic rhetoric has morphed into multiple problems on multiple fronts. In addition to mounting problems with Cyprus, Iraq and Iran Turkey has done something unique in simultaneously achieving hostile relations with both Syria and Israel. This is not easy


Turkey’s hyperactive reaction to the recently released United Nations report on the by-now infamous Mavi Marmara incident of June 2010 in which nine Turkish citizens were killed as they tried to breach the Israeli blockade of Gaza shows Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s unique ability to make justified anger look slightly foolish and ultimately self-defeating. He demanded an apology from Israel, didn’t get one, and used the UN report to escalate the issue

In all their huffing and puffing about the incident the Turkish leaders ignored the fact that the report actually said the blockade was legal and that Israel had every right to defend itself from terrorist arms smuggling. The Turks didn’t want to hear this. What they latched onto was the report’s justified criticism of the clumsy reaction of the Israel forces as they boarded the ship in international waters and killed nine people in the process of taking over the ship.

Erdoğan seized on this part of the report and instantly ordered a down-grade of relations with Israel and stopped all military cooperation. On top of this the Turkish government made heavy-breathing noises about escorting its merchant ships (as if the Mavi Marmara was a normal merchant ship and not deliberately trying to provoke the reaction it got) with its navy. One wonders what the Turkish Navy will do when and if another attempt to break the blockade is made inside Israeli territorial waters. The fact that this heated rhetoric might reduce Turkey’s credibility on the world stage never seems to have occurred to him.

It’s important to remember that this virulent anti-Israel stance is not generated by any Turkish version of Islamic fundamentalism. It is more just Tayyip Erdoğan being Tayyip Erdoğan. He cannot stand dissent in any form, least of all when it comes from someone he detests like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. No one in the Turkish government dares to disagree with Erdogan, and he naively expects the same obedience from leaders of other countries. In Erdoğan’s mind only one country is justified in having national interests, and that’s Turkey.

While all this was going on Turkey announced that it had agreed to install American anti-missile radar. The Islamic press in Turkey is working overtime to convince its gullible readers that this radar is really aimed at Israel, not Iran. Right. It’s doubtful that many Iranians share that particular twist of reality. The Turks were so nervous about installing this radar that they demanded any reference to NATO be removed in the documentation. Do they seriously think this is going to fool the Iranians?

Meanwhile, relations with Syria are not getting any better as the Syrian leader Basher Assad continues to defy Erdoğan’s calls for reform. Not too long ago Turkey held up its relations with Syria as a model of how neighbours should treat each other. Now Turkey is nervously hosting thousands of Syrian dissidents and is even considering joining international sanctions against the Syrian regime.

Then there is the PKK, the violent military wing of the Kurdish movement that continues to attack Turkish soldiers. After several bloody attacks Erdoğan’s patience – never in great supply anyway – ran out and he ordered air strikes against suspected PKK basis in northern Iraq. There is even talk in the hyper-nationalistic Turkish press of sending troops into Iraq to clean out the PKK bases. The fact that all this has been tried before to no avail does not seem to have occurred to anyone. I’m sure the Iraqis would love to see thousands of Turkish troops cross their border.

As if this wasn’t enough another Turkish minister made threatening noises about using the navy to block the attempts of the Republic of Cyprus to search for off-shore gas in its own territorial waters. He didn’t say exactly what international legal principle gives Turkey the right to interfere with exploration in another country’s internationally-recognized territorial waters. It would be interesting to learn just how the Turks would justify such a move that would be loudly condemned by the rest of the world, including Russia and the United States. Turkey could easily brush off criticism from the European Union (Cyprus is a member of the EU), but it might have more trouble with Russia and the US.

And, of course, there is the question of Cyprus itself. The Republic of Cyprus is internationally recognized and a member of the European Union. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognized only by Turkey. Chances of re-unification of the island have never seemed less likely. The Greeks in the south ask themselves what would be gained by taking over the problems of their poorer Turkish neighbours, particularly with the stiff conditions that Erdoğan has demanded. Failing unification, what will Turkey do if, as likely, it fails to get any other country to join it in recognizing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus? Will it formally annex Northern Cyprus, or will the uneasy status quo continue? No easy answers, and bombast doesn’t really solve much in the real world.

So much for ‘Zero Problems.’

'All Change' In the Middle East

The relatively muted response in the Middle East to the death of Osama Bin Laden illustrates clearly just how much conditions in region have changed and how outdated the tactics of terrorism have become. Of course the fanatics will rant and rave at the passing of the poster child of Islamic terrorism. They will swear eternal vengeance on the ‘heretics,’ ‘hypocrites’ and ‘blasphemers’ – especially those in Washington – but the words are beginning to ring hollow.

Make no mistake, the terrorists have had – and may well continue to have - their tactical successes. But they have failed miserably in their larger efforts to drag the world back into their medieval paradise. Methods of prevention and detection of terrorist threats have sharply improved, but more than that, the goal of rolling the clock back several hundred years has far less appeal than the thoroughly modern aspirations like democracy, justice, equal opportunity, or improved living standards.

If the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ has shown anything it is that millions of people across the region are willing to risk a great deal to attain these basic standards that we in the developed world tend to take for granted. The demonstrators in Tahrir Square in Cairo, the fighters in Benghazi, or the brave protestors in Syria are not struggling to impose a medieval religious life style or a new Islamic caliphate. They are trying something new. Rather than simply blame outsiders (Europe, America and Israel) for their problems, the new wave of Arab activism is looking inward and seeking long-overdue changes to the region’s stagnant political and economic structure.

In many ways groups like Al Qaeda and the old Arab regimes played off each other. Al Qaeda and the jihadis would threaten the old regimes who in turn would use this threat as a tool to deflect external calls for change and to extort billions of dollars from the West, all in the name of ‘fighting terrorism’. Now, thanks to the efforts of millions of ordinary, brave people this cynical game is ending. No one knows how these events will play out, but governments already have to begin re-calibrating their relationships with the new, emerging forces in several key Arab countries. What will the attitude of the new players be toward those countries that for too long helped to prop up oppressive regimes throughout the Middle East? Will there be serious calls for real Arab unity – something that has evaded them for centuries? Exactly how will they deal with the staggering social and economic problems that continue to plague the region? Can countries like Syria and Lebanon avoid sinking into the quagmire of sectarian violence?

Perhaps no country has to do more re-calibrating than Israel. Israeli leaders had gotten comfortable with the old regimes. They knew exactly where they stood with Egypt, Jordan, and even Syria. Israel could do pretty much what it wanted with the Palestinians, and none of its neighbours would make more than a pro forma protest. The Egyptians, for example, were perfectly happy for Israel to clamp down hard on Hamas and, in the process, remove a problem for Egypt. Successive Israeli leaders became very adept at playing off the inherent Arab divisions to the seeming benefit of Israel’s own security.

Having built its relationships with the heavy handed Arab regimes, Israel was now faced with the unsettling prospect of dealing with more democratic regimes that reflect the desires and aspirations of ordinary people. The risk for Israel is that the ordinary people in most Arab countries were much less enthusiastic about relations with Israel in general, and much more enthusiastic about the rights of the Palestinians than the old, autocratic regimes ever had been. Egypt, for one, has been quick to re-orient its foreign policy more favourably toward Hamas and even Iran. It has also opened the border with Gaza.

Israel also is now faced with the improbable alliance of the two main Palestinian groups, Fatah and Hamas, that have fought each other viciously over the past few years and have diametrically opposed views toward Israel. Fatah has recognized the reality of Israel and has worked closely with the West to negotiate a two-state solution. While Hamas pledges non-violence it continues to reject recognition of Israel. Fatah leaders also praised the death of Osama Bin Laden, whereas one Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, condemned what he called the ‘assassination and killing of an Arab holy warrior.’ The issue is further complicated because Hamas is recognized as a terrorist group by the United States and many European countries. The agreement was signed this week in Egypt, but it remains to be seen just how long these two opposites can co-exist.

Hamas as well is forced to do a bit of recalibration in Syria where it has long been supported by the Assad regime. It has to decide whether to support the murderous regime or lend its voice to the people protesting. After all their support the Syrian authorities are demanding payback and insist that Hamas speak out forcefully in favour of the regime and against the pro-democracy insurgents. The Hamas leadership disingenuously maintains that the organization is a ‘guest’ in Syria and must remain neutral.

Whatever the final outcome, this agreement between Fatah and Hamas has presented Israel with a brand new situation. Divided Palestinians were much easier to deal with than united Palestinians. Prime Minister Netanyahu reacted in his usual Pavlovian, hard-line fashion and immediately called on Fatah to break the deal. He also moved to block the transfer of $90 million to the Palestinian Authority.

The Israeli foreign ministry, however, favours a more nuanced, cautious approach. In an internal document the foreign ministry says a united Fatah/Hamas unity government would offer Israel a strategic opportunity.

“The Palestinian move is not only a security threat, but also a strategic opportunity to create a genuine change in the Palestinian context. . . Such a change may serve the long-term interests of Israel.” One can only hope that the Israeli political leadership listens to the professionals in the foreign ministry.

We can expect many similar confusing, contradictory statements from governments around the world as leaders struggle to learn just how the ‘Arab Spring’ will evolve into summer and fall.

The Palestine Question Remains Central

A recent essay in The Wall Street Journal would have us believe that the Palestine/Israel conflict has nothing to do with upheavals in the Arab world. Emanuele Ottolenghi takes the classic, if superficial, line that decades of repression and economic stagnation, rather than concern about the fate of the Palestinians, were the sparks for the mass movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Bahrain.


On one level this is true enough. It took more than dismay at the Palestinian quagmire to bring down the Twin Towers and motivate suicide bombers around the world. The internal conditions in most Arab countries were quite sufficient to generate the long smoldering hopelessness, frustration and violent rage that led to the recent mass demonstrations. All it took was the spark of a dramatic action like the self-immolation in Tunisia combined with instantaneous communication to give people the courage to overthrow political leaders that had lined their own pockets at the expense of the welfare of most of the people. In the process these dictators were able to play the Western leaders for fools by holding up the bogeyman of Al Qaeda. “Of course we are repressing our own people. You should thank us instead of sending over these interfering NGOs. If it were not for us Al Qaeda would sweep through the entire region. Oh, and by the way, don’t forget to send the billions of dollars you promised,” ran the line that was accepted by so many gullible governments.

These conditions have been well documented over the years, and people who know the Middle East at all were surprised only by the speed at which the protests spread and the relative ease, except for bizarre mystery world of Libya, with which the ancien regimes crumbled.

But to jump from the reality of this conflict to the conclusion that the Palestinian/Israeli conflict is irrelevant to the current situation defies all logic and common sense. This bit of geo-political acrobatics ignores the serious point that one of the major complaints of the Arab ‘street’ is that the isolated leaders were too close to Israel and didn’t do enough for the Palestinian people. The easy relationship between the Arab security organizations and their Israeli counterpart was justified as a way to keep the lid on the situation and prevent the fundamentalists from taking over.

What really worries the Israelis now is that whoever takes over in Egypt and elsewhere will start paying more real attention to the Palestinian problem. The Israelis and others forgot just how much the Palestinian issue resonates with the masses that were demonstrating in Tahrir Square. Those crowds did not have to be filled with jihadis or Al Qaeda members to be angry at the collusion of the regimes with the Israeli treatment of Palestinians. The new government may not break the treaty with Israel, but we can expect it to be much more vocal and active in support of both Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank.

It is also a reality that whatever their governments may have said, many in the Arab world view their relationships with the West through the prism of the Palestinian problem. I can not think of a single discussion I had over the years with ordinary people from Kuwait to Morocco that didn’t sooner or later come around to Palestine. In the most sumptuous home or humble shop the pained question, however politely framed, was always the same, “Why do you let the Israelis treat the Palestinians so badly?” The vast majority of the people were perfectly willing to grant the reality of Israel, but they could not understand the unbalanced treatment of the Palestinians. It made all the Western talk about democracy and human rights in the region seem merely like a cynical exercise of the age old ‘might makes right’ principle.

Israel now has to recalibrate its relations with the new governments. What’s it going to do? Will it maintain the Netanyahu government line that Israel’s security can only be maintained by more defense spending, tighter restrictions on the Palestinians, and more and more settlements on Palestinian land? Or will it recognize that no Arab government, especially the new ones that want to prove they listen to the people, will be able to give Israel the real security it wants as long as the Palestinian issue remains unresolved?

Ottolenghi maintains that the “…the conventional wisdom that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the mother of all problems in the region has now been exposed as nothing but a myth.” In some ways he is correct. The Palestinian conflict clearly is not the only problem facing the new governments, but, if the new governments want to gain credibility that the former regimes never had, until this burning issue is resolved nothing can really be resolved. For the time being the jihadis and other radical religious elements are very much in the background. One sure way to bring them raging out into the open is to maintain that the Palestinian problem is irrelevant.