Turkey's Struggle To Reach Its Geopolitical Potential

 

I recently attended a briefing in London from a former senior Turkish official during which he, probably unintentionally, highlighted many of the contradictions in modern Turkey. The country is truly the poster child of the ‘on the one hand and on the other hand’ conundrum that drives its friends and enemies to distraction.

 With its location in the middle of some of the world’s most sensitive areas, its military strength, growing defence industry, strong private sector companies and geo-political outreach Turkey should sit at the top table of global/regional powers with a key role to play.

 It is a large country with a population of more than 80 million. It has close ties with the EU, the Balkans, Russia, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, and, increasingly, Africa. Turkey has more diplomatic missions than all countries except the US and China. It can play a critical role in rebuilding Syria and possibly in Gaza. In Africa alone the number of Turkish diplomatic missions has increased from 12 in 2002 to 44 today.

 Turkish Airlines flies to 350 global destinations in 130 countries. Turkish companies have invested billions of dollars in several countries around the world including Egypt, the US, and many EU countries. I wonder how many customers in the UK realize that the popular white-goods company Beko is actually a brand of Arçelik that itself is part of the enormous Koç group of companies. The Turkish army is the second largest in NATO and its defence industry exports are growing rapidly to more than $8 billion this year. Many EU countries as well as the UK want Turkey to be a key component of the emerging European defence architecture.

Europe would love to have this force join its defence

 Despite these impressive figures and brute power, Turkey’s long-term quest to be considered a major international player is bogged down in the domestic quagmire of its own making. Rule of law with a truly independent judiciary, transparency and real democracy remain a mirage in the wasteland of one-man rule, crony-capitalism and widespread corruption. President Tayyip Erdoǧan has been in power for more than 20 years, and, despite articles in his own party’s founding document and the national constitution prohibiting another term, he seeks to circumvent these prohibitions by relying on friendly courts and a compliant parliament to simply change the law.

 The Turkish people understand real democracy very well, and hundreds of thousands of them have protested all over the country against the arbitrary arrest and detention of Erdoǧan’s main political opponent, the popular mayor of Istanbul Ekrem Imamoǧlu, on what appear to be ludicrous charges including corruption and espionage. It’s a miracle that the carefully chosen prosecutors could even mention Imamoǧlu’s alleged corruption without deeply blushing. But the ordinary people face at least two major challenges in their efforts to change Turkey’s domestic situation.

 Erdoǧan is a strong campaigner with almost total control of the media and is a master of cynical political manipulation. Another major obstacle is that in his long time in power he has helped certain favoured business groups amass immense fortunes that could disappear quickly if the opposition were by some miracle to win the presidency. These groups will support Erdoǧan with everything they have because they recognize that without the protection of his charisma and power their economic well-being could shatter.

 The Kurds are another possible, unexpected source of support for Erdoǧan. The much-vaunted peace process with the violent guerrilla group PKK is well underway and there is even talk of releasing the head of the Kurdish political party from his long imprisonment. Erdoǧan could easily condition concessions on Kurdish rights and the release of Selahattin Demirtaș on support from the Kurdish party for his claim to another term as president. Demirtaș has been in prison for eight years and it could be very difficult for him to turn down the offer of release even if it were part of a distasteful deal.

 One issue that could cause serious problems for Erdoǧan is the sorry state of an economy burdened with high inflation and high interest rates. Ordinary people and many companies are suffering as prices continue to rise, and high interest rates make loans – even if you can get them – very expensive for most people. Nominal interest rates are about 40% and many people believe the currency is highly overvalued. In addition to making Turkey a very expensive tourist destination this dangerous combination of high inflation/constantly increasing prices and overvalued currency puts a real squeeze on Turkey’s large export sector.  

The people are angered by increasing food prices

Many people had once hoped that external pressure from the EU would help improve conditions in Turkey as the country struggled to meet the EU entry criteria. But when that application door was slammed shut several years ago Erdoǧan was relieved of any pressure to change his autocratic rule. Now, the radically changed European and Middle Eastern security calculus has eased any external pressure on Turkey’s domestic policies. Many EU members and the UK seem perfectly willing to put up with Turkey’s democratic and judicial shortcomings in the rush to have Turkey join the new defence architecture. And the United States, especially under Trump, has always placed Turkey’s geopolitical role in an unstable region over any concern for the country’s internal affairs.

 The Turkish people, like people in most countries, don’t respond well to pressure from the outside telling them how to behave. Any lasting change in Turkey will have to come from within. And it remains to be seen if the political opposition is clever enough to overcome its internal feuding and mobilize the general popular discontent to overcome Erdoǧan’s built-in advantage of controlling all the levers of power.

Sometimes Reality Really Is Stranger Than Fiction

 

The recent Israeli attacks on Iran and the continuing brutal war against the in Gaza demonstrate that sometimes truth really is stranger than fiction.

 I recently published what the trade calls a ‘thriller’ set in Syria, Israel, Cyprus and Greece. The plot revolves around an attempt by the former Syrian dictator Bashir al-Assad to create a deadly bio-chemical weapon in a massive Crusader fortress. The sub-plot involves shadowy groups within Israel and the United States who want to use this weapon to create a larger regional war. While some of the characters are based on people I have encountered during my years in the region the plot is complete fiction.

 

The book is called Deniable and is available on either the publisher’s website https://troubador.co.uk/bookshop/crime-and-thrillers/deniable or as an ebook or paperback on Amazon:

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Deniable-David-Edgerly/dp/1836283601/ref=sr_1_2?crid=3KBPZ27NGOB78&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.b5vsX61BiHbLYCopPG5x4-u2t9a_Z74nZ9vokNeI3sFEQF0C9hCwN9O94RW2YiP8441wloEdmEp44A0ynzTgGPo8SJnAK-Jp3a4kA8I9IwMFZDWxlQHdlvyDdSKgRDu4lvXrwKdttegCcCp84yDVpaoGzY4ivroQ-Dhin_xmyngUX1VRaGbb2u3ySLsssEQ1gxZQ3q2ZNWR78Glqafqqiid8VVIgHQ4zslY90U8o62Q.OLRHKn1IGu26Mu_cgQqQDE5qaBBbp6HLktidFoioLe4&dib_tag=se&keywords=deniable&qid=1749883399&sprefix=deniable%2Caps%2C166&sr=8-2

 If I had included a hypothetical attack on Iran or ill-disguised efforts to dislodge Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza the editor would most likely have thrown the manuscript right back at me with snarky remarks about pushing fantasy theories.

Leaving aside questions of fantasy or reality these attacks do raise the question of Israel’s endgame. What exactly does it want to accomplish with the Iranian attacks or attempts to expel Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank? Taken at face value – something people with any experience in the Middle East find very hard to do – Israel wanted to destroy Iran’s ability to make nuclear weapons and to decapitate the Revolutionary Guard. Or is the ultimate aim something much more ambitious, hitherto unthinkable, -- regime change in Tehran? Or did Israel merely wish to send a deadly message: ‘We can do this anytime we want. If you continue with the nuclear weapons program or using proxies to attack Israel, we will hit you time and time again until you get the message.’ While the attacks certainly took out the leader of the Revolutionary Guards and did indeed damage Iran’s nuclear facilities it remains to be seen if the damage is permanent or temporary.

 Other militant leaders can be found who might be a bit more careful about their personal security. Early reports indicate that the nuclear facilities were damaged but not destroyed. Most of them are apparently deep underground and it’s not clear how far Iran’s nuclear program was set back. As for regime change – I believe it is much harder than anyone thinks. Iranians may not love the Islamic regime but from what I have experienced they are very proud of Iran’s glorious history and would rather choke on sand before bowing to external pressure – especially from what they consider an upstart like Israel.

 The route that the Israeli jets took to get to Iran provides an interesting commentary on just how far the Middle East has changed in the last two years. The Israelis apparently flew over Syria and northern Iraq to reach Iran – very careful to avoid embarrassing Jordan or Saudi Arabia by using their air space. When Assad was in power and the Russians were firmly entrenched in Syria it would have been unthinkable for Israel to violate Syrian airspace with such impunity. The new regime in Syria is in no position – yet - to threaten Israel, and Russia is a non-factor after beating a hasty retreat from the region. Iraq is, well, Iraq, still beset with sectarian feuds. It cannot challenge Israeli jets momentarily violating its air space in the far north of the country where the central government has limited authority. The Israelis also took care to avoid Turkish air space. The Turks have a serious air force and would have strongly resisted any violation of their air space.

 The Iranian attacks momentarily shifted the attention from Gaza and the West Bank. Here, again, it is fair to ask about Israel’s end game. Israel is now almost impregnable with the strongest military in the region. It really has created the Iron Wall envisaged by one of the state’s early leaders Ze’ev Jabotinsky. No Arab state has the ability or desire to attack Israel. Iran is another matter, but Iran is not Arab and its ability to match action with its bellicose rhetoric currently is limited. Non-state actors like Hamas or Hezbollah – or their followers – will always be a threat. But perhaps the Israeli intelligence services will be better prepared than they were on Oct. 7, 2023.

 What sort of Israel do the religious/nationalist supporters of Prime Minister Netanyahu plan when the shooting is over? They have made no secret of their desire to annex both the West Bank and Gaza. Then what? What happens to the five million Palestinians living in those areas? The far right in Israel would like to encourage or force the Palestinians to leave. The open warfare in Gaza is one such form of ‘encouragement’. The relentless pressure of ever-expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the sporadic violence against Palestinian residents can be seen as another attempt to squeeze the Palestinians out by creating unbearable conditions on the ground.

 There is one major problem with that plan. Where, exactly, will the Palestinians go? Neighbours like Jordan and Egypt have made it clear they will not accept millions of additional Palestinians in their country for fear of creating internal instability. Syria? Lebanon? Sudan? Libya? Not too likely. I wonder if the far right in Israel is aware of the tragic irony with this issue. It was the Nazis in the 1930s who searched hard for someplace to deport the Jews in Germany. Failing in that effort they resorted to extermination.

 Assuming a two-state solution is no longer feasible, annexation of the West Bank and Gaza with most of the resident Palestinians creates a major problem for Israel. The Palestinians and Moslems who are Israeli citizens will then outnumber the Jewish population of Israel. What then? Will Israel become a heavily armed, isolated, apartheid state to protect its identity? Or will some as-yet unknown genius develop a workable, loose system of cantons where Palestinians are guaranteed security and some form of self-government in return for leaving foreign relations and external security to the Israelis? This problem has festered for more than a century as numerous statesmen, countless ‘white papers’, conferences and UN resolutions have failed to find an answer. Is it possible that the current military cataclysm will cause both sides to recognize that continued conflict solves nothing at all and perhaps the time has come for serious negotiation? It is far too early to tell. But one can at least hope.