Is The Erdoǧan Era in Turkey Drawing To A Close? Maybe. Maybe Not.

 

Maybe, just maybe, after more than 20 years in power Tayyip Erdoǧan’s iron grip on the Turkish presidency could be slipping. While the opposition parties may yet find their usual way of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, current signs indicate a major change in Turkey after the presidential and parliamentary election on May 14. The stakes are very high for both sides.

Even if the opposition wins, however, it might discover that the election was the easy part. Then what? Given the enormous domestic and international challenges facing Turkey regardless of who wins the victor will enjoy a very short ‘victory lap’ before dealing with decades of economic, administrative and judicial mismanagement.

         Beset by a weak economy, high inflation, and Central Bank with only enough money for a couple of glasses of tea, Erdoǧan was already facing a restive, angry electorate before his problems were compounded by the disastrous earthquake in southeastern Turkey that claimed about 50,000 lives and destroyed hundreds of buildings. Stories of shoddy, sub-standard construction, amnesties for contractors and abysmal emergency response from the central government have fuelled growing anger and fury among key sections of the population.

     The opposition parties have for once learned something from their multiple defeats over the years. Rather than enter the elections as individual parties – none of which would ever get enough votes to topple Erdoǧan -- they have opted to form a coalition, albeit an awkward one, of six parties and unite behind a single candidate. The candidate they have chosen is long-time head of the CHP – Republican People’s Party – Kemal Kılıçdaroǧlu whose mild appearance and manner belie his surname – Son of Swordsman.

Can Kılıçdaroǧlu pull off the biggest win of his career?

    Some say the 73-year-old Kılıçdaroǧlu lacks the charisma and forceful character that draw many to Erdoǧan. Others opine that many in the country are sick and tired of Erdoǧan’s bombast and hope for quiet competence over aggressive incompetence. Whether that long-desired competence would be forthcoming with new leadership remains to be seen.

     However, and it is a huge ‘however’, one should be very careful about writing Erdoǧan’s political obituary. The political waste land is filled with people who underestimated him. He is a formidable campaigner and his party, AKP, has proven to be a well-oiled election machine. He has an intensely loyal voter base including thousands who are desperate to hang onto the positions and favours they have gained over more than two decades. The vast majority of the media is in Erdoǧan’s control, and they face financial disaster if he loses and their lucrative subsidies disappear. The security services and courts are also firmly in his hands. He will also throw vast amounts of money at key blocks of voters to keep them on his side.

One should never underestimate Erdoǧan's political skills

 In short, he has all the tools to try and bend the results in his direction. This doesn’t necessarily mean simply stuffing ballot boxes. For example, Kılıçdaroǧlu is an Alevi – a distinct type of Islam considered by some orthodox Sunni Moslems to be similar to the despised Shiites. Erdoǧan or his acolytes could fan those differences in an attempt to keep the hard-line Sunnis from voting for Kılıçdaroǧlu. There could also be a manufactured international event to keep the secular nationalists on his side. But with less than two months to go until the election Erdoǧan’s room for maneuver is beginning to shrink.

Kurds, the largest minority group in Turkey with about 15% of the population, make up the absolutely critical block of voters – literally the king makers. If they stay unified – always a question – they have the ability to swing the election to their favoured candidate. Conventional wisdom is that they will support anyone who opposes Erdoǧan and who promises to make their life a little easier. However, the opposition coalition is not united on this issue. For example, one of the coalition parties contains hard-core nationalists who tend to view the Kurds as a threat to the unity of Turkey. You can be sure that Erdoǧan will do everything in his power to fracture the opposition coalition and he is not above using the Kurds to do just that.

Selahattin Demirtaş, imprisoned leader of the Kurdish political party

 Let’s assume for a moment that the opposition wins and Kılıçdaroǧlu becomes president. A first, millions will be thrilled that Erdoǧan is gone. When that wears off things very quickly get interesting and unpredictable. The opposition coalition has promised to change the governing system from a strong president and weak parliament and return to the previous system where parliament was supreme and the president had little power. The ability of the new government to implement major changes will depend on the make-up of the new parliament and which party has the most seats. I anticipate ‘vigorous’ bargaining among the parties and a constant series of changing voting blocks depending on the legislation being considered.

 Spare some pity for the person put in charge of the economy. His in-box will be overflowing. What will he do with interest rates? How will the currency react? How, exactly, will he tame inflation without hitting living standards even more? Where will he get the money for all this economic restructuring? Will he turn to the IMF? And on, and on, and on.

 What about international relations? My guess is that there won’t be much change. Probably a little less confrontational, especially with the West. After all, that’s where most of the economic assistance could come from. But the underlying delicate balancing act with Russia will most likely continue. Who knows what Putin will do if his buddy Erdoǧan loses. He could demand immediate payment for the previously delayed gas payments. Russia is rumoured to have deposited more than $20 billion in Turkish state banks. That could be quickly withdrawn. Sweden would probably, somewhat grudgingly, be allowed to join NATO – especially if the Americans go ahead with upgrades to the F-16 fighter jets. The volume and tone of the exchanges with Greece could change. Turkey would still harbour a grudge about issues involving maritime territorial rights or exploration rights for natural gas, but the temperature of those complaints could be dialled down.

 I have followed Turkish elections for more than 30 years, and this is by far the most interesting, as well as the most important, one. The pieces of the puzzle are constantly moving and only a fool would try to predict the outcome at this point.

Will The Disastrous Turkish Earthquake Also Cause A Political Upheaval?

 

In addition to the thousands of personal tragedies following the recent disastrous earthquake in southeastern Turkey the catastrophe has also stripped away the carefully constructed mirage of competence and progress that President Tayyip Erdoǧan has tried to create. Laid bare in one horrible morning were the consequences of replacing the painstaking, difficult task of building solid economic and social foundations with glittering, weak façades.

Grieving father holds the hand of his deceased daughter

As we discovered in a recent trip to Istanbul, the façade is apparent the minute the plane lands. The airport is huge and filled with modern conveniences, roads leading into the city are wide (and usually jammed with cars), decaying warehouses along the old port have been replaced with super modern shopping areas and hotels with astronomic prices, a modern, clean metro system speeds you around the sprawling city and under the Bosphorus. Alas, the financial foundations of all these developments are as weak as the building foundations in the earthquake zone. Most of these projects were financed with foreign currency loans guaranteed by the Turkish government. With inflation at more than 60% and the currency steadily losing value repayment of these loans is becoming more and more difficult.

A cursory look at the country’s finances reveals a completely misleading picture. Central Bank reserves, for example, have been propped up by short-term borrowings (Swaps). Russia has deposited a large amount of foreign currency – the exact amount is unknown – into Turkish state banks. Russia has also told Turkey it can delay payment for the natural gas received from Russia. Turkey does not recognize EU or US sanctions and happily trades with Russia and Iran. All this helps in the short run. But peel away the gloss and a different picture emerges.

 Even without the horrors of the earthquake the country was in dire financial shape. Without all the short-term financing the Central Bank is left with minus, I repeat, minus $45 Billion. As if this were not bad enough the Central Bank is spending – wasting, really – up to $40 million a month in a fruitless effort to defend the Turkish Lira. The government will do everything it can to keep the Lira from spiralling out of control downward– again – before the presidential elections scheduled for this spring. On top of this already shaky foundation estimates of the economic cost of the earthquake range up to $100 billion. No one is quite sure where this money will come from. Even Erdoǧan’s new best friends in the Gulf might hesitate at giving this much.

 But the real questions – questions that will dominate the political landscape – surround the squalid construction that cost so many lives. As survivors crawled from the rubble, they blamed all the destruction on sub-standard construction. ‘Earthquakes don’t kill people. Badly built buildings do,’ was the constant refrain. Reports quickly emerged of contractors using substandard cement, substandard steel reinforcing rods, and, worst of all, building on or near well known fault lines. This picture was dramatically reinforced with pictures of properly constructed buildings that suffered little or no damage next to others that had completely collapsed.

 People are understandably furious and raising questions Erdoǧan wishes would stay buried in the rubble. He has relied on construction to fuel economic growth during his long stay in control. In return for winning projects contractors supported the ruling party and took over the vast majority of broadcast and print media in Turkey. Turkey has many zoning and construction regulations concerning building in the country’s many and well-known earthquake zones. To say these were ‘overlooked’ is putting it mildly. What is worse, and could come back to haunt Erdoǧan in the election campaign, is that this incestuous relationship with contractors was reinforced in 2018 when the government passed a comprehensive amnesty for these same contractors. (Click on this link to see a video of collapsing buildings. Since this video was taken the death toll has reached almost 45,000.)

 While it is clear that the earthquake and revelations about the government’s lax treatment of building codes will hurt Erdoǧan during the elections no one should assume that the opposition has an easy road to victory. After more than 20 years in power Erdoǧan controls every facet of Turkish government. The judiciary, security services, mass media, education, health, etc. are in his complete control. In the early years of his rule there were many qualified, hard working bureaucrats in key ministries. Over the years they have all been driven out and have been replaced with non-entities whose only qualification is complete loyalty to Erdoǧan. Their personal power might extend to ordering a cup of tea. Beyond that they won’t lift a finger before clearing it with Erdoǧan. Whatever independent thought they may have is wisely left at home.

 Despite this level of control the fact that the opposition has a real chance is a huge credit to the Turkish people and demonstrates vividly the difference between Turkey and other countries in the Middle East. Can you imagine Syria allowing independent legal teams into the earthquake zone looking for evidence of negligent construction? Not too likely. Turkey is extremely fortunate in having a large, well educated, well-travelled middle class that shows every sign of rejecting Erdoǧan’s dogmatic rule. The Turkish economy is open to the rest of the world and many of its companies span the globe. In addition to the angry middle class, many in the lower economic strata are also fed up with high inflation that makes it extremely difficult to make ends meet.

 It is much too early to predict the outcome of the presidential election that will probably take place in May or June. Despite the current anger about the earthquake Erdoǧan holds immense power and can shower favoured segments of the population with money. With votes for Erdoǧan and the opposition fairly close it seems the Kurds will be the kingmakers. The Kurdish population is about 12 – 15 million (out of a total 85 million) and if they vote in a bloc they can tip the outcome in any direction they want. While they have no reason to like Erdoǧan there is no guarantee they will vote for the opposition. There will be a lot of hard bargaining.

 As one young Turkish friend put it, ‘This is the most important election in the history of the Republic.’ I think he is right. But spare some pity for whoever wins. He will face a mammoth reconstruction job that will tax the skill and energy of everyone in Turkey.

How Much Will Erdoğan's Victory Cost The Country?

Turkish voters have just made their country the model for every dictator and the envy of every wanna-be dictator in the world. President Tayyip Erdoğan convinced 52% of the voters to give him unprecedented powers to run the country exactly as he sees fit. Separation of powers? Forget it. Independent journalism? Independent judiciary? Forget it. Parliamentary checks and balances? Forget it.

Erdoğan now has the power to rule by decree, appoint cabinet ministers and senior officials answerable only to him, and appoint senior judges. In short, Erdoğan is free to impose his 19^th century vision on Turkey. I was going to say 16^th century, but there were some very enlightened Ottoman rulers during that period.

With his absolute power where will he take Turkey?

The opposition put up a spirited fight, but in the end they were no match for the sheer organizational skills of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the charismatic power of a ‘strong man’ who said the dictatorial rule was necessary to restore Turkey to its rightful place in the world – wherever that might be. He has the typical autocrat’s disdain for the necessary, messy compromises or checks and balances of real democracy. Why bother with other people’s opinions when your own ideas are so good? Waste of time, really.

One sure thing was Erdoğan’s determination to use every means – fair or foul -- at his disposal to win this election. And after 16 years of near absolute control it is fair to say he has many more weapons at his command than the opposition to control the outcome of an election.

While the physical act of voting may have been more or less free, it would be a serious mistake to call these elections ‘free and democratic’ in the true sense of the phrase. All Erdoğan’s opponents faced severe restrictions on media exposure during the campaign. In addition to the media outlets owned by Erdoğan’s henchmen or by people intimidated by him, even the state TV station found reasons to keep the opponents off the air. The campaign of Meral Akşener, leader of the IYI Party, also faced frequent assaults and attempts by local Erdoğan supporters to prevent her election rallies. Selahattin Demirtaş, leader of the Kurdish-based HDP party, had to run his campaign from the prison where he has been kept for a couple of years on unspecified charges. In these circumstances it’s a minor miracle that the opponents performed as well as they did. A cynic would say it was all part of Erdogan's game plan. Let Ince run relatively free, but inhibit and intimidate the other two so their vote total won't challenge Erdogan. Crude, but effective.

Ince did well, but got no help from the other opposition parties

Other than Erdoğan’s personal victory there were a few interesting election results:

1.     Erdoğan’s main opponent, Muharrem Ince, performed exactly as he predicted, winning just under 31% of the presidential vote. He ran well ahead of his party, the CHP, raising the expectation that he may assume leadership of the party and inject some much-needed vitality. His problem was that Akşener and Demirtaş combined did not get enough votes to help force the presidential election into the second round. But, given the restrictions their campaigns faced, that is no surprise.

2.     HDP, the Kurdish party, secured enough votes (11.7%) to enter parliament with 67 MPs, making them the third largest group. HDP’s vote was undoubtedly helped by voters from other parties who voted tactically just to make sure HDP passed the 10% threshold. 

Selahattin Demirtas: Tough to run a campaign from behind bars

                       

3.     Erdoğan ran way ahead of his AKP that received just over 42% of the vote, down from previous elections. This reconfirms the president’s star power while demonstrating that at least some of the party’s former voters are beginning to lose faith with the party.  AKP now has 293 MPs, below the 300 required to give them total control of parliament. They will have to rely on the 50 MPs from the ultra-nationalist party MHP to exercise what little authority left to the parliament. Look for Turkish policy to become even more anti-Kurdish and bellicose.

4.     The two rival nationalist parties, MHP and the newly-formed, IYI party combined received more than 20% of the vote, far above the usual result for the nationalists. Perhaps the government’s strident anti-Kurdish rhetoric and military incursions into Syria and Iraq inspired this burst of nationalist fervour. Things don't look good for Demirtaş's early release.

Assaults and boycott by most media hurt her campaign

It remains to be seen just what Erdoğan will do with his sharply enhanced powers. One would like to think he might use them to help unite a badly fractured country and society. Nice, but, given past performance, not too likely. He might also move aggressively to counter the country’s mounting economic problems. Unfortunately, he has shown absolutely no sign that he even understands the gravity of the situation, let alone have any idea how to solve the problems.

During the campaign he re-iterated his plan to force the Central Bank to reduce interest rates as the best way to fight the increasing inflation and depreciating currency. This will not have a happy ending.

He also stressed his commitment to huge, budget-busting public works projects that will do little except feed his fervent contractor allies while putting great stress on an already weakened budget. One of his pet projects is the so-called Kanal Istanbul, a canal rivalling the Suez Canal to run from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara bypassing the Bosphorus Straits. It’s not clear where the $20 billion or so funding will come from, but the hapless and overstretched state banks will undoubtedly be called upon to provide the funds.

While he is touting grandiose projects, the real problems of inflation, unemployment, mounting current account deficit, depreciating currency and a tattered education system designed more for quill pens and rote memory than computers are only getting worse. On top of this the once-strong agriculture sector is reeling, forcing Turkey to import more and more basic food products like onions and potatoes.

At some point, these problems will snowball into a real economic and social crisis. But for the moment Erdoğan is free to delude himself that they are all the fault of the usual suspects – ‘foreign interests’ that are afraid of Turkey. This plays well in domestic elections, but doesn’t do much to convince those same ‘foreign interests’ to lend you a hand when you desperately need it.

Is Erdoğan Helping Or Hurting His Party In The Election Re-Run?

Something is missing from the early days of this re-run of the Turkish elections scheduled for Nov. 1. Maybe it’s the extended Islamic holiday, but the election seems somehow anti-climactic. All the polls indicate that, barring some major cataclysm or massive vote fraud, the results will not change very much from the first election in June.

            The ruling Justice and Development Party will once again fail to win enough deputies to form a single party government. The up-and-coming Kurdish-based Peoples’ Democratic Party will once again pass the 10% threshold to enter parliament. And the most likely coalition option remains as it was in June -- between AKP and the Republican People’s Party (CHP).

            So just why are the Turkish people being put through this trial yet again? Why have all key economic, foreign policy, and security issues been allowed to drift in a chaotic and dangerous fashion at a time when real leadership is required?

            Basically it’s because President Tayyip Erdoğan could not accept the fact that his fervent wish for a change of the constitution allowing him to become an all-powerful, unchecked president was simply not going to happen. No coalition government would ever allow that. Erdoğan could not accept this, and he scuttled all efforts to form a coalition in June. Better, he thought, to take his chances with a new election in November when the voters would be given a chance to correct the errors of their ways.

            But something strange is happening on the way to these elections. At one time it was unthinkable, but has Erdoğan’s once iron grip on the Turkish electorate  slipped a bit? Oh yes, he still rants and raves, and his house media still paints him as the modern equivalent of Suleiman the Magnificent. His circle of sycophants still lashes out at all dissenters. The large rent-a-crowds at his election rallies will give a misleading impression of deep support. But his Teflon coating seems to have become chipped. His version of reality was once unchallenged. No longer.

            If he is to have any chance at all he must push the HDP votes below the key 10% threshold. In the June elections the AKP was obliterated in the once-sure regions of the south-east and east as the insurgent HDP swept all the Kurdish votes that used to go to Erdoğan’s party. His tactic so far has been to whip up nationalist suspicion of all things Kurdish. He has tried to blame the HDP for the upsurge in violence that has cost dozens of lives.  According to Erdoğan’s rhetoric the HDP is merely a front for the outlawed PKK.  But according to the polls more people are holding him and the AKP government responsible for the violence. Funerals of slain soldiers and police officers are filled with people blaming the government, not the HDP, for this chaos. In this environment is hard to see AKP getting many of the vital Kurdish votes.

            His claims of a strong economy are also falling on deaf ears. The currency has depreciated almost 31% this year, growth is down, unemployment and inflation are up. Ayşe hanım may not grasp the finer points of macro-economic analysis but she knows very well when the prices of tomatoes and shoes for her kids keep going up. She also gets angry when her husband can’t find a job. Typically Ayşe and her friends take out their frustrations on the government in power.

            Erdoğan’s attacks on the few remaining independent media outlets have picked up steam. Thugs from the AKP attacked the daily Hürriyet building because of its alleged anti-Erdoğan stance. The leader of that mob was later elected to the ruling body of the AKP. Journalists critical of Erdoğan continue to be detained, and the hunt continues for anyone even vaguely associated with Fetullah Gülen, the Islamic scholar who was once close to Erdoğan but is now sharply opposed.

            Again, none of this so far seems to be having the usual impact of increasing AKP votes. Quite the contrary, many polls show declining support for the party. Not only has he lost the Kurdish vote, but an increasing number of anti-Erdoğan Turks are supporting the HDP. These polls may well be unreliable, but the widespread, uncritical popular support Erdoğan used to enjoy seems to be lacking.

            People are now starting to ask what happens after the election. Will there be a coalition? Will Erdoğan allow one this time? And what of the enigmatic figure of former president Abdullah Gül? So far he has disappointed those who had hoped he would take a stronger, more visible stance against Erdoğan and become an alternative leader of the party.  Cynics respond that such hopes are in vain because there is not that much daylight between Gül and Erdoğan, and that he never opposed Erdoğan when he had the chance as president.

Instead of taking an openly critical stance against his former colleague he has remained firmly on the fence by limiting his activities to almost dainty sentiments about how he would have done things differently, how he would have preferred to see more of an effort to bring people together rather than foster divisions. Nice words to be sure. But in the rough, hand-to-hand combat of Turkish politics they don’t count for very much. Will he abandon his Hamlet imitation and get directly involved to reclaim the party that has been taken over by the ‘Erdoğanistas?’

But the key question is how quickly after the election any new Turkish government can turn its attention to the country’s real problems of a declining economy, rapidly unravelling foreign policy, and restoring sustainable internal security.

Erdoğan Doubles Down With Another Electoral Gamble

Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan reminds me of desperate gamblers who have lost their original stake and now are putting everything they have -- the kids' college funds, the rent, family shopping money -- into one more spin of the wheel, one more roll of the dice in hopes of recouping all their losses.

Not satisfied with the results of the June 7 where his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost sole control of government he has spent the intervening two months maneuvering to force another election – an election where voters will be sharply encouraged to correct the errors of their ways.

Half-hearted talks about a coalition government with the main opposition Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) broke down last week, and the only question now is who will run the country until elections in November.

These elections are a huge gamble for Erdoğan, and an even bigger gamble for the country as a whole. But this is a gamble he has to take if he ever wants to realize his dream of a strong, unfettered presidency. The stakes could not be higher. He has already said the he is a de facto strong president and that a new constitution would merely ratify this new reality. Others differ -- strongly. Yes, the AKP may pick up enough additional MPs to form a single party government and reinforce his authoritarian rule. But, just as easily, the plan could back-fire badly and leave the AKP with even fewer MPs. This would create the scenario for another attempt at a coalition government with a partner who would force the president to operate within the tightly limited restrictions of the present constitution.

Not accepting a coalition, he rolls the dice on another election

It is not at all clear just what Erdoğan would do if he fails a second time to get his required majority. It is difficult to see him going quietly into the night. Therefore, he cannot afford to leave the campaign to his handpicked, low key prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu. He will play a dominant role in the campaign, circumventing constitutional restrictions by appearing at ‘opening ceremonies’ from one end of the country to other. This tactic is also a gamble because post-election polls in June showed that his polarizing personality alienated a large number of voters. Furthermore, voters might just hold him responsible for the collapse of coalition talks and dragging the country through more uncertainty.

He is also gambling with critical issues like the economy that will drift aimlessly as the president and the ruling party focus exclusively on the election in a fight for their political lives. The possibility of at least three more months of political instability has already driven the Turkish Lira to record lows against the US dollar. Turks have developed extremely sensitive antennae for political troubles and react at warp speed by buying foreign currency at the first sign of instability. Retailers and other merchants report that business is stagnant at best as people conserve their cash and while waiting for further developments.

For Erdoğan this will be a one-issue campaign – national security. He will never forgive the Kurdish-based People’s Democratic Party (HDP) for winning enough votes to drive the ruling party below the number of MPs required for a single-party government. In the June elections HDP won 13% of the vote and sent 80 members to parliament, 80 members that used routinely to go to AKP. The charismatic leader of the HDP also committed the unforgiveable sin of proclaiming loudly that his party would never make Erdoğan the strong president he so strongly covets.

Can the HDP repeat its June electoral success?

Therefore Erdoğan is doing everything in his power to win additional nationalist votes by attempting to tie HDP to the outlawed Kurdish guerrilla group, the PKK. If he is going to win he must eliminate the HDP members of parliament by driving HDP votes in any new election below the barrier of 10% of total votes cast required for sending MPs to parliament. The other strategy would be to ban the party altogether on the very tenuous grounds of its alleged links to the PKK. Both of these strategies, however, promise to re-kindle tensions that many Turks had hoped were long buried.

It is no coincidence that the level of violence in Turkey has picked up dramatically since the election with almost daily clashes between government security forces and an eclectic group of terrorists. The deadly bombing in the town of Suruç was blamed on the barbarians from ISIS, a bizarre group of anarchists was blamed for the hapless attack with a few shots fired at the fortress-like American consulate in Istanbul, and then the PKK has stepped up its attacks against police and the army. 

The PKK, for its part, is playing right into Erdoğan’s hands with the revival of its militant tactics that caused so much bloodshed over the years. The head of the Kurdish-based political party HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, must be tearing his hair in despair. Just as the Kurds had achieved their long-desired political break through with strong parliamentary representation the guerrilla group threatens to undo all those gains with its renewed violence.

Even with the renewed violence, a number of pieces have to fall into place for Erdoğan’s gamble to pay off.

1.      Closing the HDP  - ironically this has been made more difficult by changes instituted by Erdoğan’s own political party. The closure could happen, but it would be difficult. Would infuriate a significant portion of the Turkish population.

2.      Drive HDP votes below the 10% threshold. Very difficult. Hard to see the Kurds switching their votes back to the AKP. HDP might get less than 13%, but will still pass the 10% threshold.

3.      Attract more nationalist votes to AKP – Possible. Votes lost to the nationalist MHP party could swing back to the AKP.

4.      Reduce the number of non-Kurds voting for the HDP – Very difficult. These voters dislike Erdoğan intensely and will vote for anyone who promises to derail his ambitions.

5.      AKP must remain united behind Erdoğan – This is not a given. There are a significant number of original AKP members unhappy with Erdoğan’s increasingly autocratic tendencies. It’s not at all clear how this faction will vote. Also not clear if former President Abdullah Gül will finally get off the fence and openly declare his opposition to Erdoğan. So far he seems to prefer issuing vague pronouncements while seated firmly on the fence ready to go in any direction.

My prediction is that unless HDP is shut down the election results will not differ very much from June. Even if AKP scrapes in with just enough votes to form a single-party government it will not have enough MPs to change the constitution the way Erdoğan wants. Meanwhile the economy will stutter along and internal security threats will raise their ugly head again. It’s one thing to gamble with one’s own political life. It’s quite another to include the entire country in that throw of the dice.

Maybe This Time The Opposition Has Learned Something

People in Turkey are beginning to think the previously unthinkable. President Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) that have dominated every election since 2002 may actually fall far short of their goals in the national elections scheduled for June. At this early stage it appears very difficult for AKP to get enough deputies to give Erdoğan his long-sought powerful, unchecked presidency. There is even a chance that for the first time in its history AKP will fail to get enough deputies to establish a government by itself. And, perhaps most important, for the first time I can remember  the Kurds seem to hold the trump card for this election.

            AKP, despite its almost total control of the broadcast media, is suddenly on the defensive. Party leaders have to explain away a sharply deteriorating economy. Erdoğan even has to concede the possibility of a coalition by saying such an outcome would be a ‘nightmare, the end of Turkey.’  Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was forced to copy the opposition’s opening to Turkey’s dwindling number of minorities by making sweeping promises to the Roma community. He even went so far as to say that AKP candidates include members (unnamed at this point) of the Alevi community, a branch of Islam considered heretical by the majority Sunni AKP.

            What has changed since the humiliating debacle of the presidential elections last summer when Erdoğan’s opponents couldn’t be bothered to get off their sunbeds in the holiday resorts to vote? Voter participation in that election fell to about 74%, the lowest level in 12 years. The apathy and incompetence of the opposition allowed Erdoğan to win just enough votes on the first ballot to win. What gives Erdoğan’s growing number of opponents the nervous, the very cautious hope that just maybe this time is different?

 

Is his appeal fading fast?

            In addition to the fatigue factor involved in listening to Erdoğan’s inflated bombast for so many years, the economy on which he based much of his political success is sliding rapidly downhill. The Turkish lira has lost almost 16% this year, and now trades close to a record low. GDP growth has stalled, inflation is up, unemployment has climbed to about 11%, and foreign direct investment has slowed down dramatically. Some voters are beginning to make the connection between the AKP’s policies and the economic decline. The AKP swept into power on the back of an economic collapse, and some people are openly repeating an old Turkish saying, ‘They will go as they came.’

            Then there are the political mistakes that the usually sure-footed AKP has made. In hindsight, the first mistake may have been Erdoğan’s decision to run for president. This decision could wind up isolating him in his new, huge presidential palace. The Turkish presidency is largely a ceremonial position with limited political power. The president is supposed to be above partisan politics and refrain from active involvement in government affairs. Erdoğan of course paid no attention to these constitutional constraints, and was deeply involved in all facets of party and government work. In order to justify these constitutionally questionable activities he was counting on the AKP winning enough deputies to change the constitution and implement a system with a politically powerful, unchecked presidency. This possibility opened cracks within the usually solid AKP. Several leading member of the party oppose his interference and the strong presidential system. They have made no secret of their opposition. The party also stuck with a rule limiting MPs to three terms in parliament. This meant that many experienced AKP deputies are being replaced on the candidate lists with novices unknown by voters.

Another challenge facing AKP is a revitalized opposition. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) has emerged from its usual torpor to run a vigorous campaign with some decent positive ideas rather than relying simply on the ‘anti-Erdogan’ vote. But the biggest surprise is the emergence of the predominantly Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) led by the young, charismatic Selahattin Demirtaş.

 

The king maker this time?

            In order to cross the barrier of winning 10% of total votes he has to extend the party’s vote beyond its traditional regional, Kurdish base. There are some signs that he is doing this. For one thing, he has a good chance of getting the votes of Turkey’s small, but vocal, liberal/intellectual constituency. This group used to vote AKP in protest against the military and authoritarian tendencies of earlier governments. Now that AKP has become even more authoritarian, this block of votes is looking for a new home. Another point is that the Kurds in general have won a great deal of sympathy for their struggle against the brutal, fundamentalist hordes of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Even my stalwart CHP friends are talking of switching their votes to

HDP. “I am definitely voting for him (Demirtaş), and I am telling all my friends to vote for him or I will beat them around the head and shoulders,” exclaimed one Istanbul matron waving her arms in a threatening manner. Dinner party conversations in smart Istanbul homes are dominated by animated opinions about the Kurds. “You must vote them,” cry most. “I will never vote for terrorists,” others insist.

Others claim there is a risk HDP will do a deal with AKP if it gets into parliament. In return for getting greater cultural and perhaps political autonomy, the argument runs, the Kurds would support Erdoğan’s presidential ambitions. “Rubbish,” responds Demirtaş. Every chance he gets he repeats that HDP will never support AKP.

HDP would have an immense impact on Turkish politics if it can cross the 10% the barrier. For one thing, Erdoğan’s presidential hopes would disappear. More than that, HDP could conceivably get enough MPs to force a coalition government for the first time since 2002. This possibility alone is making AKP very nervous. In this case even AKP’s rock-solid voter base of about 40% may not be enough to let them form a single-party government. No wonder Erdoğan is throwing all constitutional constraints aside and campaigning hard for his political life.