A Strong Defence Industry Helps Earn A Place At The Top Table

Donald Trump isn’t the only one taking a victory lap around the Gaza ceasefire and hostage release settlement. Whether that settlement evolves into lasting, so far elusive peace remains to be seen. One can only hope that Trump will retain his interest long enough to give real peace a chance. Turkish president Tayyip Erdoǧan is also basking in the limelight of his country’s emergence, or re-emergence, as a major player in the Middle East. Erdoǧan jumped at the opportunity to include Turkish soldiers in the peace-keeping force in Gaza

 

Key players at the Gaza conference

Ever since the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 and the creation of the Turkish republic the country’s leaders have tried to make the distinction between the modern, dynamic Turkey and the moribund, lethargic Arab countries to the south. Indeed, the antipathy was mutual. The Arabs resented the long years of Ottoman domination while the Turks found it hard to forgive the Arabs for their alleged ‘stab in the back’ when some of them supported the English in World War I. The Egyptians, always sensitive to any hint of renewed Turkish control, often tried to persuade me to move my investment management headquarters from Istanbul to Cairo.

 Now, with the new political, military and economic reality in the region, people seem to be willing to let bygones be bygones. Over the last few decades, the Gulf states have invested billions of dollars into the Turkish economy. And Turkish companies have expanded heavily in Egypt to capitalize on lower wages and easier access to the large African markets. Turkey has played – and will continue to play – a key role in Syria as that country tries to rebuild after the devastation of Assad’s rule. The Arabs also see the powerful Turkish military as something of a counterweight to Israel’s regional military dominance. Sometimes it’s nice to see a large, potential ally with plenty of tanks, drones and fighter planes of its own.

 

The very popular Turkish drone

Turkey’s new-found place among Arab nations was displayed at the recent ‘Gaza peace’ summit in Egypt. When several Arab leaders and Erdoǧan heard that Trump had also invited Israeli prime minister Netanyahu they threatened to pull out of the meeting. According to the not-always-reliable Turkish press, Erdoǧan’s plane was about to land when he ordered it back into a holding pattern until he was assured that Netanyahu was uninvited and remained in Israel.

 Greece is not among those nations welcoming Turkey’s return to regional prominence. Many in Greece still see Turkey as a threat to its interests in the Aegean and Mediterranean – especially a potential threat to some of the islands close to the Turkish coast or to whatever hydrocarbon resources lie deep beneath the seas. Some also feel that the rapid growth of the Turkish defence industry has left Greece with its small defence industry very exposed politically and militarily. The Turks are quite good at playing the realpolitik game of economic and military power, and many in Europe are now calling for Turkey to become a key partner in the emerging European defence architecture. Greek leaders tend to get very nervous when other members of the European Union start aggressively courting Turkey.

 Greek leaders may be exaggerating any potential threat, but their nervous response to Turkey’s growing domestic defence industry raises an interesting point. Why has Greece made no similar effort to develop its own significant defence industry? Turkey has become one of the world leaders in drone technology and manufacturing. Its defence exports are soaring. With all due respect to Turkish drone developers, led by MIT-graduate Selcuk Bayraktar, drones have become almost a commodity.

 Greece has plenty of extremely talented engineers who could help develop a domestic drone industry. What is stopping the government from utilizing this resource? The size of the country is irrelevant. The Czech Republic, roughly the same size as Greece, is a significant exporter of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and other defence items. The Czechs do have the advantage of building on a strong defence tradition. When I visited one Czech arms manufacturer the CEO proudly pointed to a wall displaying all the company’s products. ‘We have been supplying weapons to just about every army in Europe for a very long time,’ he said wryly.

 

A small part of the Czech defence industry

Building a strong domestic defence industry may offend those who thought the need for such an industry was a thing of the past. Alas not, as recent history shows. Furthermore, the sustainable economic benefits of a strong defence industry far surpass whatever the thousands of passengers from massive cruise ships spend on beer, souvlaki and Chinese-made trinkets on the jammed streets of Mykonos and other islands.

 Instead of simply whinging about the growing Turkish defence industry, Greece could start to build a similar industry and reduce its reliance on fickle tourism.

 

Has Turkey's Long-Suffering Opposition Finally Found Its Winner?

 

After the landslide victory of Ekrem Imamoǧlu in Istanbul’s mayoral election and the general resurgence of the long-suffering Republican People’s Party (CHP) throughout the country the question of the hour is what all this means for President Tayyip Erdoǧan and his AKP party. Is the iron grip that Erdoǧan has maintained on the AKP and the country at large for more than 20 years, a grip that was reinforced only 10 months ago in the presidential election, starting to slip?

Huge crowds greeted Imamoglu's victory

While it’s too early to write Erdoǧan’s political obituary, one can draw a few conclusions from Sunday’s elections. The individual candidate is extremely important. When Erdoǧan himself is on the ballot he has almost been assured of victory. He is one of the most effective, charismatic campaigners I have ever seen and has an intuitive sense of what the crowds want. It is a different story when he is merely campaigning for someone else.

Voters didn't want Erdogan's chosen candidate

 Murat Kurum, Erdoǧan’s hand-picked candidate for mayor of Istanbul seems like a nice, decent person. But he couldn’t compete with the flair and almost pop star personality of Imamoǧlu. Erdoǧan campaigned hard for his man and even sent 17 cabinet ministers to help rally the faithful in Istanbul. But it was all to no avail. Voters could tell the difference between the real item and his chosen puppet. When Erdoǧan himself was on the ballot he could make voters temporarily suspend their anger at the ruinous state of the economy and the shoddy construction that led to so many deaths in last year’s earthquake. When Erdoǧan is not on the ballot, voters are less willing to forgive and forget. Although these were local elections they were a sharp reminder to Erdoǧan that people are really struggling and so far he has not provided any solutions.

One also got a glimpse of post-Erdoǧan Turkish politics. With two consecutive victories in the country’s largest and most important city Imamoǧlu has certainly boosted his claim to challenge for the presidency in 2028. Like Erdoǧan, he is an effective and charismatic campaigner and would be a serious candidate. Unlike Erdoǧan he does not enjoy an iron grip on his own party, the CHP. After so many years in the wilderness there are sure to be many in the party who will claim the right to run for president. Imamoǧlu’s task of convincing his fellow party members that he is the strongest candidate will not be easy or straightforward.

Can he ride his landslide in Istanbul to the presidency?

 And what should one expect if CHP actually won the presidency? Perhaps there would be a slight easing of the overtly Islamic trends of Erdoǧan’s government, but I doubt very much there would a return to the very strict secularism of earlier CHP governments. The CHP has also shown no signs of reducing Turkey’s strong nationalistic tendencies. It is, after all, the party that Atatürk founded. People anticipating something like a Scandinavian social democracy will probably be disappointed. There may well be a return to a more parliamentary government in place of Erdoǧan’s dominant role. But it’s also possible that once a person gets his hands on that kind of power, he - or she - would be reluctant to give it up.

The Kurds showed once again that they dominate elections in the southeastern part of the country. The Kurdish party won all those provinces and a couple of others. And the very large block of Kurdish voters in Istanbul clearly helped Imamoǧlu. What will the Kurds demand in return for any future support of a possible CHP government? Tricky question, given the historical animosity between the two groups.

 And what of Erdoǧan himself? How will he react to this defeat? He faces not only the challenge of a revived CHP but a renewed challenge from the resurrection of an openly Islamic party that took key votes away from AKP and won two provinces. The renewed Islamist Welfare Party is a serious challenge to Erdogan. It has a much stronger anti-Israel and anti-semitic stance than Erdogan and took 6% of the votes away from AKP. Will this make Erdoǧan double down on his nationalist and Islamic rhetoric or will be continue the slightly – very slightly -- more moderate path we have seen recently?

What now for Turkey's dominant leader?

 He has said he will not stand for election in 2028. He will be 74 in 2028 and has run the country almost single-handedly for more than 20 years and is beginning to look tired. He controls every decision, big or small, for the entire government. Nothing happens without his signature or approval. Even his opponents concede that few people work harder than he does. That takes a toll after a while, and maybe he means it when he says he won’t run again. But it’s much too early to take bets on that.

 There is already talk of succession, but if he interprets the recent election rout as a sign of what may happen when he leaves, he could decide to stay for another term.  One name frequently mentioned as a possible successor is one of Erdoǧan’s sons-in-law – 44-year-old Selcuk Bayraktar. Educated at the Istanbul Technical University, the University of Pennsylvania and MIT he returned to Turkey to work in the family defence company Baykar where he developed the very successful series of Turkish UAVs, drones. He is the company’s chief technology officer while his older brother Haluk – a graduate of the Middle East Technical University and Columbia – is the CEO. The Wall Street Journal recently had a long feature on Selcuk that mentioned the possibility of a future political role for him.

Will the son-in-law ultimately take over?

 He seems well liked and respected across a wide spectrum of domestic and international opinion but, so far, he has deflected all mention as a possible successor to his father-in-law. He is wise to do so. Turkish politics is a blood sport. Once it becomes apparent that Erdoǧan is serious about leaving, the competing factions within AKP, each with its own powerful baron and prince, could easily pull the party apart. Until now Erdoǧan has been able to control the centrifugal forces within AKP. But if he is out of the picture the very future of AKP is in some question. One of the major challenges any possible successor faces is controlling those forces with their ambitious, hungry personalities.

 Given the critical role of Bayrak in Turkey’s burgeoning defence industry it seems to be a fair question whether the younger Bayraktar really wants or needs to follow his father-in-law. But given Erdoǧan’s legendary powers of persuasion nothing should be ruled out. There will be a great deal of very sharp-elbowed jockeying within both major parties during the next couple of years and only a very brave – or foolish – person would predict an outcome now.

Erdoǧan Proves - Again - That The Medium Really Is The Message

 

    Once again Turkish President Tayyip Erdoǧan has proved the accuracy of Canadian communications theorist Marshall McLuhan’s statement that ‘the medium is the message.’

     In the recent Turkish presidential election, the medium was Erdoǧan himself who succeeded in obscuring the real message that he is the one responsible for driving the country near economic collapse and creating wide social/political divisions. The winning margin was not huge, less than 5%, but demonstrated clearly that his dominating presence on the campaign trail, generous use of economic handouts, and domination of the media made all the difference. He succeeded in identifying himself with just enough of the struggling sectors of society and painting the opposition as gray men in gray suits who want to solve Turkey’s economic problems on the backs of the poor. ‘I’m one of you. My social/cultural values are the same as yours. I’m not some distant westernized elitist who treats you like merely like wooden, unfeeling pieces on a chess board.’

Winner and still champion

    Erdoǧan was clever in acknowledging the economic problems of the average citizen but then strained all credulity by adding he alone could solve them. It’s a bit like an arsonist saying he is the best person to put out a fire. He backed up these statements by supplying things like free natural gas, discounted electricity bills, and increased free internet usage for students. ‘Forget the actual situation. Look at me. I’m helping you. The other bunch just wants to take away everything you enjoy in the name of economic orthodoxy.’ The fact that such steps make a bad situation worse is conveniently ignored.

 The government’s abject failure on the deadly earthquake – from amnesties for substandard construction to slow emergency response – was obscured by promises of rapid re-construction. Whether such rapid re-construction actually happens is another question.

 Will Erdoǧan’s personal popularity withstand a further drop in the economy? There is already speculation that he will try to recall the former deputy prime minister Mehmet Şimșek to help run the economy. Şimșek used to work as a financial analyst in London and at least understands the rudiments of conventional economic management.  For his sake I hope he turns down the offer to return. It would be a no-win situation. If, by some miracle, the economy improves Erdoǧan would take all the credit. If Şimșek is forced to continue Erdoǧan’s unorthodox policies and the economy crashes he would take all the blame and quickly be forced out.

 Much of the western media is moaning about the ‘end of democracy’ in Turkey and the return to dictatorship. It’s not that simple. By most accounts the result of the election really does reflect the will of 52% of the people. We might not like the result, but it does no good to blame the voters or the alleged failure of democracy in Turkey. Erdoǧan may have bent most democratic norms almost out of shape with his patronage and bombast, but the superficial norms of democratic elections were maintained. Rigging the outcome began years before the actual election as the institutions of the state were moulded – legally -- in Erdoǧan’s favor. He recognized that the simple truth that the person who controls the process controls the outcome. The only surprising thing for me is that his victory margin was not larger.

 Therein lies hope for the future. The fact that nearly 48% of the voters saw through Erdoǧan’s charade is encouraging. Tayyip Erdoǧan deserves a victory lap because this victory was his and his alone. The message was nowhere near as popular as the medium. I doubt that anyone else in his party could have pulled this off. Just look at the municipal elections when Erdoǧan was not on the ballot. Almost all his surrogates in major cities lost. Even in this election the opposition won majorities in all the major cities except Bursa.

 It will be interesting to watch the political manoeuvring within the ruling AKP party as well as the opposition coalition. There is already speculation on post-Erdoǧan leadership of the AKP. Will Erdoǧan try to insert one of his sons-on-law or will the very ambitious minister of the interior Suleyman Soylu make a run for the top spot? I doubt very much that any of these replacements can equal the sheer political magnetism of Tayyip Erdoǧan.

Is Ekrem Imamoǧlu a credible challenger?

 What about the opposition? Will the coalition hold together or will the charismatic mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoǧlu, make a run for leadership? He clearly outshone the opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroǧlu during the campaign, but he was a good soldier and worked hard for Kılıçdaroǧlu. Turkish politics is a very rough sport and I hesitate to make any predictions. Nothing creates enemies faster than an early claim to leadership. There is very little that Erdoǧan would not do if he sees Imamoǧlu as a serious threat to his own plans.

 There will be many candidates claiming to be the only ones able to repair Turkey’s economy and torn social fabric. For outsiders it will be fascinating spectator sport. For frustrated, disheartened people inside Turkey it will be far more serious.

Turks Got Their Strong Leader. But Where Will He Lead Them?

    A good friend from Istanbul succinctly summed up his feelings about the recent election results. ‘Welcome to Venezuela without the oil.’

  Turkish President Tayyip Erdoǧan is on track to defeat his opponent Kemal Kılıçdaroǧlu fairly easily in the second round of the Turkish elections If he does indeed win there will be much gnashing of teeth in the large urban areas of Istanbul and in the Western media. How could this happen? How could this nightmare come again and again? There must have been massive fraud.

     Unfortunately, not. He didn’t need to resort to much fraud for several reasons. When you control all the security services, the judiciary and almost all the media you make sure yours is the only narrative that gets heard by people every day and night. The message that all of Turkey’s well-documented problems can be blamed on others, particularly foreigners, is pounded home again and again. Instead of being the problem you become the only solution.

    

What will he do with his latest victory?

        Turks abroad, especially in Germany with its 1.5 million Turkish voters, were fed a daily diet rich in resentment and alienation where many Turkish workers were portrayed as second-class citizens.  The sub-text was simple. Only AKP can restore your sense of pride and welfare in this place where most people regard you merely as something they scrape off their shoes. The reality that the vast majority of Turks and other immigrants in Germany are usually treated well is glossed over.

             Underneath these messages lies another reality. Over the years AKP has built a formidable political organization capable of turning out the vote. AKP apparatchiks are very good at the nuts and bolts of successful politics. Voters can shrug off the deafening rants filled with lies and distortions if the local AKP official can help them slog through the bureaucratic quagmire that plagues everyone’s life. None of this work is glamorous but it is the glue that binds voters to leaders.

While it’s obvious that overall economic conditions have deteriorated, much of the blame has been shifted to vague, impersonal – often described malignant foreign – forces beyond any reasonable person’s control. Abstract issues like independent judiciary and human rights that resonate so loudly in European and American media count for very little against the quality of local services.

Nice guy, but still in second place

             It also helped that Erdoǧan is a much more seasoned, charismatic campaigner than any of his opponents to date. He is very skilful at doling out patronage while blaring a simplistic, distorted message to voters. Essentially, he is telling them that he is their only hope against the forces of atheism, foreign intrigue, pernicious liberal influences and others who would deny Turkey its justified place at the High Table of powerful nations. The reality that his policies have driven the country into bankruptcy is conveniently swept under the rhetorical onslaught of populism and nationalism. The fact that he has turned an old saying, a Turk has no friends but a Turk, into a reality is presented as a matter of pride, a badge of honour. Us vs. Them!! Turkey vs. the World!! Against this tsunami of conspiracy theories, pride, and lavish handouts the country can’t afford it would take someone much more charismatic than the mild-mannered Kemal Kılıçdaroǧlu to survive.

     One knowledgeable friend said the mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoǧlu, would have been a much stronger candidate. But then, she added, ‘Erdoǧan would have cut him off at the knees once he became a real threat.’

             So what happens now? Given the victory of populism and intense nationalism the country will undoubtedly slide further from the West whose liberal ideals are not welcome in Erdoǧan’s Turkey. But it is not clear where it will slide to. The country has no natural allies (Azerbaijan, maybe) and its relationship with Putin’s Russia is purely transactional. The Arabs? How much are they really willing to help Turkey besides buying up valuable assets?  The security services will be strengthened and any sign of dissent will be ruthlessly stamped out. Unfortunates like Selahattin Demirtaş (leader of the Kurdish HDP party)  and Osman Kavala (a philanthropist  thrown in jail on some vague charge related to the Gezi Park protests in 2013) will probably remain behind bars. The country’s economy will continue to sink with yawning budget deficits and a rapidly depreciating currency. The Central Bank is beyond broke. I would not be at all surprised to see some sort of currency controls, however disguised, to slow the depreciation of the Turkish Lira. Such controls will be sold to the people as an act of economic nationalism. ‘Let’s free Turkey from the evils of foreign influence.’  

     Erdoǧan may occasionally sound bellicose on the international front, but in reality there’s not much he can do. Foreign military adventures cost a great deal of money, which he doesn’t have. Media barons will breathe a sigh of relief at their continued financial well-being and continue to fill the airways and papers with pro-Erdoǧan propaganda. Why bother with anything resembling real news when that pays so well?

       I am reminded of what British Prime Minister William Pitt the younger said when he learned of Napoleon’s crushing victory against the Russians and Austrians at Austerlitz in 1805. ‘Roll up that map of Europe. It will not be needed these 10 years.’ The same sense of sadness and weary resignation permeates people who had hoped for a change in Turkey. It will take time, but sooner or later a strong alternative to Erdoǧan will emerge.

 

 

Who Will Be The Lucky (?) Person To Win The Turkish Election?

 

One can get a headache focusing on all the conflicting Turkish election polls. According to various polls President Tayyip Erdoǧan or his main challenger Kemal Kılıçdaroǧlu is a) going to win easily, b) lose in a tight race in the first round, c) win handily in the second round. Take your pick.

 Meanwhile headlines scream about election alliances being formed and broken. Little-known  politicians who will soon sink into their well-deserved obscurity claim their support is crucial for anyone who wants to win. This is their moment in the sun, and they are milking it for all it’s worth. These fringe party candidates can only hope that even though they will be lucky to get 3% of the total votes that will be enough to deny either Erdoǧan or Kılıçdaroǧlu victory in the first round where the winner has to get 50%+1. Then their small votes become extremely valuable and can be sold at a high price in a run-off vote.

 In reality, I doubt anyone has a clue about the outcome. While it’s clear that Erdoǧan is facing severe headwinds – economy, earthquake response, voter fatigue with his bombast, etc. – it is not at all clear that the alliance of six parties backing Kılıçdaroǧlu can generate enough excitement to beat him. There’s no doubt that a large part of the voters would be happy to see the end of Erdoǧan’s 20-year rule that has seen the once-promising economy crumble and concepts like the rule of law casually thrown out the window. But is that enough to get them to vote for Kılıçdaroǧlu? No doubt he is a nice, honourable person. But, sadly, such people have a hard time in the full contact sport of Turkish politics. Can Kurdish voters push him across the finish line? Will the Kurdish support push the nationalists back toward Erdoǧan?

 

Who knows which way their votes will go?

What about fears that Erdoǧan will try to rig the elections if he thinks he is losing? More easily said than done. The usual ‘retail’ method of vote rigging by stuffing the ballot boxes is difficult because of all the observers at each polling place. Also, it’s difficult to stuff enough votes at that level to make much of a difference. If Erdoǧan does anything it will likely be at the ‘wholesale’ level of forming alliances with some very strange partners. He is already doing this with Hezbollah look­-alikes and other stray cats and dogs. He certainly has enough money to buy additional support. There are many, many businesses – mainly construction – who made billions during his reign and are nervous about their future contracts should Erdoǧan lose. They would gladly contribute whatever is required to keep the good times rolling.

One of these two will face severe post-election challenges

 A scenario that is discussed only in hushed, fearful voices is the possibility of staged violence disrupting the elections. While the chances are slim that mobs inspired by whatever candidate appears to be losing could ruin the election some observers think those chances are not zero. It is unfortunately fairly easy to organize a rent-a-mob in Turkey, and some people will be anxiously holding their breath on election day and its immediate aftermath.

 One big problem Erdoǧan faces is the changing nature of the Turkish electorate. He used to rely heavily on votes from rural areas and smaller Anatolian cities to help him overcome the so-called urban elite he claimed was closer to Paris than to the ‘authentic’ Turkish homeland of Anatolia. Now rural Anatolia has largely disappeared after waves of migration to Turkey’s largest urban areas like Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Adana, Mersin, Eskișehir, Bursa, and many others. As we saw in the latest municipal elections most of these huge urban agglomerations are now firmly in the control of Erdoǧan’s main opposition, the Republican People’s Party. Erdoǧan may have retained the loyalty of the first generation of Anatolians who moved to the cities, but their children and grandchildren have become used to big city life and are less impressed by Erdoǧan’s rants and raves than their elders.

 Then there is the question of what Erdoǧan will do if he, by some chance, actually loses. Will he and his desperate supporters go quietly into the night? Will he go Full Donald Trump and say the election was stolen from him? Will the winner -- aware of troubles a resentful, angry Erdoǧan could cause – make some sort of deal with him?

 If Erdoǧan wins the post-election political scenarios are clear. Anyone, within his own party or without, who showed the slightest reluctance to re-elect him will be cast into the political and financial wilderness.

 Less clear is the post-election outlook for the country regardless of who wins. Unfortunately, it will be extremely difficult to restore the economic balances easily. How do you bring interest rates, the currency and inflation to acceptable levels without further disruption? How do you restore issues like the real rule of law, transparency, and, perhaps most important, hope for the thousands of young people who now believe their best opportunities lie outside Turkey. One doesn’t know whether to congratulate the winner or commiserate with the challenges he will face.

 

 

 

Will The Disastrous Turkish Earthquake Also Cause A Political Upheaval?

 

In addition to the thousands of personal tragedies following the recent disastrous earthquake in southeastern Turkey the catastrophe has also stripped away the carefully constructed mirage of competence and progress that President Tayyip Erdoǧan has tried to create. Laid bare in one horrible morning were the consequences of replacing the painstaking, difficult task of building solid economic and social foundations with glittering, weak façades.

Grieving father holds the hand of his deceased daughter

As we discovered in a recent trip to Istanbul, the façade is apparent the minute the plane lands. The airport is huge and filled with modern conveniences, roads leading into the city are wide (and usually jammed with cars), decaying warehouses along the old port have been replaced with super modern shopping areas and hotels with astronomic prices, a modern, clean metro system speeds you around the sprawling city and under the Bosphorus. Alas, the financial foundations of all these developments are as weak as the building foundations in the earthquake zone. Most of these projects were financed with foreign currency loans guaranteed by the Turkish government. With inflation at more than 60% and the currency steadily losing value repayment of these loans is becoming more and more difficult.

A cursory look at the country’s finances reveals a completely misleading picture. Central Bank reserves, for example, have been propped up by short-term borrowings (Swaps). Russia has deposited a large amount of foreign currency – the exact amount is unknown – into Turkish state banks. Russia has also told Turkey it can delay payment for the natural gas received from Russia. Turkey does not recognize EU or US sanctions and happily trades with Russia and Iran. All this helps in the short run. But peel away the gloss and a different picture emerges.

 Even without the horrors of the earthquake the country was in dire financial shape. Without all the short-term financing the Central Bank is left with minus, I repeat, minus $45 Billion. As if this were not bad enough the Central Bank is spending – wasting, really – up to $40 million a month in a fruitless effort to defend the Turkish Lira. The government will do everything it can to keep the Lira from spiralling out of control downward– again – before the presidential elections scheduled for this spring. On top of this already shaky foundation estimates of the economic cost of the earthquake range up to $100 billion. No one is quite sure where this money will come from. Even Erdoǧan’s new best friends in the Gulf might hesitate at giving this much.

 But the real questions – questions that will dominate the political landscape – surround the squalid construction that cost so many lives. As survivors crawled from the rubble, they blamed all the destruction on sub-standard construction. ‘Earthquakes don’t kill people. Badly built buildings do,’ was the constant refrain. Reports quickly emerged of contractors using substandard cement, substandard steel reinforcing rods, and, worst of all, building on or near well known fault lines. This picture was dramatically reinforced with pictures of properly constructed buildings that suffered little or no damage next to others that had completely collapsed.

 People are understandably furious and raising questions Erdoǧan wishes would stay buried in the rubble. He has relied on construction to fuel economic growth during his long stay in control. In return for winning projects contractors supported the ruling party and took over the vast majority of broadcast and print media in Turkey. Turkey has many zoning and construction regulations concerning building in the country’s many and well-known earthquake zones. To say these were ‘overlooked’ is putting it mildly. What is worse, and could come back to haunt Erdoǧan in the election campaign, is that this incestuous relationship with contractors was reinforced in 2018 when the government passed a comprehensive amnesty for these same contractors. (Click on this link to see a video of collapsing buildings. Since this video was taken the death toll has reached almost 45,000.)

 While it is clear that the earthquake and revelations about the government’s lax treatment of building codes will hurt Erdoǧan during the elections no one should assume that the opposition has an easy road to victory. After more than 20 years in power Erdoǧan controls every facet of Turkish government. The judiciary, security services, mass media, education, health, etc. are in his complete control. In the early years of his rule there were many qualified, hard working bureaucrats in key ministries. Over the years they have all been driven out and have been replaced with non-entities whose only qualification is complete loyalty to Erdoǧan. Their personal power might extend to ordering a cup of tea. Beyond that they won’t lift a finger before clearing it with Erdoǧan. Whatever independent thought they may have is wisely left at home.

 Despite this level of control the fact that the opposition has a real chance is a huge credit to the Turkish people and demonstrates vividly the difference between Turkey and other countries in the Middle East. Can you imagine Syria allowing independent legal teams into the earthquake zone looking for evidence of negligent construction? Not too likely. Turkey is extremely fortunate in having a large, well educated, well-travelled middle class that shows every sign of rejecting Erdoǧan’s dogmatic rule. The Turkish economy is open to the rest of the world and many of its companies span the globe. In addition to the angry middle class, many in the lower economic strata are also fed up with high inflation that makes it extremely difficult to make ends meet.

 It is much too early to predict the outcome of the presidential election that will probably take place in May or June. Despite the current anger about the earthquake Erdoǧan holds immense power and can shower favoured segments of the population with money. With votes for Erdoǧan and the opposition fairly close it seems the Kurds will be the kingmakers. The Kurdish population is about 12 – 15 million (out of a total 85 million) and if they vote in a bloc they can tip the outcome in any direction they want. While they have no reason to like Erdoǧan there is no guarantee they will vote for the opposition. There will be a lot of hard bargaining.

 As one young Turkish friend put it, ‘This is the most important election in the history of the Republic.’ I think he is right. But spare some pity for whoever wins. He will face a mammoth reconstruction job that will tax the skill and energy of everyone in Turkey.

Mediterranean Standoff Shows Little Sign Of Resolution

 

So far Greece has played a masterful hand against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean standoff. It has collected an impressive list of allies against Turkish attempts to claim a larger slice of the maritime territory and has used this tension to build up its armed forces.

 

            It has also been extremely fortunate in its opponent. Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan is extremely unpopular outside Turkey and has diplomatically isolated his country. I have found only one country, Azerbaijan, that half-heartedly supports Turkish claims over maritime sovereignty. He has not only alienated most of the European Union members but has also alienated the vast majority of Arab countries who are happy to align themselves with Greece. Erdogan was furious when the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain recognized Israel. But, as usual, he glosses over inconvenient facts. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Israel and still has several daily flights to Tel Aviv. He has always portrayed himself as the leader of the Muslim Middle East but those claims have now drifted into fantasy land.

 

            Even the loudly trumpeted maritime pact with the UN-recognized part of Libya remains stillborn. In order to become effective the pact had to be ratified by parliaments in both countries. The Turkish parliament quickly ratified it but so far the Libyan parliament has rejected it. Therefore that agreement has no legal standing and is just another baseless claim by Erdoğan.

 

            Beyond these various maritime agreements Erdoğan has other problems that limit his options. Turkey is bogged down with military adventures in Syria and Libya with no end in sight. Keeping a large part of its army in Syria and supporting mercenaries in Libya is an expensive exercise – one the country really cannot afford. After years of mismanagement the Turkish economy is in tatters and the currency keeps sinking to one record low after another. Unemployment is rising and inflation is running well above the Central Bank’s benchmark interest rate. Erdoğan has a pathological hatred of interest and rebuffs every attempt by the Central Bank to counter currency weakness by increasing interest rates. According to his logic the currency is not sinking because of his own mismanagement but because of machinations by the so-called interest rate lobby, the Free Masons, George Soros (he of the infamous anti-Turkish Jewish lobby), the Knights Templar and other assorted malign foreign forces.

 

            But beneath the bellicose language Turkey does have a point in all these discussions about maritime boundaries. The sad thing is that if the Turkish position were presented by someone other than Erdoğan people might actually pay attention and try to solve the problem intelligently. But no one is inclined to give the swaggering neighbourhood bully such consideration.

           

            The Greek position may be within the strict letter of the law but often seems unnecessarily provocative. When you look at a map of the Aegean there is a string of islands extending along the Turkish coast from Mytilene in the north all the way down to the tiny (12 square kilometres) island of Kastellorizo in the south. Then, of course, there’s Cyprus off Turkey’s southern coast. But that’s another long, complicated story. These islands enable Greece and Cyprus (at least the internationally-recognized part of the island) to claim sovereignty over a large part of the Aegean and much of the  eastern Mediterranean.

           

            Understandably these claims infuriate Turkey, which has a long coast line of its own stretching from the northern Aegean all the way around to the eastern edge of the Mediterranean, because it feels hemmed in and denied access to potential maritime riches by a chain of relatively small islands. The various laws and treaties governing maritime rights can fill at least one very large bookcase. Suffice it to say that Greece and Turkey have conflicting views on the application of these laws and treaties. Just one example – Greece has signed the United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Seas which states that Greece is entitled to an Exclusive Economic Zone around the islands. Turkey has not signed this convention and says that convention applies only to the countries that signed it.  In fact Turkey does not recognize a legal continental shelf and EEZ around the Greek islands. As far as Turkey is concerned the continental shelf should be measured from mainland Turkey and not the adjacent Greek islands.

 

            Beyond these migraine-inducing legal arguments there is the even more fundamental question about the size of the resources under the sea. While significant gas fields have been discovered in the indisputably Israeli and Egyptian zones there is serious question about resources near Cyprus. Exploration off Cyprus has so far yielded disappointing results. And nothing has yet been found in the Aegean. But let’s say a major field is discovered. What exactly do you do with it? Some people talk grandly about an undersea pipeline extending from the waters off Cyprus to Crete or Rhodes and then somehow to the Greek mainland and onto Italy. Such a pipeline is astronomically expensive and at today’s natural gas prices completely unrealistic. Ah, you say, send it to Cyprus where it will be converted into LNG (liquified natural gas) and sent on its way in ships. Too bad no such LNG facility exists on Cyprus. And it’s doubtful anyone would build one unless a major field is discovered and gas prices increase sharply.

 

            Looking at a map and ignoring politics for a minute the obvious solution is a pipeline through neighbouring Turkey, a country with multiple pipelines and only 40 miles from Cyprus. Logical? Perhaps. But this is the Aegean/Mediterranean region that has a much longer history of conflict than of logic and cooperation. One might hope for a breakthrough but that would require more statesmanship than is visible right now.

           

Time To Call Tayyip Erdoğan's Bluff

With his latest move to change one of Orthodox Christianity’s most powerful symbols from a museum into a mosque Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdoğan is once again demonstrating his complete contempt for international cooperation or opinion. He simply doesn’t care – at all. The only thing important to him is to maintain the unwavering support of his nationalist and fundamentalist Islamic base of support, a base that has shown signs of weakening in recent years.

Haghia Sophia before the Ottoman conquest

            To the world at large Erdoğan is Turkey. That is a serious mistake. His main damage over the years has been to obscure the complex, rich reality of Turkey – a complexity which he loathes. There are literally millions of hard working, well educated people in Turkey who reject his narrow, inward view of the world.  They want to engage with the rest of the world not retreat from it. Indeed in the last round of municipal elections they showed their strength when the opposition won almost all the major cities including Istanbul. These cities and surrounding areas  contain the bulk of Turkey’s population and the vast majority of the country’s economic activity. There are promising signs that the success in local elections could be carried to the national level. This is what Erdoğan really fears and why he has to work hard to maintain is base of support.

            Why is the status of Haghia Sophia so important? Constructed in the 6^th century AD by Byzantine Emperor Justinian it stood for almost 1,000 years as a powerful symbol of Christianity with its soaring dome and glittering mosaics. When the Ottoman Turks conquered Constantinople in 1453 one of their first acts was to convert this symbol into a mosque. It remained a mosque until 1934 when the Turkish republic’s first president Kemal Ataturk – determined to secularize and modernize the country – converted it into a museum. Thus it remained until today. Erdoğan and his fervent followers deeply resent Ataturk’s secularization drive and have tried over the years to weaken his hold on the Turkish public. The conversion of Haghia Sophia back into a mosque is simply their latest, boldest, step in trying to settle decades-old grievances against Ataturk’s legacy and the outside world – especially the perfidious West. It remains to be seen if their Islamic zeal will make them destroy the remnants of the original glorious 6^th century mosaics inside Haghia Sophia. After all, human representation in any artistic form is an anathema for Islamic fundamentalists.

Will these precious mosaics in Haghia Sophia be destroyed?

            Is there anything the rest of the world can do to make Erdoğan reverse this decision? In the short term, not really. Isolated in his bubble and surrounded by sycophants he is impervious to criticism – especially from Europe. This time is slightly different in that Orthodox Russia has also severely criticized the conversion. But the Russian condemnation quickly gets tangled in the delicate and complex web of Russian/Turkish relations and might not have much effect.

            But that doesn’t mean other countries and international organizations are completely impotent in this matter. Erdoğan is a very shrewd, clever villager who has little knowledge of or interest in the rest of the world. But up to now has played his international counterparts like a harp. They can flap their arms in despair at some of Erdoğan’s moves, express all the righteous indignation they want and he just laughs because he knows full well those are empty gestures. They won’t do anything. Turkey may be resource poor but it occupies what has been considered a critical piece of geography, literally spanning East and West. It is a member of NATO and played a key role during the Cold War. However, those ties are fraying and Turkey’s useful role is being questioned more and more. There are also strong elements in Turkey that want to get rid of all Western alliances and focus more on Eurasia – an area they feel is more politically and socially compatible with their 16th century vision for Turkey. Much of Turkey’s economic elite is horrified at such an Iranization of the country, but it’s not clear how much – if any – influence this elite has.

Erdogan in a familiar pose

            Erdoğan loves to stress that Turkey is a sovereign nation and can make its own decisions. True enough. But other nations are also sovereign and are perfectly free to make their own reactions to Erdoğan’s moves. Merely whining does no good at all. He feeds on that. It is time to get serious and call his bluff. He wants to change the status of historic monuments? Fine. But there must be consequences, regardless of any inconvenience. International cultural organizations could make Erdoğan’s Turkey a pariah and withdraw the country’s membership. Yes, there are countless valuable antiquities in Turkey. But if anyone thinks coddling Erdoğan is the way to preserve those he is kidding himself. He has shown an undying love of modern concrete over natural beauty or ancient sites – especially if they are Christian.

            What else could be done? Erdoğan is exposed in Syria. Yes, the Assad regime is an abomination but Orthodox Christians in Syria should be very afraid of the alternative of the fundamental Sunnis, the Al Qaeda offshoots supported by Erdoğan. The West together with Russia could put serious pressure on Assad to do a deal with the Kurds, who hate Erdoğan, and work for a loose federation that keeps Syria together while getting rid of the Turkish occupation of the north-western part of the country.

            Thanks to Erdoğan’s mismanagement the country’s economy has become quite fragile with an over-reliance on imports, dwindling foreign currency reserves, high unemployment and massive foreign currency debt obligations. Officials may be adept at managing these challenges in the short term but longer term the country will pay a high price.

            Ah, but the immigrants you say. Annoy him too much and he can unleash millions of immigrants – most of whom are not Syrian refugees -- into Europe. Yes and no. Several months ago Greece showed what could be done with a little resolve. Close the border. Bulgaria could do the same. Most civilized countries recoil at such measures. But it is up to Europe to set its own immigration terms and not permit Erdoğan to use these unfortunates as pawns to intimidate other countries.

Political Earthquake Rattles Turkish Political Status Quo

The recent crushing defeat of Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan’s chosen candidate for mayor of Istanbul – the country’s largest city and centre of economic activity – demonstrated much more than the skill of a young, dynamic opponent with a clear message. The defeat revealed wide cracks in the dogmatic, resentful, autocratic veneer that Erdoğan had drawn over the country – cracks that will be almost impossible for him to repair.

            Another key message of this election – and why it heralds deep changes in Turkey – is that the slow, sometimes painfully slow, evolution of democracy is much longer lasting than the previous quick fixes of military coups that only made things worse in the long run by papering over rather than solving sharp divisions. Yet another message is that the term ‘Islamic democracy’ is not a complete oxymoron. When given the chance people in countries with an overwhelmingly Moslem population can indeed vote for positive change.

Ekrem Imamoglu and his wife Dilek. The new symbol of Turkey?

            From the time he first became mayor of Istanbul in 1994, then prime minister, then president with unchecked powers Erdoğan has feasted on the ‘we-vs.-them’  theme where the ‘we’ were the struggling masses of Anatolia and the ‘them’ were the so-called ‘White Turks’ of the traditional political, military, and economic elite. The message only got stronger when the bulk of rural Anatolia emigrated into Turkey’s booming cities. Erdoğan’s message of how the social, religious and economic concerns of the masses were ignored by the White Turks resonated loudly. The sad thing is that he was not completely wrong.

            Rainer Hermann, Middle East editor for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, lived for almost 20 years in Turkey and the Gulf and is one of the most astute analysts of the region. He has travelled widely throughout Turkey and spent many days in the burgeoning suburbs of Istanbul observing how they have changed over the last 15 – 20 years. The festering slums have been replaced by apartment blocks, water systems, roads, public transit, and schools. ‘What Erdoğan failed to notice were the social, political and economic changes in the third and fourth generation of Anatolian immigrants into Turkey’s cities. Now almost 80% of the Turkish population now lives in the country’s 30 largest cities. By this time, they are thoroughly urbanized and their expectations are similar to many young people throughout Europe. In short, the ‘we’ he used to rely on has become the ‘them’.’

            With this background it is easier to see how Erdoğan’s proxy candidate in Istanbul,  the old faithful Binali Yildirm, had very little chance against the much younger and energetic Ekrem Imamoğlu who had previously been the mayor of one of the city’s several sub-districts. Yildirm sang the same old song, but this time the chorus was not with him.

            Another very good analyst of Turkish affairs, Kadri Gursel, noted that the Istanbul election amounts to a ‘political earthquake. The June 23 result is nothing less than a tectonic shift in Turkish politics, the impact of which was felt in all of Istanbul’s districts.’ He went on to say that Erdoğan ‘could well lose Turkey down the road because any political change in Istanbul reflects on the whole country sooner or later. A megapolis of 16 million people, Istanbul is a role model emulated by the rest of the country. It is a trendsetter in almost everything, from lifestyles and consumption habits to sports, culture and arts. And any trend that Istanbul does not adopt remains local, failing to spread across the country. This goes for political trends as well. One cannot win over Turkey without winning over Istanbul.’

            This defeat could also have a serious impact on Turkey’s foreign relations. It is one thing to punch above your weight and use the bellicose language of a neighbourhood bully when supported by the full-throated roar of 80 million people. It is quite another to act that way when the economy is in free-fall and that ‘full-throated roar’ has diminished to a whimper. A weakened domestic position will very quickly result in a weakened international position. Very few leaders will be willing to pay attention to or do any favours for someone they may start to see as a lame duck.

            This development couldn’t have come at a worse time for Erdoğan who is facing problems and increased isolation on multiple fronts – Syria, the Kurds, Iraq, the US, the European Union, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, Cyprus, Greece, Russia – just to name a few. Take the Russian S-400 missiles for example. He is damned if he takes them and damned if he doesn’t. The American Congress has threatened serious economic sanctions – such as excluding Turkey from the advanced fighter jet F-35 program – if Turkey carries through with its purchase of the Russian missiles. Erdoğan is desperately lobbying President Trump to overrule the proposed sanctions, but Trump would have a great of difficulty in doing that because the sanctions were approved unanimously in the famously partisan Congress. Turkey has very few friends in Washington these days. If he doesn’t take the Russian missiles who knows how Russian President Putin will react. Not calmly one suspects.

                                                

Which one Mr. President? You can't have both.

                                                                                    

                                       

S-400

            

            

The next step in this rapidly unfolding drama is the much-talked-about creation of a new political party led by former stalwarts of previous AKP governments. Erdoğan could be in a very difficult position if they succeed in forming such a party and peeling away significant numbers of AKP members of parliament. Then he could find himself as isolated domestically as he is on the international front. If that happens his days as an autocratic one-man ruler could be over.