Turkey's Struggle To Reach Its Geopolitical Potential

 

I recently attended a briefing in London from a former senior Turkish official during which he, probably unintentionally, highlighted many of the contradictions in modern Turkey. The country is truly the poster child of the ‘on the one hand and on the other hand’ conundrum that drives its friends and enemies to distraction.

 With its location in the middle of some of the world’s most sensitive areas, its military strength, growing defence industry, strong private sector companies and geo-political outreach Turkey should sit at the top table of global/regional powers with a key role to play.

 It is a large country with a population of more than 80 million. It has close ties with the EU, the Balkans, Russia, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, and, increasingly, Africa. Turkey has more diplomatic missions than all countries except the US and China. It can play a critical role in rebuilding Syria and possibly in Gaza. In Africa alone the number of Turkish diplomatic missions has increased from 12 in 2002 to 44 today.

 Turkish Airlines flies to 350 global destinations in 130 countries. Turkish companies have invested billions of dollars in several countries around the world including Egypt, the US, and many EU countries. I wonder how many customers in the UK realize that the popular white-goods company Beko is actually a brand of Arçelik that itself is part of the enormous Koç group of companies. The Turkish army is the second largest in NATO and its defence industry exports are growing rapidly to more than $8 billion this year. Many EU countries as well as the UK want Turkey to be a key component of the emerging European defence architecture.

Europe would love to have this force join its defence

 Despite these impressive figures and brute power, Turkey’s long-term quest to be considered a major international player is bogged down in the domestic quagmire of its own making. Rule of law with a truly independent judiciary, transparency and real democracy remain a mirage in the wasteland of one-man rule, crony-capitalism and widespread corruption. President Tayyip Erdoǧan has been in power for more than 20 years, and, despite articles in his own party’s founding document and the national constitution prohibiting another term, he seeks to circumvent these prohibitions by relying on friendly courts and a compliant parliament to simply change the law.

 The Turkish people understand real democracy very well, and hundreds of thousands of them have protested all over the country against the arbitrary arrest and detention of Erdoǧan’s main political opponent, the popular mayor of Istanbul Ekrem Imamoǧlu, on what appear to be ludicrous charges including corruption and espionage. It’s a miracle that the carefully chosen prosecutors could even mention Imamoǧlu’s alleged corruption without deeply blushing. But the ordinary people face at least two major challenges in their efforts to change Turkey’s domestic situation.

 Erdoǧan is a strong campaigner with almost total control of the media and is a master of cynical political manipulation. Another major obstacle is that in his long time in power he has helped certain favoured business groups amass immense fortunes that could disappear quickly if the opposition were by some miracle to win the presidency. These groups will support Erdoǧan with everything they have because they recognize that without the protection of his charisma and power their economic well-being could shatter.

 The Kurds are another possible, unexpected source of support for Erdoǧan. The much-vaunted peace process with the violent guerrilla group PKK is well underway and there is even talk of releasing the head of the Kurdish political party from his long imprisonment. Erdoǧan could easily condition concessions on Kurdish rights and the release of Selahattin Demirtaș on support from the Kurdish party for his claim to another term as president. Demirtaș has been in prison for eight years and it could be very difficult for him to turn down the offer of release even if it were part of a distasteful deal.

 One issue that could cause serious problems for Erdoǧan is the sorry state of an economy burdened with high inflation and high interest rates. Ordinary people and many companies are suffering as prices continue to rise, and high interest rates make loans – even if you can get them – very expensive for most people. Nominal interest rates are about 40% and many people believe the currency is highly overvalued. In addition to making Turkey a very expensive tourist destination this dangerous combination of high inflation/constantly increasing prices and overvalued currency puts a real squeeze on Turkey’s large export sector.  

The people are angered by increasing food prices

Many people had once hoped that external pressure from the EU would help improve conditions in Turkey as the country struggled to meet the EU entry criteria. But when that application door was slammed shut several years ago Erdoǧan was relieved of any pressure to change his autocratic rule. Now, the radically changed European and Middle Eastern security calculus has eased any external pressure on Turkey’s domestic policies. Many EU members and the UK seem perfectly willing to put up with Turkey’s democratic and judicial shortcomings in the rush to have Turkey join the new defence architecture. And the United States, especially under Trump, has always placed Turkey’s geopolitical role in an unstable region over any concern for the country’s internal affairs.

 The Turkish people, like people in most countries, don’t respond well to pressure from the outside telling them how to behave. Any lasting change in Turkey will have to come from within. And it remains to be seen if the political opposition is clever enough to overcome its internal feuding and mobilize the general popular discontent to overcome Erdoǧan’s built-in advantage of controlling all the levers of power.

Spiral Of Violence In Turkey Spins Faster And Faster

Several years ago I was sitting in the back of a very small school room on a very small chair in the Kurdish area of Turkey watching an earnest young teacher trying to teach the Turkish language to about 40 Kurdish 10-year-olds. Suddenly the door burst open and another student rushed in with eyes as big as dinner plates. “Obzer,” he yelled, “Run for it. They’re here.” Obzer didn’t need to be told twice. He knew he was just the latest target in a generations-old feud.

In one bound he was out the window and quickly disappeared toward the Euphrates River in a ball of dust. A few minutes later the door crashed open again as two very rough men carrying small, lethal shotguns came into the room demanding to know where Obzer -- the new world record holder in the 400-meter dash -- had gone. No one said a word. One kid in the front row merely nodded his head toward the open window to indicate that their quarry had escaped.

            I was told later that this was more or less par for the course in that part of the country. Blood feuds were common. No one bothered calling the police or gendarmes to settle ancient grievances. In another, less lethal example, the farmer I was staying with grew rice near the river, and each night he had to hide his tools in a different location in an effort to keep them from thieves.

            Therein lies one of the big problems with the Kurds – the lack of unity, the lack of trust among themselves. Kurds are scattered over at least four countries. And from what I could see each of the several factions, tribes, families has a different agenda. Just when you think that a Kurdish-based political party is making serious, peaceful, headway in Turkey, another group becomes jealous of the newcomer’s power and resorts to violence to assert its own power. The only beneficiary of this mess is Turkey’s aspiring dictator, President Tayyip Erdogan. This intra-Kurdish conflict makes it easy for him to demonize all Kurds and erode the base of the Kurdish political party. This in turn makes it easier for him to get enough members of parliament to change the constitution.

            I have no idea who was behind the latest deadly suicide bomb attack in Ankara. The government is saying, predictably, that the Kurds are behind it. Perhaps. But it sounds a little like Captain Louis Renault in Casablanca, telling police to ‘round up the usual suspects.' It is entirely possible that a little-known faction of the militant Kurdish guerrilla group, PKK, that is even more militant than the parent group has resorted to these attacks. If so, it is another nail in the coffin of Kurdish political development – at least in Turkey.

Is this the new normal in Turkey?

            It is not obvious who re-started the military conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state last summer. We know it followed the unexpectedly strong showing of the Kurdish political party in the June elections. Both the PKK and the government each had reasons to re-start the violence at that time. The PKK could well have wanted to demonstrate that it, not the Kurdish political party HDP, controlled negotiations with the Turkish state. The government, for its part, needed to demonize the Kurds to reduce their vote in the next election. That strategy worked like a charm in the November election.

            What is obvious now is that Erdoğan has no idea how to stop the violence. His preferred military solution isn’t working any better than similar efforts for the last 30 years. Security officials have so far proven incompetent in stopping the violence spreading from the southeast to big cities. Arial attacks on alleged PKK camps in the mountains of northern Iraq do nothing except make the rocks bounce. The bomb in Ankara on Sunday was the third deadly attack in the Turkish capital since last fall. In January another terrorist attack claimed about 10 lives in the middle of Istanbul’s main tourist area. In most countries, such failure on this scale would at the very least raise questions about the quality of the security services. Not in Erdoğan’s Turkey.

            It is also sadly clear that Erdoğan does not have the will, temperament, or imagination to seek any other solution at this time. He can use the violence and instability as an argument for his long-cherished unchecked presidency. He can blame the current parliamentary system for the current chaos in Turkey, and say that only a strong presidency can stop the violence. The fact that Erdoğan, already acting as a strong president, has been unable or unwilling to change course is conveniently forgotten by most AKP voters.

The tragedy of the situation is that at one time he almost succeeded in a negotiated settlement with the PKK. But he must have felt betrayed when that settlement lead to strong Kurdish political gains that put his cherished presidential ambitions at risk. He could, if he wanted, recognize that the military solution won’t work and re-start the political process. He could also, if he wanted, seek the support of the other political parties for such a move. But, given the dangerously polarized state of the nation it is unlikely any of this will happen. And it is the innocent citizens of Turkey who will continue to pay the price for this folly. At what point does he start to question the high cost of his obsessive push for the strong presidency?

Does Erdoğan Want Yet Another Election In Turkey?

Not too long ago Turkey was regarded as an island of stability, a reliable barrier between the unstable Middle East and Europe, a respectable model of ‘moderate’ Islam, a promising democracy in a region where democracy is in short supply.

            Now, all of those clichés look completely outdated as the country lurches from one crisis to another. Far from having a moderating influence on the region Turkey seems to be sliding ever further into the unrest that plagues its neighbours. 

            “(President Tayyip) Erdoğan always wanted Turkey to be more a part of the Middle East. Well, he certainly has achieved that – only not quite in the way he imagined,” quipped one mordant businessman.

            Deadly bomb attacks in Ankara and Istanbul attributed to ISIS show just how much the Syrian chaos has spread to Turkey and is drawing the country reluctantly into that fight. Renewed military confrontations with the Kurdish guerrilla group PKK have virtually shut down several provinces in the south east with almost daily clashes resulting in mounting civilian and military casualties.

Deadly Istanbul blast killed several German tourists

            Some of these crises, like the deepening polarization and fractures in Turkish society, are home grown. They reflect the overbearing, authoritarian nature of President Tayyip Erdoğan who cannot tolerate dissent in any form – especially when such dissent blocks his road to an imperial presidency.  

The latest incident came with the arrest of several academics who signed a petition protesting the government’s actions in the strife-torn Kurdish region of the country. They were charged with ‘supporting terrorism’. Erdoğan could have brushed off this criticism as ‘naïve’ in its failure to criticize the brutality of the PKK, and be done with it. Instead, he overreacts with insults and legal action that may impress his devout followers but only yet again demonstrates his rigid intolerance to any other opinion.

            Foreign policy problems with countries like Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Russia have highlighted the country’s almost total isolation and forced the Turkish government into embarrassing U-turns. Once scorned as the source of unrest in the region, Israel is now embraced. The European Union, once mocked for interfering in Turkish affairs with constant calls for more democracy, is now back in favour. The government has always had a love/hate relationship with the United States. But the needle is now pointing more toward the ‘love’ side as Turkey has nowhere else to turn since Russia, infuriated by the shooting down of one its fighter planes, slapped stiff economic sanctions on Turkey.  

            Perhaps the biggest puzzle in this mounting list of problems is the deadly struggle with its own Kurdish population. After the highly touted ‘peace process’ with the PKK broke down last summer the savage fighting renewed with devastating consequences for anyone caught in the middle. Whole regions of the south east are now under martial law and the government has imposed curfews on several towns.

            But why all this trouble now? What caused this so-called process and dialogue with the Kurds to break down? One reason may be Turkey’s fear of Kurdish gains in Iraq and Syria. Over strong Turkish objections America has supported Kurdish fighters in Iraq and Syria who have recaptured a great deal of territory from ISIS. The last thing Turkey wants is a viable, autonomous Kurdish region on its southern border. The Turks fear that such an autonomous region could link up with Kurds in Turkey and claim an even larger area at the expense of Turkey. This is Turkey’s Red Line, and may explain in part why they are trying to pre-empt such a move.

                        Turkey’s conspiracy theorists have a simpler reason – one linked to Erdoğan’s overweening presidential ambitions, ambitions that require a new constitution. According to this theory the Kurdish political party HDP is responsible for the ruling party’s failure to get enough votes to change the constitution unilaterally and allow Erdoğan to become a powerful president unfettered by the checks and balances that define mature democracies. In the June election the HDP easily passed the 10% barrier for parliamentary representation and won 80 MPs. This drove AKP below an absolute majority for the first time since 2002.

            This did not please Erdoğan. He made sure that no coalition government could be formed, thereby forcing a second election. The conspiracy theory is that the real troubles with the PKK began after the June election and escalated to the point where voters would desert the HDP and return to the ruling party for the sake of stability. To some degree this worked, but the HDP still won enough votes and MPs in the November elections to deny AKP the ability to change the constitution by itself.

            The question now is what Erdoğan will do if this parliament fails to give him the constitution he so desperately wants. Will he force yet a third election hoping that the increased action against the PKK weakens the HDP enough so that it doesn’t even qualify for parliament?  In that eventuality the ruling AKP party would pick up all the MPs that HDP had previously won. And then Erdoğan should finally have enough MPs to force through the constitutional changes he wants.

            In normal times one would laugh off such speculation as being completely absurd.  But these are far from normal times in Turkey, and such conspiracy theories are no longer considered totally absurd.

The Syrian Situation Just Got More Complicated

Besides clearly demonstrating the utter hypocrisy of both Turkish and Russian actions in Syria, the destruction of the Russian fighter plane by the Turkish Air Force demonstrates the complexity of forming any coalition to defeat ISIS. It is almost impossible to find a formula that fits everyone’s agenda, especially Turkey’s, in Syria.

According to Turkish sources the Russian plane was in Turkish air space along the northern Syrian border for all of 17 seconds. Given the uneven nature of the border at that point it is hard enough to stay on the Turkish side on foot let alone in a jet fighter travelling at more than the speed of sound. None less than Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan recognized this reality in July 2012 when Syrian forces downed a Turkish fighter plane. The BBC reported his comments then that “A short term border violation can never be a pretext for an attack.” And now? What has changed?

Turkey has a great deal to lose by alienating Russia.  Russian President Vladimir Putin has many levers to use against Turkey if he chooses. For one thing, almost all of Turkey’s natural gas comes from Russia. And more than three million Russian tourists come to Turkey every year, almost filling the massive hotels along the southern coast. In addition, countless Turkish businesses operate in Russia which is also a key market for Turkish exports. Russia could also decide to use this incident as an excuse to annoy Turkey by helping the Syrian Kurds in their fight against ISIS.

            So why did Turkey take such a risky step when it could just as easily have overlooked the temporary border violation and sent a sternly worded memo that the Russians would have filed in circular bin?

 

Dangerous Escalation In SyrIa

            The most obvious, and least credible, is that Turkey was defending its homeland. Scrambling a few fighters to ‘guide’ the Russian plane out of Turkish air space could have accomplished that. A more credible explanation is that this incident demonstrates the completely different objectives of Russia and Turkey in Syria. Russia has committed money and military might to prop up Syrian president Hafez al-Assad. Turkey demands that al-Assad’s departure is a requirement for any settlement.

            Rather than focusing on defeating ISIS, Russian planes, for their part, have been attacking those anti-Assad forces, mainly in the north western part of the country, that are friendly with Turkey. This annoys Erdoğan greatly, especially as he considers some of those anti-Assad forces to be distant cousins of the Turks. Therefore, shooting down a Russian fighter plane in that area could be seen as a warning not to attack the Turkmens. A dangerous step, because history has repeatedly shown that Russians tend to react harshly to threats.

            Conspiracy theorists, never in short supply in that region, go one step further and say that the attack is Erdoğan’s attempt to derail any grand coalition to destroy the barbaric ISIS forces by making it harder for Turkey’s NATO allies America and France to join forces with Russia against ISIS.

Turkey has a complicated relationship with ISIS, and so far has devoted much more rhetoric than military action against the group. This could reflect Erdoğan’s preference for ISIS rather than the Kurds along Turkey’s southern border, but it also reflects that fact that some of his political base views ISIS positively. Twice in the last month there have been ugly incidents at Turkish football matches when a moment of silence for victims of ISIS attacks in Ankara as well as Paris has been interrupted by a group of fans whistling abuse or shouting loudly “Allah-u Ekber.” Erdoğan’s criticism of this atrocious disrespect was muted at best.

Turkey will go to great lengths to prevent the Kurds in Syria from creating an autonomous region along its southern border even if the Kurds have been the most effective anti-ISIS force. Turkey is already annoyed at American support for the Kurds, and it would be doubly annoyed to see increased support from France and Russia in the name of an anti-ISIS coalition.

Add to this Turkey’s role as a transit point for refugees and you begin to see the volatile mixture that complicates any potential settlement of the Syrian issue. It is no longer just about the Syria we used to know or the future of al-Assad and his clan of Alawites. Now you have to include the contradictory agendas of several different regional and global players – agendas that include sharp religious differences, hopes for political autonomy, and national security.

Three years ago I wrote a post about Dr. Haitham Manna, one of the early opponents of the Assad regime, and how he was strongly opposed to foreign intervention into what he considered a Syrian civil war. His concern was that the foreigners would turn a Syrian conflict into their conflict. How right he was.

Will Sunday's Elections Challenge Tayyip Erdoğan's Dominance Of Turkish Politics?

With just three days remaining before the critical Turkish elections the noise is reaching deafening crescendo levels, the streets are blanketed in party posters, and party leaders continue their furious pace around the country trying to convince voters that they and only they can put the country on the right course. And, above all else, speculation on the outcome and post-election scenarios has replaced football as the favourite national pastime.

As we all discovered in the British elections last month polls can be misleading. They can miss underlying trends by asking the wrong question or taking at face value what people tell the pollsters. Polls in Turkey are even more useless. And the media merely takes the side of whoever owns that particular outlet. If the media owner owes his fortune to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) it’s a safe bet that his broadcast outlet or newspaper will claim that Turkey without President Tayyip Erdoğan will rapidly go down tubes. And if the owner is brave enough to oppose Erdoğan you can bet his TV station or newspaper will lay all of Turkey’s present and future problems at his doorstep.

Election posters cover all available space

Nonetheless, even with all these caveats, your fearless correspondent has asked a number of people from different walks of life about their predictions for these elections.

One expat who has been in Turkey for a number of years offered one of the more cynical opinions.

“The AKP will definitely get enough votes and deputies to change the constitution to give Erdoğan what he wants. Erdoğan and his henchmen will do whatever is necessary to keep the Kurdish party (HDP) just below the 10% threshold for entering parliament. This may be a cynical reaction, but I have learned never to underestimate Erdoğan’s ability to generate, one way or another, the outcome he wants. Too many people are confusing what they hope will happen with what will happen.”

The other extreme came from another friend who admittedly has no love for AKP, but has been observing Turkish politics for several decades.

“This time AKP will get only 35% - 38%. The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) will get 28% - 32%, the nationalist party (MHP) will get 14% - 17%, and HDP will get 12% - 15%. With this scenario AKP will definitely fail to get enough deputies to form a single party government. Even worse for them is that a group of 50 – 60 AKP deputies could split off and form an independent group inside the parliament.”

A Turkish cab driver in New York was more succinct. “The country has finally woken up. Those b…… won’t even get 40%. They’re just frauds and phonies.”

A London-based young Turkish professional also believes the AKP vote will fall to the low 40% level and that HDP will succeed in entering parliament. But he warns not to forget the Gülenists, referring to followers of the Islamic scholar Fetullah Gülen who are accused by Erdoğan of running a parallel government within Turkish state institutions. “They hate Erdoğan and are running as independents in many districts. Some of them will enter parliament and cause problems for AKP. Watch the post-election manoeuvring. That will be fascinating.”

An Istanbul housewife who typically supports CHP says she will vote for the Kurdish party this time. “I have been trying to convince all my friends to vote for HDP. It’s critical that they cross the 10% threshold.  I think that AKP’s vote will fall to just above 40%, still the biggest party but not powerful enough to force a constitution change. CHP could get as much as 27%, MHP around 17% and HDP could get 11% - 12%.”

The all-important ballot box

Another long-term expat who accurately predicted the outcome of last summer’s presidential election agrees that AKP’s vote share will drop sharply this time.

“They will probably get somewhere around 43%, CHP 26%, MHP 17% and HDP between 10% - 11%. The actual HDP votes will have to be quite a bit higher than the final number because of potential election fraud. They could lose a lot of votes because some of Erdoğan’s more fervent followers will try anything to make sure HDP stays below 10%. AKP will be close to getting enough deputies to form a single-party government, but won’t have enough to change the constitution.”

One of the intriguing things about this election is the persistent rumours of sharp tensions within the AKP that could lead to post-election re-alignment of alliances. One rumour gaining some traction is that Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu is tired of Erdoğan’s constant interference and wants to assert his own power. According to this scenario he would not be at all unhappy if Erdoğan failed to the constitutional change allowing for a strong president. He could then put Erdoğan back into his box and carry running the government in a rational fashion with his own people. Davutoğlu has gone out his way, for example, to state that his plans for economic reform and growth are far different from Erdoğan’s.

Tayyip Erdoğan has dominated Turkish politics for more than a decade, and desperately wants to consolidate his position by changing the constitution to create a strong executive presidency enabling him to rule with no checks or balances. Even though he is not running for anything this time, this election is in large measure a referendum on him. But Turkish society has changed a great deal since 2002. It remains to be seen if Erdoğan’s old father-knows-best approach will work with an increasingly assertive group of voters. One can only hope that massive fraud does not derail the results and plunge the country into chaos.

Maybe This Time The Opposition Has Learned Something

People in Turkey are beginning to think the previously unthinkable. President Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) that have dominated every election since 2002 may actually fall far short of their goals in the national elections scheduled for June. At this early stage it appears very difficult for AKP to get enough deputies to give Erdoğan his long-sought powerful, unchecked presidency. There is even a chance that for the first time in its history AKP will fail to get enough deputies to establish a government by itself. And, perhaps most important, for the first time I can remember  the Kurds seem to hold the trump card for this election.

            AKP, despite its almost total control of the broadcast media, is suddenly on the defensive. Party leaders have to explain away a sharply deteriorating economy. Erdoğan even has to concede the possibility of a coalition by saying such an outcome would be a ‘nightmare, the end of Turkey.’  Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was forced to copy the opposition’s opening to Turkey’s dwindling number of minorities by making sweeping promises to the Roma community. He even went so far as to say that AKP candidates include members (unnamed at this point) of the Alevi community, a branch of Islam considered heretical by the majority Sunni AKP.

            What has changed since the humiliating debacle of the presidential elections last summer when Erdoğan’s opponents couldn’t be bothered to get off their sunbeds in the holiday resorts to vote? Voter participation in that election fell to about 74%, the lowest level in 12 years. The apathy and incompetence of the opposition allowed Erdoğan to win just enough votes on the first ballot to win. What gives Erdoğan’s growing number of opponents the nervous, the very cautious hope that just maybe this time is different?

 

Is his appeal fading fast?

            In addition to the fatigue factor involved in listening to Erdoğan’s inflated bombast for so many years, the economy on which he based much of his political success is sliding rapidly downhill. The Turkish lira has lost almost 16% this year, and now trades close to a record low. GDP growth has stalled, inflation is up, unemployment has climbed to about 11%, and foreign direct investment has slowed down dramatically. Some voters are beginning to make the connection between the AKP’s policies and the economic decline. The AKP swept into power on the back of an economic collapse, and some people are openly repeating an old Turkish saying, ‘They will go as they came.’

            Then there are the political mistakes that the usually sure-footed AKP has made. In hindsight, the first mistake may have been Erdoğan’s decision to run for president. This decision could wind up isolating him in his new, huge presidential palace. The Turkish presidency is largely a ceremonial position with limited political power. The president is supposed to be above partisan politics and refrain from active involvement in government affairs. Erdoğan of course paid no attention to these constitutional constraints, and was deeply involved in all facets of party and government work. In order to justify these constitutionally questionable activities he was counting on the AKP winning enough deputies to change the constitution and implement a system with a politically powerful, unchecked presidency. This possibility opened cracks within the usually solid AKP. Several leading member of the party oppose his interference and the strong presidential system. They have made no secret of their opposition. The party also stuck with a rule limiting MPs to three terms in parliament. This meant that many experienced AKP deputies are being replaced on the candidate lists with novices unknown by voters.

Another challenge facing AKP is a revitalized opposition. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) has emerged from its usual torpor to run a vigorous campaign with some decent positive ideas rather than relying simply on the ‘anti-Erdogan’ vote. But the biggest surprise is the emergence of the predominantly Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) led by the young, charismatic Selahattin Demirtaş.

 

The king maker this time?

            In order to cross the barrier of winning 10% of total votes he has to extend the party’s vote beyond its traditional regional, Kurdish base. There are some signs that he is doing this. For one thing, he has a good chance of getting the votes of Turkey’s small, but vocal, liberal/intellectual constituency. This group used to vote AKP in protest against the military and authoritarian tendencies of earlier governments. Now that AKP has become even more authoritarian, this block of votes is looking for a new home. Another point is that the Kurds in general have won a great deal of sympathy for their struggle against the brutal, fundamentalist hordes of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Even my stalwart CHP friends are talking of switching their votes to

HDP. “I am definitely voting for him (Demirtaş), and I am telling all my friends to vote for him or I will beat them around the head and shoulders,” exclaimed one Istanbul matron waving her arms in a threatening manner. Dinner party conversations in smart Istanbul homes are dominated by animated opinions about the Kurds. “You must vote them,” cry most. “I will never vote for terrorists,” others insist.

Others claim there is a risk HDP will do a deal with AKP if it gets into parliament. In return for getting greater cultural and perhaps political autonomy, the argument runs, the Kurds would support Erdoğan’s presidential ambitions. “Rubbish,” responds Demirtaş. Every chance he gets he repeats that HDP will never support AKP.

HDP would have an immense impact on Turkish politics if it can cross the 10% the barrier. For one thing, Erdoğan’s presidential hopes would disappear. More than that, HDP could conceivably get enough MPs to force a coalition government for the first time since 2002. This possibility alone is making AKP very nervous. In this case even AKP’s rock-solid voter base of about 40% may not be enough to let them form a single-party government. No wonder Erdoğan is throwing all constitutional constraints aside and campaigning hard for his political life.

Has The Post-Erdoğan Era Begun In Turkey?

Are the wheels starting to come off the Turkish wagon? The political stability and economic growth that have characterized Turkey since 2002 are beginning to fray at the edges just before critical general elections in June that could determine the country’s political direction for years to come.

            These elections will go a long way to determining whether President Tayyip Erdoğan will achieve his goal of complete control or be hampered by the current constitutional restraints on the president’s power. He runs the risk of being politically and legally isolated in his extravagant new palace unless the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins enough seats to unilaterally change the constitution the way he wants. Not content with the current largely ceremonial role of president, Erdoğan desperately wants a new constitution to enshrine his vision of a powerful, unchecked, unfettered presidency.

Is Prime Minister Davutoglu's Patience Running Out?

            A toxic combination of international and domestic problems is making this task more difficult than it was just a few years ago. On top of this a growing sense of ‘Erdoğan fatigue’ seems to have gripped even some members of his own party. Maybe they’re getting tired of 12 years of bombast. How much longer is Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu going to put up with Erdoğan’s constant – and unconstitutional – interference? Furthermore, many rank-and-file AKP members have shown little enthusiasm for a change in Turkey’s governing structure.

            In order to unilaterally change the constitution the AKP must increase its members of parliament from the current 316 to 330. This is not an easy task in the best of times, and these are not the best of times.

            The AKP can no longer count on strong economic growth to support its election campaign. For several years the party would loudly trumpet the impressive growth figures and strong currency as confirmation of its ‘brilliant’ policies. Now it is reduced to finding excuses for below-forecast growth, a rapidly depreciating currency, declining exports, and stubbornly high unemployment.

The currency has depreciated more than 10% so far this year, unemployment has risen to 10% and is much higher in the volatile south eastern region, exports are declining, and president is hammering the Central Bank to lower interest rates. The cacophony and mixed signals over Turkey’s economic policies are making investors very nervous. The prime minister and his top economic aides were in New York last week in an apparently futile mission to calm these nerves.

This is very difficult to achieve when the president insists that the theoretically independent Central Bank lower interest rates in hopes of stimulating the economy and reviving the critical construction industry that has created so many millionaires during Erdoğan’s reign. Ali Babacan, the minister in charge of the economy for the last 12 years, understands finance and economics very well. He has done a masterful job keeping the country on the rails so far, but it remains to be seen just how long his rational policies will survive the onslaught of Erdoğan and his comical presidential ‘advisors’.

On top of the economic problems there are the Kurds. No one knows precisely how many Kurds live in Turkey, but common assumptions are about 15% of the total population, or roughly 12 million people. Kurdish guerrillas, the PKK, have been fighting a low-intensity war against the Turkish state for years. In an effort to end the violence and integrate the Kurdish population more completely into Turkish society the government has begun long, drawn-out ‘peace process’. While many applaud this effort, cynics accuse the government of simply trying to buy off the Kurds to gain votes in the upcoming election.

Regardless of the ultimate reason, the Kurds may well hold the key to the June election. Bear with me for a little background on the convoluted Turkish election system. In order to enter parliament a political party must gain at least 10% of the total votes cast. In the past the Kurdish political party did very well in the Kurdish districts of the south east, but failed to cross the 10% national barrier. In the event that a party fails to get the required 10% on the national level all that party’s votes are given to the runner-up in the districts in question. In the vast majority of cases this runner-up was the AKP candidate.

In order to circumvent this rule Kurdish candidates previously would enter the elections as independents who only had to win their districts to enter parliament. This time, however, the young, charismatic leader of the Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Party (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş, has decided to risk everything by entering these elections as a party, subject to the 10% threshold. If he wins the Kurds will gain a powerful voice in parliament. If he loses the AKP will pick up several additional members of parliament – perhaps enough to take them over the 330 needed to change the constitution.

Is Kurdish Leader Selahattin Demirtas The Country's New Hope?

The real question is whether Demirtaş can broaden the party’s appeal to the non-Kurdish segments of the population. He has been helped positive images of Kurds in Iraq and Syria defying the barbarians of ISIS. He may also get some help from what is left of the disaffected, alienated liberal bloc as well as from those who dislike Erdoğan so much they will vote for the Kurdish party. “My deepest apologies to my grandfather who is turning over in his grave, but I will vote for the Kurds this time. Just to block Erdoğan,” said a typical ‘tactical’ voter.

Turkey is in for a very bumpy ride until the June elections. Then we shall see if Erdoğan gets his heartfelt wish for an imperial presidency, or whether is left roaming around his enormous new palace looking vainly for something to fill his days.

"We Have History"

Taking a taxi in Istanbul can be an interesting experience in the best of times. Sometimes the driver knows how to drive. Often the cab is his first experience with a motorized vehicle. Sometimes the driver knows where he is going. Other times you find that he only arrived in the city shortly before you did and knows very little.

            In theory the taxis are regulated. The reality is somewhat different. Take smoking. Removing a cigarette from many Turks is almost an act of war. Most cabs have stickers warning that smoking is not allowed. Most drivers, however, are busy working their way through at least two packs a day. If you’re brave or foolish enough to point out the no-smoking sticker they merely point to traffic mess around them and mutter the word ‘stress’ to explain their action. Given the total vehicular and pedestrian anarchy dominating the city’s streets they have a point.

The safest taxi in Istanbul?

             Then comes the tricky point of conversation. Most drivers are astute enough to recognize that you’re probably not Turkish. And they’re naturally curious. Who is this person in the back of my car? So while manoeuvring with the dexterity of a Formula 1 driver through speeding traffic as they constantly change lanes and run red lights they half-turn to you and utter the word ‘memleket’ – country—with head and hand gestures signifying a question. It’s a loaded question with uncertain consequences for the wrong answer. You, however terrified you may be with visions of instant death rapidly passing in front of your eyes, would be well advised to consider the answer carefully. Looking for tell-tale clues of the driver’s own political, sporting, or religious tendencies is a good start. These can usually be found hanging from the rear-view mirror or stuck to the windshield obliterating the view of oncoming death.

            One time I got this question from a driver who had a long beard and was wearing a white skull cap. Another clue was the fact that he was bobbing his head and muttering verses from the Koran propped up on the steering wheel. Given the state of his driving I thought this was an entirely logical thing to do. When he turned around with his fierce, challenging eyes and fired the question memleket? I had to do some fast thinking. The wrong answer might just land me bound and gagged in his trunk.

            My first reaction was to scroll quickly through my family tree to see if I could come up with a long-lost relative who was a companion of the Prophet Mohammed.  Failing that I concluded that admitting I was an American was probably not a great idea. British probably wouldn’t work either. Dutch? Risky. He might have a relative there and could speak a few words in Dutch, which was more than I could. Irish? Too obviously Catholic. Finally it dawned on me. Canadian. God bless the Canadians! No one in his right mind hates Canadians. Doubtful he’s ever seen one. And who has ever heard of Canadians getting stuck in trunks with gags and blind folds? Once I ventured that miraculous word Canadian he muttered something incomprehensible and focused on his driving.

            Another time I got this question and quickly searched for clues. Surprisingly there were none – no prayer beads hanging from the mirror and no stickers proclaiming his allegiance to one football team or another. The driver seemed like a decent person and I admitted to being American. Instantly his face lit up into a huge gap-toothed smile. The only nervous moment was when he turned around to give me a high-five.

            “My friend, this trip is on me. Where can I take you,” he proclaimed.

            Stunned, I asked him where he was from. This being the Middle East, friends of America are a little thin on the ground. He thumped his chest proudly. “I am from Kurdistan,” he announced. It turned out his family was from northern Iraq and had been saved by the American no-fly zone after Saddam Hussein had killed thousands of Kurds with his chemical warfare. For him the Americans could do no wrong. He was far less charitable toward the Turks whom he accused of suppressing their own large Kurdish population. “We have history,” he said darkly as he spat viciously out the window. Indeed they do. And much of it is not pretty.

            And therein lies the problem we see played out today as the brutal  jihadi forces of ISIS threaten to take over the city of Kobani, just a few meters from the Turkish border. The world wonders why Turkey, with its huge army, does nothing to stop this assault. The Kurdish forces in Kobani may not even want the Turkish army. But Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan won't even let the Kurds get resupplied from Turkey. And he refuses to let anti-ISIS forces use air bases inside Turkey for more effective air cover. The simple fact is that Erdoğan and many of his acolytes see the Kurds in Kobani as a greater threat than ISIS. They see the Kobani Kurds merely as an extension of the militant PKK Kurds in Turkey that have caused so much trouble over the years. Any effort to help the Kurds in Kobani, they believe, could backfire on Turkey.

            No one knows for sure how many Kurds are inside Turkey, but various estimates put the number at 12 – 15 million – a sizable minority out of population of about 75 million. After years of brutal conflict with the PKK that has cost about 40,000 lives over the last two decades, Erdoğan had launched a highly publicized effort to end that conflict and give the Kurdish citizens more cultural rights.

 

A preview of coming attractions inside Turkey?

            Such cynical realpolitik of letting ISIS do his dirty work in Kobani carries two large risks. One is that it could risk alienating even the moderate Kurds in Turkey. Any future outbreaks of violence won't be limited to the traditional Kurdish homelands of south-eastern Turkey. The large cities are also extremely vulnerable. Whatever progress has been made to ease age-old tensions could be undone very quickly. The fragile alliance between Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Kurds could quickly unravel. Among other things this could easily cost the AKP a lot of votes in the next election, ending whatever fading hopes Erdoğan has of changing the constitution to give himself even more power.

            The second major risk is that despite AKP's kind gestures ISIS will not stop at the border. The group has enough followers within Turkey to cause serious problems. 

            If he is going to stop to the looming Kobani massacre from igniting even greater problems inside Turkey he is going to have to act with greater sensitivity and skill than we have witnessed so far. His usual bluster and bellowing will only intensify the problem.

Damned If You Do. Damned If You Don't.

Turkey is beginning to learn the very high cost of fighting wars by proxy. Unfortunately they never learned the lessons of the Americans or the Pakistanis who armed the mujahedeen in Afghanistan to fight the Russians 30 years ago. Both the United States and Pakistan soon learned at a very great cost that those heavily armed and well trained fighters had their own agenda – one that was viciously opposed to their former benefactors.

            After funnelling arms and money to radical Sunni groups in Syria opposed to the regime of Bashar al Assad Turkey now finds that those one-time allies are threatening to bite the hand that fed them. Welcome to the Middle East where alliances and loyalty are fluid at the best of times. What is interesting is that many of the same people in the United States who fervently supported arming the mujahedeen against the Russians in the 1980s now want President Obama to fall into the same trap in Syria. Good thinking, guys.

Exactly why Turkey is so vehemently opposed to its former best friend Assad is a matter of some speculation. President Tayyip Erdoğan would have us believe he is shocked, shocked at the violence and brutality that Assad has used against his own people. Others, less charitable, say he only wants to establish a strong Sunni belt on Turkey’s southern border to counter what he sees as the Shiite threat from Iraq and possibly Iran.

Whatever his reasons, this policy has left Turkey with extremely difficult choices, each of which has unpredictable and dangerous outcomes. Right now a heavily armed (thanks in part to Turkey) group of medieval jihadis (ISIS) has swept through large parts of Syria and Iraq. They have besieged a fairly large town right next to the Turkish border. If they take that town they will be right up against Turkey itself. What to do? From Turkey’s point of view it would appear to be the lesser of two evils.

The town in question, Kobani, is largely populated by Kurds who have pretty much established an autonomous region within Syria. Turkey doesn’t like that. It might give Turkey’s own large Kurdish population similar ideas.

On the other hand, Turkey has suddenly woken up to the dangers posed by ISIS. “Hey, these guys may be out of control and may not be our friends.” The Turkish parliament passed a motion allowing Turkish participation in the hastily formed anti-ISIS coalition. So far that participation has been limited to loud denunciations of terror and strident calls for more action -- by someone else -- against ISIS. But what action, and by whom are not clear. What is clear is Turkey’s ambivalence about the entire anti-ISIS project.

So far the Turkish army has provided great photo opportunities of its tanks lined up aggressively on the border across from Kobani. And there they sit. Turkey does not even allow coalition airplanes to use nearby bases in Turkey in order to provide more effective air power against ISIS.

Turkish tanks on Syrian border

Coalition commanders are frustrated and the Kurds are furious. Turkish leaders piously justify their do-nothing response by claiming that taking out ISIS without first taking out Assad would be pointless. The Turks also say they want a no-fly zone. Why, precisely? ISIS has no air force. But, for the Turks, the target is Assad, not ISIS. Therefore they will do nothing unless the coalition, i.e. the Americans, commit to regime change in Damascus. The Turks are silent on who or what might fill the power vacuum in Syria once Assad goes. Having, hopefully, learned the folly of regime change the Americans are in no mood to topple Assad, no matter how brutally he might treat his own people.

The Kurds are adamant that the Turkish lack of action is merely a pretext for eliminating the Kurdish population. If ISIS wipes out the Kurds, according to this logic, then that particular threat to Turkey is gone.

To be fair to the Turks, however, any action, or lack thereof, carries grave risks. Don’t attack ISIS and you risk inflaming your own large Kurdish population and ending whatever chance there was for reconciliation. Kurds in several of the country’s larger cities have already hit the streets in violent protests against Turkey’s lack of support. The cease-fire with the Kurdish militant group could end any day and plunge the country back into a brutal conflict that has cost about 40,000 lives over the past two decades. Soldiers are now patrolling the streets of major cities in an effort to stop the protests.

Kurdish protest in Turkey. A return to the bad old days?

Moving aggressively against ISIS, however, risks alienating a large part of the Turkish population that wants nothing to do with a war among Arabs that they believe was created by the Americans in the first place. “Let them stew in their own juice” seems to be the most popular attitude in Turkey. The government would also risk alienating that portion of the Turkish population that thinks ISIS is not such a bad thing.

The other serious risk of attacking ISIS is creating blow-back inside Turkey. I doubt that ISIS would challenge the might of the Turkish army directly. But it doesn’t have to. It could easily create problems using the 1.5 million Syrian refugees already in Turkey. ISIS could also ignite serious violence using its supporters already in Turkey’s sprawling major cities. A recent story in The New York Times about Pakistan’slessons for Turkey highlighted the problems the country could face with people it once thought were its allies.

"He (Erdoğan) is a fool," a Turkish friend fumed. "He wanted to be a big deal in the Middle East, the champion of the Sunnis, the new Caliph. All he did was to bring the problems of the Middle East inside Turkey."

The Turkish government is in a very uncomfortable place at the moment, condemned both for doing too little and possibly too much against ISIS. Sooner or later it will have to make a choice. And then the question is whether the Turkish leadership is wise enough to handle the consequences of whatever choice it makes.

Turkey Looks OK . . . By Comparison

During the media storm surrounding Greece's continuing efforts at self-immolation its large neighbor across the Aegean has been getting a relatively free ride from the international press. Apart from a few semi-critical pieces in The Economist and various small items about the Kurds, critical analysis of what is going on in Turkey tends to get buried under the Greek and Syrian avalanche of news.

Part of the reason is that compared to the very, very low standards of the neighbourhood Turkey seems pretty good. When the comparisons are Greece, Bulgaria, Syria, Iraq and Iran you don’t have to do much to be the star of the class.

One banker said the relatively rosy picture of the Turkish economy masks a real vulnerability. “We are extremely vulnerable to external events. We need a steady flow of foreign funds to cover our deficits. We need low global interest rates. The minute these stop is the minute the Turkish economy starts to wobble.”

But the real risk, according to an experienced foreign banker, is political.

“The risk here, as always, is political. We have seen this chain of events often. At the first sign of political problems people rush to the U.S. dollar, the currency collapses, interest rates sky rocket, people stop spending, the ‘feel-good’ factor disappears overnight. We have seen this many, many times,” he said.

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 promising an increase in ‘democracy’. What has actually transpired over the last decade is a re-emergence of familiar rigid Turkish autocracy, but with a different cast of characters running the show. Instead of the Kemalist military, bureaucratic and business elite the country is now run by and for the conservative Anatolian-based masses. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has emerged as the undisputed, unchallenged leader of the country, more in line with one of the early Ottoman sultans than any modern democrat.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan

 The few checks and balances that once existed have all but disappeared. The once-powerful military has been humbled, any remaining political opposition has been emasculated, and the rapidly diminishing number of critics silenced. “He can do anything he wants,” said one foreign businessman referring to the prime minister. “This is a democracy in structure, but not in function.”

The press has been one of the major victims of this disturbing trend toward thought control. Never known for its accuracy, the Turkish press was at least lively with several different versions of the same story appearing in different papers. Now, as one friend put it, “the press has been reduced to bread and circuses.” Front pages are dominated by scandal-ridden Turkish football, the inevitable bus accident, crime, or pictures of aging starlets displaying embarrassing amounts of cellulite. In many ways the press now resembles Jack Nicholson’s lobotomized character Randle McMurphy at the end of the great film One Flew Over The Cuckoo’s Nest. Challenge authority too much and this is what can happen.

Jack Nicholson in One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest

Scores of journalists have been jailed or fired for daring to criticize any aspect of the government in general or the prime minister in particular. As Yavuz Baydar points out in a column in Today’s Zaman this timidity does not require overt government censorship. He says the courage of media owners, never that strong in the first place, has completely wilted in the face of potential threats against any of their other business interests. They all remember with horror the very large tax claim against the country’s leading media group. It was a very effective shot across the bow.

This self-censorship does not apply only to papers that once used to challenge Erdoğan. A journalist from a strong government supporter Yeni Şafak was recently fired for veering from the company line over the killing of 34 Kurdish teenagers who were thought to be terrorists. The reality was that they were smuggling goods back and forth between Iraq and Turkey, an activity in that area that goes back at least as far as Xenophon in 401 BC.

A recent column in the English language DailyNews by Semih Idiz points out dangerous trends in the judiciary, politics, social and cultural life as the ruling party tries to impose its narrow views on Turkish life. The government is moving against state-sponsored theatres after the prime minister lashed out against ‘arrogant, alcoholic actors’ who he said insulted his daughter. Erdoğan  says he wants a ‘religious generation’ to emerge. A prosecutor recently brought a case against internationally-renowned pianist Fazıl Say for allegedly insulting Islam in a Twitter message.

State Theater Workers Protesting A Government Crackdown

 In yet another outburst the prime minister compared abortion to the massacre of the Kurdish teenagers at Uludere and said anyone who had an abortion was committing murder. Predictably this has unleashed a wave of protest. But as long as that protest does not reach down into the deep AKP voter base Erdoğan really doesn’t care.

Turkish Women Defending The Right To Abortion

 One Turkish analyst says two of the major problems facing Turkey are the Kurdish issue and succession within AKP if and when Erdoğan moves up to the presidency.

“The Arab Spring has reached our borders, but our leaders don’t seem anxious to apply the lessons they’re preaching to others. Turkey is such a one-man show right now, that no one can predict what will happen if Erdoğan ever leaves active daily politics for the rarefied atmosphere of the theoretically neutral presidency.”

For the moment the prime minister can afford to ignore any of the voices raised in protest. The Teflon shield surrounding him won't crack until the economy hits the wall or the violence of the Kurdish protests

increases. Then he will need more than simple, loud bombast.