A Strong Defence Industry Helps Earn A Place At The Top Table

Donald Trump isn’t the only one taking a victory lap around the Gaza ceasefire and hostage release settlement. Whether that settlement evolves into lasting, so far elusive peace remains to be seen. One can only hope that Trump will retain his interest long enough to give real peace a chance. Turkish president Tayyip Erdoǧan is also basking in the limelight of his country’s emergence, or re-emergence, as a major player in the Middle East. Erdoǧan jumped at the opportunity to include Turkish soldiers in the peace-keeping force in Gaza

 

Key players at the Gaza conference

Ever since the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 and the creation of the Turkish republic the country’s leaders have tried to make the distinction between the modern, dynamic Turkey and the moribund, lethargic Arab countries to the south. Indeed, the antipathy was mutual. The Arabs resented the long years of Ottoman domination while the Turks found it hard to forgive the Arabs for their alleged ‘stab in the back’ when some of them supported the English in World War I. The Egyptians, always sensitive to any hint of renewed Turkish control, often tried to persuade me to move my investment management headquarters from Istanbul to Cairo.

 Now, with the new political, military and economic reality in the region, people seem to be willing to let bygones be bygones. Over the last few decades, the Gulf states have invested billions of dollars into the Turkish economy. And Turkish companies have expanded heavily in Egypt to capitalize on lower wages and easier access to the large African markets. Turkey has played – and will continue to play – a key role in Syria as that country tries to rebuild after the devastation of Assad’s rule. The Arabs also see the powerful Turkish military as something of a counterweight to Israel’s regional military dominance. Sometimes it’s nice to see a large, potential ally with plenty of tanks, drones and fighter planes of its own.

 

The very popular Turkish drone

Turkey’s new-found place among Arab nations was displayed at the recent ‘Gaza peace’ summit in Egypt. When several Arab leaders and Erdoǧan heard that Trump had also invited Israeli prime minister Netanyahu they threatened to pull out of the meeting. According to the not-always-reliable Turkish press, Erdoǧan’s plane was about to land when he ordered it back into a holding pattern until he was assured that Netanyahu was uninvited and remained in Israel.

 Greece is not among those nations welcoming Turkey’s return to regional prominence. Many in Greece still see Turkey as a threat to its interests in the Aegean and Mediterranean – especially a potential threat to some of the islands close to the Turkish coast or to whatever hydrocarbon resources lie deep beneath the seas. Some also feel that the rapid growth of the Turkish defence industry has left Greece with its small defence industry very exposed politically and militarily. The Turks are quite good at playing the realpolitik game of economic and military power, and many in Europe are now calling for Turkey to become a key partner in the emerging European defence architecture. Greek leaders tend to get very nervous when other members of the European Union start aggressively courting Turkey.

 Greek leaders may be exaggerating any potential threat, but their nervous response to Turkey’s growing domestic defence industry raises an interesting point. Why has Greece made no similar effort to develop its own significant defence industry? Turkey has become one of the world leaders in drone technology and manufacturing. Its defence exports are soaring. With all due respect to Turkish drone developers, led by MIT-graduate Selcuk Bayraktar, drones have become almost a commodity.

 Greece has plenty of extremely talented engineers who could help develop a domestic drone industry. What is stopping the government from utilizing this resource? The size of the country is irrelevant. The Czech Republic, roughly the same size as Greece, is a significant exporter of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and other defence items. The Czechs do have the advantage of building on a strong defence tradition. When I visited one Czech arms manufacturer the CEO proudly pointed to a wall displaying all the company’s products. ‘We have been supplying weapons to just about every army in Europe for a very long time,’ he said wryly.

 

A small part of the Czech defence industry

Building a strong domestic defence industry may offend those who thought the need for such an industry was a thing of the past. Alas not, as recent history shows. Furthermore, the sustainable economic benefits of a strong defence industry far surpass whatever the thousands of passengers from massive cruise ships spend on beer, souvlaki and Chinese-made trinkets on the jammed streets of Mykonos and other islands.

 Instead of simply whinging about the growing Turkish defence industry, Greece could start to build a similar industry and reduce its reliance on fickle tourism.

 

Is It 'All Change' in the Middle East -- Again?

 

The Middle East has long been the place where well ordered, ‘reasonable’, plans conceived in the comfortable, air-conditioned rooms in Washington, London or other capitals of Europe go to die. Such has been the fate of all plans since the post-World War I divisions, the disastrous British or French mandates, military coups, clumsy attempts at ‘regime change’, recurring Israeli/Palestinian hostilities, western intervention, and on, and on, and on.

  But the situation on the ground has changed with the sudden Iranian weakness, withdrawal of Russia, powerful Israeli aggression and determination to re-shape the region, the near destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the unending plight of Palestinians once again mere pawns in a vicious game they can’t possibly win.

 Now there is a great deal of chatter about possible new outcomes., new shape of the Middle East. Will the Iranian regime change? If so, will that change come internally or be imposed by military might?  Will Iran continue with its nuclear program? Will the nationalist/religious zealots in Israel achieve their goal of ripping all the Palestinians from their now-diminished homeland and expelling them to distant lands? Who will fill the apparent vacuum in Syria? What role, if any, will Trump’s America play in the re-configuration of the region? And what will happen in Israel itself?

Pre-WW I Middle East

 There is nothing new about turmoil in the region, however, something is different this time. Strong regional players like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Turkey seem unwilling to let outside forces determine the shape of the region. According to conversations I have had with people who know the region well there is a new, strong desire and ability to take matters into their own hands. Doubt they could do much worse than the Western economic/political/military interventions for the last 100 years.

Current Middle East 

 Included in these discussions is speculation about whether the hard-line, uncompromising nationalists in Iran could yield to more pragmatic forces – still very nationalistic but willing to make certain difficult compromises to bring Iran in from the cold. Reconstruction of the Iranian economy will require large infusions of cash and talent. In addition to Western companies that may have a role to play, it is also possible that Turkey and the Gulf countries could supply the required talent and money. What price would Iran be willing to pay to achieve this? Iran would probably have to give up its nuclear weapons goal and remove support for forces like Hezbollah and Hamas. Unlikely? Improbable? Perhaps. But at least such possibilities are on the table.

 The same goes for reconstruction of Syria. None of the regional players would like see groups like ISIS fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the Assad regime. And no one wants a repeat of the chaos that followed the downfall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Very difficult to see any serious reconstruction in Syria going forward without a large Turkish presence. One extremely knowledgeable friend said discussions between Turkey and Saudi on the reconstruction of Syria are already underway. Turkey’s involvement in Syria becomes easier now that the Kurdish guerilla group PKK has surrendered its arms and vowed to give up hostilities against Turkey launched from Syria or Iraq.

 What could any rapprochement between the Arab states and Iran mean for Israel, especially an Israel controlled by Netanyahu and his nationalist allies? Such a rapprochement is probably something they would not like to see because it would present a more unified and stronger counterforce than the country has ever faced. It is difficult to see this new configuration in the region willing to have much to do with an Israel that has larger regional aspirations and that has driven millions of Palestinians out of their homeland. The current Israeli policy of making Palestinian life so miserable that they would welcome expulsion to countries like Libya or South Sudan does not help any possible reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbours. In some way, the deportations of immigrants from the United States to South Sudan can be seen as a test run for any later Palestinian ‘relocation.’

Will Israel re-claim the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza?

 There’s not much the Arabs can do to stop such an expulsion – similar to the Nazi effort to find a new homeland – some place like Madagascar - for German Jews before the Holocaust. Arab states are unable and unwilling to intervene militarily. But they can freeze whatever relations they have now, effectively isolate Israel and await developments within Israel. The internal divisions in Israel are deep and who knows how the political struggle will play out. Will Netanyahu stay in power? Will his many opponents compromise with each other create a realistic alternative? There is a great deal of noise inside Israel right now but not much clarity.

 What role, if any, will the United States play? Is it willing to stand aside and let the Arabs and Iranians determine their own fate? Again, very hard to say. The Trump administration’s general ambivalence toward international relations in general and the fear of getting dragged into another no-win Middle Eastern quagmire suggest that Trump would be happy to pass the torch to regional powers. But he is nothing if not mercurial. And only the very foolhardy would attempt to predict anything.

 All one can safely say now is that the situation is more fluid than ever and that the major powers like Russia and United States have reduced influence. It remains to be seen if the local players can indeed shape a new Middle East, one that finally after more than 100 years determines its own course.

Sometimes Reality Really Is Stranger Than Fiction

 

The recent Israeli attacks on Iran and the continuing brutal war against the in Gaza demonstrate that sometimes truth really is stranger than fiction.

 I recently published what the trade calls a ‘thriller’ set in Syria, Israel, Cyprus and Greece. The plot revolves around an attempt by the former Syrian dictator Bashir al-Assad to create a deadly bio-chemical weapon in a massive Crusader fortress. The sub-plot involves shadowy groups within Israel and the United States who want to use this weapon to create a larger regional war. While some of the characters are based on people I have encountered during my years in the region the plot is complete fiction.

 

The book is called Deniable and is available on either the publisher’s website https://troubador.co.uk/bookshop/crime-and-thrillers/deniable or as an ebook or paperback on Amazon:

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Deniable-David-Edgerly/dp/1836283601/ref=sr_1_2?crid=3KBPZ27NGOB78&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.b5vsX61BiHbLYCopPG5x4-u2t9a_Z74nZ9vokNeI3sFEQF0C9hCwN9O94RW2YiP8441wloEdmEp44A0ynzTgGPo8SJnAK-Jp3a4kA8I9IwMFZDWxlQHdlvyDdSKgRDu4lvXrwKdttegCcCp84yDVpaoGzY4ivroQ-Dhin_xmyngUX1VRaGbb2u3ySLsssEQ1gxZQ3q2ZNWR78Glqafqqiid8VVIgHQ4zslY90U8o62Q.OLRHKn1IGu26Mu_cgQqQDE5qaBBbp6HLktidFoioLe4&dib_tag=se&keywords=deniable&qid=1749883399&sprefix=deniable%2Caps%2C166&sr=8-2

 If I had included a hypothetical attack on Iran or ill-disguised efforts to dislodge Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza the editor would most likely have thrown the manuscript right back at me with snarky remarks about pushing fantasy theories.

Leaving aside questions of fantasy or reality these attacks do raise the question of Israel’s endgame. What exactly does it want to accomplish with the Iranian attacks or attempts to expel Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank? Taken at face value – something people with any experience in the Middle East find very hard to do – Israel wanted to destroy Iran’s ability to make nuclear weapons and to decapitate the Revolutionary Guard. Or is the ultimate aim something much more ambitious, hitherto unthinkable, -- regime change in Tehran? Or did Israel merely wish to send a deadly message: ‘We can do this anytime we want. If you continue with the nuclear weapons program or using proxies to attack Israel, we will hit you time and time again until you get the message.’ While the attacks certainly took out the leader of the Revolutionary Guards and did indeed damage Iran’s nuclear facilities it remains to be seen if the damage is permanent or temporary.

 Other militant leaders can be found who might be a bit more careful about their personal security. Early reports indicate that the nuclear facilities were damaged but not destroyed. Most of them are apparently deep underground and it’s not clear how far Iran’s nuclear program was set back. As for regime change – I believe it is much harder than anyone thinks. Iranians may not love the Islamic regime but from what I have experienced they are very proud of Iran’s glorious history and would rather choke on sand before bowing to external pressure – especially from what they consider an upstart like Israel.

 The route that the Israeli jets took to get to Iran provides an interesting commentary on just how far the Middle East has changed in the last two years. The Israelis apparently flew over Syria and northern Iraq to reach Iran – very careful to avoid embarrassing Jordan or Saudi Arabia by using their air space. When Assad was in power and the Russians were firmly entrenched in Syria it would have been unthinkable for Israel to violate Syrian airspace with such impunity. The new regime in Syria is in no position – yet - to threaten Israel, and Russia is a non-factor after beating a hasty retreat from the region. Iraq is, well, Iraq, still beset with sectarian feuds. It cannot challenge Israeli jets momentarily violating its air space in the far north of the country where the central government has limited authority. The Israelis also took care to avoid Turkish air space. The Turks have a serious air force and would have strongly resisted any violation of their air space.

 The Iranian attacks momentarily shifted the attention from Gaza and the West Bank. Here, again, it is fair to ask about Israel’s end game. Israel is now almost impregnable with the strongest military in the region. It really has created the Iron Wall envisaged by one of the state’s early leaders Ze’ev Jabotinsky. No Arab state has the ability or desire to attack Israel. Iran is another matter, but Iran is not Arab and its ability to match action with its bellicose rhetoric currently is limited. Non-state actors like Hamas or Hezbollah – or their followers – will always be a threat. But perhaps the Israeli intelligence services will be better prepared than they were on Oct. 7, 2023.

 What sort of Israel do the religious/nationalist supporters of Prime Minister Netanyahu plan when the shooting is over? They have made no secret of their desire to annex both the West Bank and Gaza. Then what? What happens to the five million Palestinians living in those areas? The far right in Israel would like to encourage or force the Palestinians to leave. The open warfare in Gaza is one such form of ‘encouragement’. The relentless pressure of ever-expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the sporadic violence against Palestinian residents can be seen as another attempt to squeeze the Palestinians out by creating unbearable conditions on the ground.

 There is one major problem with that plan. Where, exactly, will the Palestinians go? Neighbours like Jordan and Egypt have made it clear they will not accept millions of additional Palestinians in their country for fear of creating internal instability. Syria? Lebanon? Sudan? Libya? Not too likely. I wonder if the far right in Israel is aware of the tragic irony with this issue. It was the Nazis in the 1930s who searched hard for someplace to deport the Jews in Germany. Failing in that effort they resorted to extermination.

 Assuming a two-state solution is no longer feasible, annexation of the West Bank and Gaza with most of the resident Palestinians creates a major problem for Israel. The Palestinians and Moslems who are Israeli citizens will then outnumber the Jewish population of Israel. What then? Will Israel become a heavily armed, isolated, apartheid state to protect its identity? Or will some as-yet unknown genius develop a workable, loose system of cantons where Palestinians are guaranteed security and some form of self-government in return for leaving foreign relations and external security to the Israelis? This problem has festered for more than a century as numerous statesmen, countless ‘white papers’, conferences and UN resolutions have failed to find an answer. Is it possible that the current military cataclysm will cause both sides to recognize that continued conflict solves nothing at all and perhaps the time has come for serious negotiation? It is far too early to tell. But one can at least hope.

Thank You Very Much, Mr. Vice President. Now We Know.

 

We should probably be grateful for the recent European visits of Vice President  J.D.Vance and Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth. Probably not grateful in the way they sought, but grateful nonetheless. These visits demonstrated clearly for anyone with eyes and ears the profound, wilful, arrogant ignorance of the Trump administration to anything outside the continental boundaries of the United States.

It’s not just that they know nothing and have absolutely no appreciation of other cultures. They’re very proud of that ignorance – swaggering around like the new sheriff in town demanding that everyone follow ‘my way or the highway.’ I can just hear many former allies saying quietly that they’ll choose the highway, thank you,  as they hit the speed dial button for Chinese President Xi Jinping. They may not really like China, but they appreciate that the Chinese president is much smarter than Trump and plays a long game.

Vice President J.D. Vance lecturing

There is a response I dearly wish some European leader would give Trump and his smug billionaire minions. It goes something like this.

‘I want to thank Vice President Vance for his comments – his lecture about our supposed inadequacies in fostering welfare and democracy in our communities. We are well aware of the dark pages of our history, both on our own continent and in other countries. But, unlike you, we have learned something from those tragedies. We have learned the hard way that national reconciliation and doing our best to provide a decent standard of living, health care, and a retirement free from fear for all our citizens – not just the top 1% -- are worth every financial sacrifice we make. Do we always succeed? Certainly not. There are still too many people that fall through the cracks. Did I mention health care? Of course, the United States has brilliant physicians and hospitals. Pity that so many millions of your citizens have no access to that brilliance. But let’s not be picky. You think we aren’t democratic enough, that we somehow suppress voices and opinions that don’t fit the prevailing narrative. Pity you don’t speak a foreign language. Then you might see for yourself that debate across the political spectrum is alive and well. Furthermore, unlike you, we have bitter experience of what happens when you cosy up to demagogues and hate merchants. Perhaps it’s our diversity you don’t appreciate. We know all too well what happens when the vicious myth of religious, national or ethnic purity drives out all compassion and reason. That didn’t turn out well. Pity you don’t see the parallel when mobs stormed your beautiful capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. So yes, forgive us if we take the bitter lessons of history and limit the spread of that hate before it gets out of control. Again, thank you for your lecture. It was most illuminating. Don’t get me wrong. We love and appreciate America – even if that love and appreciation are unrequited. But, again unlike you, we take a long view. This too shall pass.

Trump has also shown that it is much more dangerous to be a friend of the United States than an enemy. You might have thought Greece was a long-time friend of the United States, military ally in NATO, with close ties to the many thousands of Greek Americans who proudly demonstrate their loyalty to both the United States and the land of their ancestors. You also might have thought this type of relationship would deserve serious, knowledgeable representation on the ambassadorial level. Unfortunately, under Trump you would be wrong. Completely wrong. While Greece’s contentious neighbour across the Aegean, Turkey, gets an ambassador of substance – maybe not a diplomat but at least an accomplished businessman – Greece is stuck with one of Donald Trump Junior’s cast-off girlfriends. OK. Maybe Kimberly Guilfoyle is an embarrassment to still have hovering in the background as Don Jr. declares his new undying love for a Florida society maven. But what a slap in the face for Greece. I mean, why Greece? Surely, making her special envoy to Greenland would have served the same purpose. What a brutal demonstration of just how far down the pecking order a proud nation has slipped. I am only surprised that leading Greek politicians don’t have the courage, the pride to exercise the country’s right to refuse this appointment.

Καλώς ήρθατε στην Ελλάδα κυρία Γκιλφόιλ

Guilfoyle’s nomination hearing should be interesting. In theory, this hearing is a chance for senators to examine a nominee’s qualifications and suitability for the position. After all, the ambassador is the public face of the United States. Occasionally the Senate has rejected a nominee. But given the Senate’s supine behaviour in the recent cabinet hearings I don’t expect much. Other than being a one-time TV ‘personality’ on a right-wing network it’s hard to find anything Guilfoyle did to qualify for this job. Perhaps the rumour that she was runner-up in the world Botox championship counts. But that has not been confirmed. She’s going to have fun with those heels on the Acropolis.

Has Turkey's Long-Suffering Opposition Finally Found Its Winner?

 

After the landslide victory of Ekrem Imamoǧlu in Istanbul’s mayoral election and the general resurgence of the long-suffering Republican People’s Party (CHP) throughout the country the question of the hour is what all this means for President Tayyip Erdoǧan and his AKP party. Is the iron grip that Erdoǧan has maintained on the AKP and the country at large for more than 20 years, a grip that was reinforced only 10 months ago in the presidential election, starting to slip?

Huge crowds greeted Imamoglu's victory

While it’s too early to write Erdoǧan’s political obituary, one can draw a few conclusions from Sunday’s elections. The individual candidate is extremely important. When Erdoǧan himself is on the ballot he has almost been assured of victory. He is one of the most effective, charismatic campaigners I have ever seen and has an intuitive sense of what the crowds want. It is a different story when he is merely campaigning for someone else.

Voters didn't want Erdogan's chosen candidate

 Murat Kurum, Erdoǧan’s hand-picked candidate for mayor of Istanbul seems like a nice, decent person. But he couldn’t compete with the flair and almost pop star personality of Imamoǧlu. Erdoǧan campaigned hard for his man and even sent 17 cabinet ministers to help rally the faithful in Istanbul. But it was all to no avail. Voters could tell the difference between the real item and his chosen puppet. When Erdoǧan himself was on the ballot he could make voters temporarily suspend their anger at the ruinous state of the economy and the shoddy construction that led to so many deaths in last year’s earthquake. When Erdoǧan is not on the ballot, voters are less willing to forgive and forget. Although these were local elections they were a sharp reminder to Erdoǧan that people are really struggling and so far he has not provided any solutions.

One also got a glimpse of post-Erdoǧan Turkish politics. With two consecutive victories in the country’s largest and most important city Imamoǧlu has certainly boosted his claim to challenge for the presidency in 2028. Like Erdoǧan, he is an effective and charismatic campaigner and would be a serious candidate. Unlike Erdoǧan he does not enjoy an iron grip on his own party, the CHP. After so many years in the wilderness there are sure to be many in the party who will claim the right to run for president. Imamoǧlu’s task of convincing his fellow party members that he is the strongest candidate will not be easy or straightforward.

Can he ride his landslide in Istanbul to the presidency?

 And what should one expect if CHP actually won the presidency? Perhaps there would be a slight easing of the overtly Islamic trends of Erdoǧan’s government, but I doubt very much there would a return to the very strict secularism of earlier CHP governments. The CHP has also shown no signs of reducing Turkey’s strong nationalistic tendencies. It is, after all, the party that Atatürk founded. People anticipating something like a Scandinavian social democracy will probably be disappointed. There may well be a return to a more parliamentary government in place of Erdoǧan’s dominant role. But it’s also possible that once a person gets his hands on that kind of power, he - or she - would be reluctant to give it up.

The Kurds showed once again that they dominate elections in the southeastern part of the country. The Kurdish party won all those provinces and a couple of others. And the very large block of Kurdish voters in Istanbul clearly helped Imamoǧlu. What will the Kurds demand in return for any future support of a possible CHP government? Tricky question, given the historical animosity between the two groups.

 And what of Erdoǧan himself? How will he react to this defeat? He faces not only the challenge of a revived CHP but a renewed challenge from the resurrection of an openly Islamic party that took key votes away from AKP and won two provinces. The renewed Islamist Welfare Party is a serious challenge to Erdogan. It has a much stronger anti-Israel and anti-semitic stance than Erdogan and took 6% of the votes away from AKP. Will this make Erdoǧan double down on his nationalist and Islamic rhetoric or will be continue the slightly – very slightly -- more moderate path we have seen recently?

What now for Turkey's dominant leader?

 He has said he will not stand for election in 2028. He will be 74 in 2028 and has run the country almost single-handedly for more than 20 years and is beginning to look tired. He controls every decision, big or small, for the entire government. Nothing happens without his signature or approval. Even his opponents concede that few people work harder than he does. That takes a toll after a while, and maybe he means it when he says he won’t run again. But it’s much too early to take bets on that.

 There is already talk of succession, but if he interprets the recent election rout as a sign of what may happen when he leaves, he could decide to stay for another term.  One name frequently mentioned as a possible successor is one of Erdoǧan’s sons-in-law – 44-year-old Selcuk Bayraktar. Educated at the Istanbul Technical University, the University of Pennsylvania and MIT he returned to Turkey to work in the family defence company Baykar where he developed the very successful series of Turkish UAVs, drones. He is the company’s chief technology officer while his older brother Haluk – a graduate of the Middle East Technical University and Columbia – is the CEO. The Wall Street Journal recently had a long feature on Selcuk that mentioned the possibility of a future political role for him.

Will the son-in-law ultimately take over?

 He seems well liked and respected across a wide spectrum of domestic and international opinion but, so far, he has deflected all mention as a possible successor to his father-in-law. He is wise to do so. Turkish politics is a blood sport. Once it becomes apparent that Erdoǧan is serious about leaving, the competing factions within AKP, each with its own powerful baron and prince, could easily pull the party apart. Until now Erdoǧan has been able to control the centrifugal forces within AKP. But if he is out of the picture the very future of AKP is in some question. One of the major challenges any possible successor faces is controlling those forces with their ambitious, hungry personalities.

 Given the critical role of Bayrak in Turkey’s burgeoning defence industry it seems to be a fair question whether the younger Bayraktar really wants or needs to follow his father-in-law. But given Erdoǧan’s legendary powers of persuasion nothing should be ruled out. There will be a great deal of very sharp-elbowed jockeying within both major parties during the next couple of years and only a very brave – or foolish – person would predict an outcome now.