Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts

Tuesday, 1 March 2011

Turkey's Selective Support of Popular Uprisings

Turkey’s much vaunted rejuvenated role in the Middle East is in danger of unraveling before it gets started as the prime minister cannot make up his mind whether the popular uprisings throughout the region are a good thing or a bad thing. During the demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square Prime Minister Erdogan lost no opportunity to show his support for the demonstrators and to lecture Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak about listening to the people.

It is a pity that the brave demonstrators in Iran and Libya did not receive any such support from the usually outspoken Turkish prime minister. They were left to suffer at the hands of thugs and mercenaries as the Turkish leadership sat silently in the stands watching the blood flow in Teheran and Tripoli. Erdogan even went so far as to denounce the recent unanimous vote by the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on what is left of the Gaddafi regime. Erdogan once again isolated Turkey by completely misreading the facts of the situation and ranting that the sanctions would only hurt the Libyan people. In reality the sanctions amount to an arms embargo and freeze of the Gaddafi family assets – nothing that would hurt the long suffering people of Libya. One wonders how he explains the fact that even Ibrahim Dabbashi, Libya’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, thanked the Security Council for the vote.

This selective support of oppressive Middle Eastern regimes should come as no surprise because last year Turkey, when it was a non-permanent member of the Security Council, voted against Iranian sanctions. The combative Turkish prime minister even finds it difficult to say anything mildly critical of Sudan’s despot Omar al-Bashir, the subject of an international arrest warrant for his genocidal policies in Darfur. One supposes Erdogan could be excused in the case of Libya, however, because just last November he received the highly valued Gaddafi International Prize for Human Rights from the great man himself.

This and the fact that Turkish businessmen, many of whom are strong supporters of Erdogan’s party (AKP), have about $15 billion in contracts in Libyan projects may go a long way to explain Turkish selective concern for human rights. There is some concern that if Gaddafi scuttles away to some welcoming regime like Zimbabwe these contracts will become worthless overnight leaving the 10,000 Turkish workers there unemployed.

As he ventures out on these wild solo foreign policy initiatives there is some suspicion that the Turkish prime minister is bypassing the country’s experienced and professional Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fact that Erdogan, who comes from a gritty Istanbul neighborhood and speaks no foreign language, disdains the cultured and multi-lingual Turkish diplomatic corps is well known. He likes to denigrate them by referring to the diplomats sarcastically as ‘mon chers’, a term he believes labels them as passive and effete whereas he, Erdogan, represents the real Turkey. When he was criticized for his attack on Israeli President Shimon Peres at Davos he angrily retorted, “I come from politics; I don’t know about the ways the mon chers behave. And I don’t want to know.” I wonder if the prime minister realizes just how much he sounds like the 'I Know Nothing And Am Proud Of It' Turkish version of Sarah Palin.

As Damla Aras notes in an article in the Middle East Quarterly, this split culminated in a written statement by 72 retired Turkish ambassadors and consul-generals sharply criticizing the government’s foreign policy and the prime minister’s lack of respect. As one of the retired ambassadors, Faruk Logoglu, points out the characterization of diplomats as a closed, elite caste detached from the rest of Turkish society is ‘neither true nor justified.’ He notes that they come from all levels of Turkish society and are selected on the basis of rigorous examinations. But there is no escaping the fact, as Logoglu continues, that their education, their career and experiences make them different from the average politician. I have often seen Turkish diplomats in various European cities groan quietly but put on a brave face as a plane load of Anatolian politicians would descend on their city with empty suitcases that they spent the next few days filling with goods from designer shops.

Up to now Turkish diplomats have prided themselves on their relative independence from whatever political party was ruling Turkey. They often told me with some exasperation that they were representing the country and not any political party. But this is about to change. Aras notes that a new law passed last summer stipulates that the diplomats will represent not only the Turkish Republic and its president but also the government that happens to be in power at any particular time.

The retired ambassadors are particularly concerned about the current shift in Turkish policy away from the traditional Euro-Atlantic orientation toward new directions, mostly the Moslem world. “Should the current political dynamics and trends persist Turkey will be a very different country in both domestic and external terms . . . Turkey will probably abandon its EU accession drive altogether …Its ties to NATO may come under increasing questioning. In short, Turkey’s place may no longer be in the Euro-Atlantic community, but elsewhere. . . it is certain that Turkey will no longer be the secular democracy it has been since its foundation, a society with a commitment to progressive civilization,” Logoglu added.

It is doubtful that Erdogan will pay any attention to these words. He has grown more confident in his own policies with each election victory and dislikes criticism from any quarter, least of all from people he considers effete snobs. What is clear is that Turkey’s diplomatic corps is going to get a lot of practice putting out fires created as the prime minister forges his own idiosyncratic foreign policy.

Wednesday, 8 September 2010

Turkish Communications Failures

Turkish Communications Failures




It’s tough enough trying to run a foreign policy that sustains a delicate balancing act between your traditional Western alliances and the perceived need to play a larger regional role in the Middle East. It is doubly hard when you repeatedly shoot yourself in both feet with an inadequate, amateur communications policy.

The positions of the Turkish government on key issues like Iran, Sudan, Hamas, and Israel have created understandable concern in Europe and the United States. Is this member of NATO forsaking its traditional Western alliances in favour of radical Islamic movements?

The government’s response was to send a high-level delegation to Washington in an attempt to convince a sceptical Congress and Administration that nothing has changed and that Turkey is still firmly in the Western camp. This short visit was supposed to alleviate all the concerns that had been mounting for months as Turkey continued to act as Iran’s defence attorney, slam Israel repeatedly and loudly, and ignore calls to ostracize Sudan’s leader for the genocide in Darfur.

Whatever the merits or demerits of Turkey’s political positions, the last minute decision to send the delegation demonstrates clearly the country has no idea how to communicate its policies in open, fairly sophisticated, democratic societies. The country spends millions on Washington lobbyists, and yet it still violates just about every communications rule in the book.



1. Don’t Make Friends In The Morning You Need That Afternoon

In other words, effective communications is a long term effort. Responding only at times of crisis is ineffective if no ground work has been laid. Audiences grow tired very quickly of strident sales pitches. Where is the on-going information program and dialogue when there is no particular issue on the table?

2. Get Out In Front

Don’t wait until you get repeatedly slapped in the face before responding. You know what the issues are. Start making your case now. Make your opponents respond; put them on the defensive for once. Don’t let others constantly set the agenda.

3. Leave The Rhetoric Home

Self-righteous rhetoric may play well at party rallies, but it does nothing to convince an educated, sceptical audience. Artful give-and-take plays much, much better.

4. Get Out of Washington

The United States is a big country, and most people have never seen any Turks, let alone an official one. Take your message to the smaller cities and towns. Most schools are cutting programs because of budget problems. Help them out with apolitical information about Turkey and the Near East. Congressmen usually vote the way they think people back home want them to vote. Good relations at the local level could pay off in crucial votes in Washington.

5. Appreciate the Complexity


Successive Turkish governments have failed to appreciate the complexity of setting foreign policy in open democracies. I remember being approached by a Turkish cabinet official asking me if I knew someone in the White House who might help Turkey. He scuttled away when I said I had no contacts at all. He, like so many in the Middle East, still believes that the head of any one country can set any policy he sees fit. They simply do not understand that in mature democracies there are multiple influences on foreign policy: the Administration, Congress, the military, NGOs, think tanks, media, business, and, unfortunately, Diaspora politics of every ethnic group in the country. Each of these groups has to be approached.

6. Use Your Friends

There are many people throughout Europe and the United States that actually like Turkey and would like to help it deliver a coherent, intelligent message. Yet, time and again, these groups are completely ignored. They fall victim to the internal games of senior officials reluctant to use any outside source they do not directly control. The major criterion for accepting any form of help seems to be “Onlar bizden mi?” Are they with us? There is paranoia about using anyone not from the inner circles. Thus, valuable help is turned away, and the amateurs at home continue to determine communications policy.

7. Lighten Up

In an age where international consensus and cooperation is slowly gaining strength the message from Turkey always seems to rely on the same outmoded, defensive, chip-on-the-shoulder virulent nationalism. “We’re Turks. We are always right. Everyone else is wrong and/or anti-Turkish.” I once sat through a diatribe delivered by the Prime Minister to foreign businessmen telling them to convince their governments to support Turkey. The message was simple. “Turkey is correct. Any criticism is unfair or prejudiced.” The reality of the particular issue was less simple, but the Prime Minister did not want to hear any questions or dialogue. He treated the whole evening like a party rally in some small town in the middle of Anatolia. Needless to say the message did not go down well, and there was much laughter later at the bar.

8. Be Credible

Like every country on the earth Turkey has unpleasant issues it must deal with: human rights, the Kurdish policy, the 1915 Armenian deportations, continued aggression against minorities. Most people appreciate that these are complex, fractious issues not given to simple solutions. Simple denial or accusations that all these claims are part of an anti-Turkish are not credible. It is much more credible to admit what can be admitted and move on. Turkey will never get beyond these issues if it continues to cover its ears and pretend none of them happened. Turkey has much to be proud of, and it is a shame to see the government allow these positive developments become overshadowed by issues that it refuses to discuss in a credible fashion.

9. Take Communication Seriously

Don’t put inexperienced party faithful with a marginal grasp of any foreign language on the job. International communications is far more complex than it was 50 years ago. Use talented, experienced people who know how to work the system if you expect decent results.