Tuesday, 2 April 2024

Has Turkey's Long-Suffering Opposition Finally Found Its Winner?

 

After the landslide victory of Ekrem Imamoǧlu in Istanbul’s mayoral election and the general resurgence of the long-suffering Republican People’s Party (CHP) throughout the country the question of the hour is what all this means for President Tayyip Erdoǧan and his AKP party. Is the iron grip that Erdoǧan has maintained on the AKP and the country at large for more than 20 years, a grip that was reinforced only 10 months ago in the presidential election, starting to slip?


Huge crowds greeted Imamoglu's victory

While it’s too early to write Erdoǧan’s political obituary, one can draw a few conclusions from Sunday’s elections. The individual candidate is extremely important. When Erdoǧan himself is on the ballot he has almost been assured of victory. He is one of the most effective, charismatic campaigners I have ever seen and has an intuitive sense of what the crowds want. It is a different story when he is merely campaigning for someone else.

Voters didn't want Erdogan's chosen candidate

 Murat Kurum, Erdoǧan’s hand-picked candidate for mayor of Istanbul seems like a nice, decent person. But he couldn’t compete with the flair and almost pop star personality of Imamoǧlu. Erdoǧan campaigned hard for his man and even sent 17 cabinet ministers to help rally the faithful in Istanbul. But it was all to no avail. Voters could tell the difference between the real item and his chosen puppet. When Erdoǧan himself was on the ballot he could make voters temporarily suspend their anger at the ruinous state of the economy and the shoddy construction that led to so many deaths in last year’s earthquake. When Erdoǧan is not on the ballot, voters are less willing to forgive and forget. Although these were local elections they were a sharp reminder to Erdoǧan that people are really struggling and so far he has not provided any solutions.

One also got a glimpse of post-Erdoǧan Turkish politics. With two consecutive victories in the country’s largest and most important city Imamoǧlu has certainly boosted his claim to challenge for the presidency in 2028. Like Erdoǧan, he is an effective and charismatic campaigner and would be a serious candidate. Unlike Erdoǧan he does not enjoy an iron grip on his own party, the CHP. After so many years in the wilderness there are sure to be many in the party who will claim the right to run for president. Imamoǧlu’s task of convincing his fellow party members that he is the strongest candidate will not be easy or straightforward.

Can he ride his landslide in Istanbul to the presidency?

 And what should one expect if CHP actually won the presidency? Perhaps there would be a slight easing of the overtly Islamic trends of Erdoǧan’s government, but I doubt very much there would a return to the very strict secularism of earlier CHP governments. The CHP has also shown no signs of reducing Turkey’s strong nationalistic tendencies. It is, after all, the party that Atatürk founded. People anticipating something like a Scandinavian social democracy will probably be disappointed. There may well be a return to a more parliamentary government in place of Erdoǧan’s dominant role. But it’s also possible that once a person gets his hands on that kind of power, he - or she - would be reluctant to give it up.

The Kurds showed once again that they dominate elections in the southeastern part of the country. The Kurdish party won all those provinces and a couple of others. And the very large block of Kurdish voters in Istanbul clearly helped Imamoǧlu. What will the Kurds demand in return for any future support of a possible CHP government? Tricky question, given the historical animosity between the two groups.

 And what of Erdoǧan himself? How will he react to this defeat? He faces not only the challenge of a revived CHP but a renewed challenge from the resurrection of an openly Islamic party that took key votes away from AKP and won two provinces. The renewed Islamist Welfare Party is a serious challenge to Erdogan. It has a much stronger anti-Israel and anti-semitic stance than Erdogan and took 6% of the votes away from AKP. Will this make Erdoǧan double down on his nationalist and Islamic rhetoric or will be continue the slightly – very slightly -- more moderate path we have seen recently?


What now for Turkey's dominant leader?

 He has said he will not stand for election in 2028. He will be 74 in 2028 and has run the country almost single-handedly for more than 20 years and is beginning to look tired. He controls every decision, big or small, for the entire government. Nothing happens without his signature or approval. Even his opponents concede that few people work harder than he does. That takes a toll after a while, and maybe he means it when he says he won’t run again. But it’s much too early to take bets on that.

 There is already talk of succession, but if he interprets the recent election rout as a sign of what may happen when he leaves, he could decide to stay for another term.  One name frequently mentioned as a possible successor is one of Erdoǧan’s sons-in-law – 44-year-old Selcuk Bayraktar. Educated at the Istanbul Technical University, the University of Pennsylvania and MIT he returned to Turkey to work in the family defence company Baykar where he developed the very successful series of Turkish UAVs, drones. He is the company’s chief technology officer while his older brother Haluk – a graduate of the Middle East Technical University and Columbia – is the CEO. The Wall Street Journal recently had a long feature on Selcuk that mentioned the possibility of a future political role for him.


Will the son-in-law ultimately take over?

 He seems well liked and respected across a wide spectrum of domestic and international opinion but, so far, he has deflected all mention as a possible successor to his father-in-law. He is wise to do so. Turkish politics is a blood sport. Once it becomes apparent that Erdoǧan is serious about leaving, the competing factions within AKP, each with its own powerful baron and prince, could easily pull the party apart. Until now Erdoǧan has been able to control the centrifugal forces within AKP. But if he is out of the picture the very future of AKP is in some question. One of the major challenges any possible successor faces is controlling those forces with their ambitious, hungry personalities.

 Given the critical role of Bayrak in Turkey’s burgeoning defence industry it seems to be a fair question whether the younger Bayraktar really wants or needs to follow his father-in-law. But given Erdoǧan’s legendary powers of persuasion nothing should be ruled out. There will be a great deal of very sharp-elbowed jockeying within both major parties during the next couple of years and only a very brave – or foolish – person would predict an outcome now.


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