How Much Will Erdoğan's Victory Cost The Country?

Turkish voters have just made their country the model for every dictator and the envy of every wanna-be dictator in the world. President Tayyip Erdoğan convinced 52% of the voters to give him unprecedented powers to run the country exactly as he sees fit. Separation of powers? Forget it. Independent journalism? Independent judiciary? Forget it. Parliamentary checks and balances? Forget it.

Erdoğan now has the power to rule by decree, appoint cabinet ministers and senior officials answerable only to him, and appoint senior judges. In short, Erdoğan is free to impose his 19^th century vision on Turkey. I was going to say 16^th century, but there were some very enlightened Ottoman rulers during that period.

With his absolute power where will he take Turkey?

The opposition put up a spirited fight, but in the end they were no match for the sheer organizational skills of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the charismatic power of a ‘strong man’ who said the dictatorial rule was necessary to restore Turkey to its rightful place in the world – wherever that might be. He has the typical autocrat’s disdain for the necessary, messy compromises or checks and balances of real democracy. Why bother with other people’s opinions when your own ideas are so good? Waste of time, really.

One sure thing was Erdoğan’s determination to use every means – fair or foul -- at his disposal to win this election. And after 16 years of near absolute control it is fair to say he has many more weapons at his command than the opposition to control the outcome of an election.

While the physical act of voting may have been more or less free, it would be a serious mistake to call these elections ‘free and democratic’ in the true sense of the phrase. All Erdoğan’s opponents faced severe restrictions on media exposure during the campaign. In addition to the media outlets owned by Erdoğan’s henchmen or by people intimidated by him, even the state TV station found reasons to keep the opponents off the air. The campaign of Meral Akşener, leader of the IYI Party, also faced frequent assaults and attempts by local Erdoğan supporters to prevent her election rallies. Selahattin Demirtaş, leader of the Kurdish-based HDP party, had to run his campaign from the prison where he has been kept for a couple of years on unspecified charges. In these circumstances it’s a minor miracle that the opponents performed as well as they did. A cynic would say it was all part of Erdogan's game plan. Let Ince run relatively free, but inhibit and intimidate the other two so their vote total won't challenge Erdogan. Crude, but effective.

Ince did well, but got no help from the other opposition parties

Other than Erdoğan’s personal victory there were a few interesting election results:

1.     Erdoğan’s main opponent, Muharrem Ince, performed exactly as he predicted, winning just under 31% of the presidential vote. He ran well ahead of his party, the CHP, raising the expectation that he may assume leadership of the party and inject some much-needed vitality. His problem was that Akşener and Demirtaş combined did not get enough votes to help force the presidential election into the second round. But, given the restrictions their campaigns faced, that is no surprise.

2.     HDP, the Kurdish party, secured enough votes (11.7%) to enter parliament with 67 MPs, making them the third largest group. HDP’s vote was undoubtedly helped by voters from other parties who voted tactically just to make sure HDP passed the 10% threshold. 

Selahattin Demirtas: Tough to run a campaign from behind bars

                       

3.     Erdoğan ran way ahead of his AKP that received just over 42% of the vote, down from previous elections. This reconfirms the president’s star power while demonstrating that at least some of the party’s former voters are beginning to lose faith with the party.  AKP now has 293 MPs, below the 300 required to give them total control of parliament. They will have to rely on the 50 MPs from the ultra-nationalist party MHP to exercise what little authority left to the parliament. Look for Turkish policy to become even more anti-Kurdish and bellicose.

4.     The two rival nationalist parties, MHP and the newly-formed, IYI party combined received more than 20% of the vote, far above the usual result for the nationalists. Perhaps the government’s strident anti-Kurdish rhetoric and military incursions into Syria and Iraq inspired this burst of nationalist fervour. Things don't look good for Demirtaş's early release.

Assaults and boycott by most media hurt her campaign

It remains to be seen just what Erdoğan will do with his sharply enhanced powers. One would like to think he might use them to help unite a badly fractured country and society. Nice, but, given past performance, not too likely. He might also move aggressively to counter the country’s mounting economic problems. Unfortunately, he has shown absolutely no sign that he even understands the gravity of the situation, let alone have any idea how to solve the problems.

During the campaign he re-iterated his plan to force the Central Bank to reduce interest rates as the best way to fight the increasing inflation and depreciating currency. This will not have a happy ending.

He also stressed his commitment to huge, budget-busting public works projects that will do little except feed his fervent contractor allies while putting great stress on an already weakened budget. One of his pet projects is the so-called Kanal Istanbul, a canal rivalling the Suez Canal to run from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara bypassing the Bosphorus Straits. It’s not clear where the $20 billion or so funding will come from, but the hapless and overstretched state banks will undoubtedly be called upon to provide the funds.

While he is touting grandiose projects, the real problems of inflation, unemployment, mounting current account deficit, depreciating currency and a tattered education system designed more for quill pens and rote memory than computers are only getting worse. On top of this the once-strong agriculture sector is reeling, forcing Turkey to import more and more basic food products like onions and potatoes.

At some point, these problems will snowball into a real economic and social crisis. But for the moment Erdoğan is free to delude himself that they are all the fault of the usual suspects – ‘foreign interests’ that are afraid of Turkey. This plays well in domestic elections, but doesn’t do much to convince those same ‘foreign interests’ to lend you a hand when you desperately need it.

Erdoğan Doubles Down With Another Electoral Gamble

Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan reminds me of desperate gamblers who have lost their original stake and now are putting everything they have -- the kids' college funds, the rent, family shopping money -- into one more spin of the wheel, one more roll of the dice in hopes of recouping all their losses.

Not satisfied with the results of the June 7 where his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost sole control of government he has spent the intervening two months maneuvering to force another election – an election where voters will be sharply encouraged to correct the errors of their ways.

Half-hearted talks about a coalition government with the main opposition Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) broke down last week, and the only question now is who will run the country until elections in November.

These elections are a huge gamble for Erdoğan, and an even bigger gamble for the country as a whole. But this is a gamble he has to take if he ever wants to realize his dream of a strong, unfettered presidency. The stakes could not be higher. He has already said the he is a de facto strong president and that a new constitution would merely ratify this new reality. Others differ -- strongly. Yes, the AKP may pick up enough additional MPs to form a single party government and reinforce his authoritarian rule. But, just as easily, the plan could back-fire badly and leave the AKP with even fewer MPs. This would create the scenario for another attempt at a coalition government with a partner who would force the president to operate within the tightly limited restrictions of the present constitution.

Not accepting a coalition, he rolls the dice on another election

It is not at all clear just what Erdoğan would do if he fails a second time to get his required majority. It is difficult to see him going quietly into the night. Therefore, he cannot afford to leave the campaign to his handpicked, low key prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu. He will play a dominant role in the campaign, circumventing constitutional restrictions by appearing at ‘opening ceremonies’ from one end of the country to other. This tactic is also a gamble because post-election polls in June showed that his polarizing personality alienated a large number of voters. Furthermore, voters might just hold him responsible for the collapse of coalition talks and dragging the country through more uncertainty.

He is also gambling with critical issues like the economy that will drift aimlessly as the president and the ruling party focus exclusively on the election in a fight for their political lives. The possibility of at least three more months of political instability has already driven the Turkish Lira to record lows against the US dollar. Turks have developed extremely sensitive antennae for political troubles and react at warp speed by buying foreign currency at the first sign of instability. Retailers and other merchants report that business is stagnant at best as people conserve their cash and while waiting for further developments.

For Erdoğan this will be a one-issue campaign – national security. He will never forgive the Kurdish-based People’s Democratic Party (HDP) for winning enough votes to drive the ruling party below the number of MPs required for a single-party government. In the June elections HDP won 13% of the vote and sent 80 members to parliament, 80 members that used routinely to go to AKP. The charismatic leader of the HDP also committed the unforgiveable sin of proclaiming loudly that his party would never make Erdoğan the strong president he so strongly covets.

Can the HDP repeat its June electoral success?

Therefore Erdoğan is doing everything in his power to win additional nationalist votes by attempting to tie HDP to the outlawed Kurdish guerrilla group, the PKK. If he is going to win he must eliminate the HDP members of parliament by driving HDP votes in any new election below the barrier of 10% of total votes cast required for sending MPs to parliament. The other strategy would be to ban the party altogether on the very tenuous grounds of its alleged links to the PKK. Both of these strategies, however, promise to re-kindle tensions that many Turks had hoped were long buried.

It is no coincidence that the level of violence in Turkey has picked up dramatically since the election with almost daily clashes between government security forces and an eclectic group of terrorists. The deadly bombing in the town of Suruç was blamed on the barbarians from ISIS, a bizarre group of anarchists was blamed for the hapless attack with a few shots fired at the fortress-like American consulate in Istanbul, and then the PKK has stepped up its attacks against police and the army. 

The PKK, for its part, is playing right into Erdoğan’s hands with the revival of its militant tactics that caused so much bloodshed over the years. The head of the Kurdish-based political party HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, must be tearing his hair in despair. Just as the Kurds had achieved their long-desired political break through with strong parliamentary representation the guerrilla group threatens to undo all those gains with its renewed violence.

Even with the renewed violence, a number of pieces have to fall into place for Erdoğan’s gamble to pay off.

1.      Closing the HDP  - ironically this has been made more difficult by changes instituted by Erdoğan’s own political party. The closure could happen, but it would be difficult. Would infuriate a significant portion of the Turkish population.

2.      Drive HDP votes below the 10% threshold. Very difficult. Hard to see the Kurds switching their votes back to the AKP. HDP might get less than 13%, but will still pass the 10% threshold.

3.      Attract more nationalist votes to AKP – Possible. Votes lost to the nationalist MHP party could swing back to the AKP.

4.      Reduce the number of non-Kurds voting for the HDP – Very difficult. These voters dislike Erdoğan intensely and will vote for anyone who promises to derail his ambitions.

5.      AKP must remain united behind Erdoğan – This is not a given. There are a significant number of original AKP members unhappy with Erdoğan’s increasingly autocratic tendencies. It’s not at all clear how this faction will vote. Also not clear if former President Abdullah Gül will finally get off the fence and openly declare his opposition to Erdoğan. So far he seems to prefer issuing vague pronouncements while seated firmly on the fence ready to go in any direction.

My prediction is that unless HDP is shut down the election results will not differ very much from June. Even if AKP scrapes in with just enough votes to form a single-party government it will not have enough MPs to change the constitution the way Erdoğan wants. Meanwhile the economy will stutter along and internal security threats will raise their ugly head again. It’s one thing to gamble with one’s own political life. It’s quite another to include the entire country in that throw of the dice.

Erdoğan Needs To Be Very Careful At This Point

A possible sign that Turkey’s notoriously inaccurate election polls may for once be on the right track is the increasingly shrill and often bizarre behaviour of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the run-up to June’s general election.

Since storming to power in 2002 the AKP has swept every election with overwhelming majorities and maintained its strong grip on single-party government. Now, due a host of factors including a weak economy, fatigue with President Tayyip Erdoğan, corruption and disunity within AKP that tight grip is being challenged. One of the main threats is coming from the Kurdish-based People’s Democratic Party (HDP) with its charismatic, pop-star-like leader Selahattin Demirtaş. If Demirtaş can lead his party over the absurd 10% barrier to enter parliament it can pose a serious threat to AKP’s ability to rule by itself without a coalition.

The panicked response of AKP to this threat indicates that the polls showing HDP close to the 10% goal might just be accurate. Elections in Turkey have always been raucous affairs with accusations of wholesale vote rigging, threats of violence, massive demonstrations, and lots and lots of loud noise. But this one is going even further.

AKP minions, led by Erdoğan who is supposed to be above such things as president, are busy labelling the Kurdish party as:

·                     Terrorists

·                     Atheists

·                     And my favourite, ‘Zoroastrians’. For those of you whose knowledge of Zoroastrians is as limited as mine I recommend a wonderful book about remnants of ancient Middle Eastern religions called Heirs to Forgotten Kingdoms by Gerard Russell. He writes that the Zoroastrian faith dominated Persia until the Islamic conquest in the 7^th century. There are only a very few Zoroastrians remaining in modern Iran, but, even so, Erdoğan now counts them as an existential threat to Turkey in the form of a Kurdish political party.

Assaults on the HDP are growing beyond verbal absurdities. So far there have more than 50 attacks on HDP election offices across the country. Yesterday there were serious bomb attacks on two HDP offices in the cities of Adana and Mersin. Two senior AKP officials condemned the attacks, and no one has claimed responsibility. And no suspects have been found.

 

Scene after bomb at HDP office in Mersin

A sign of AKP desperation is the fact that Ahmet Davutoğlu, the prime minister and official head of the party, has been almost completely side-lined. He is perceived as a weak campaigner, and Erdoğan has gladly leapt into the breach with his almost daily fire-and-brimstone speeches about the catastrophe that awaits Turkey if the AKP fails to win enough deputies to form a single-party government.

In another indication of AKP nervousness, some party stalwarts are demanding the few remaining opposition media outlets be shut down and their assets confiscated.

            Then there is the very strange incident of rumours about a possible Turkish military incursion into Syria, an incursion that could cause the elections to be postponed thereby staving off potential embarrassment for the AKP. These rumours were quickly followed by the surprise decision of the Chief of Staff of the Turkish army to take a 15-day medical leave. It is well known that the army is firmly opposed to any such Syrian adventure, and the absence of the Chief of Staff makes any move into Syria very difficult. The conspiracy theorists are having a field day with this one, but it will be quite a while before anything resembling the truth emerges.

            Even more serious are the mounting concerns about voter fraud. With the judiciary and the theoretically independent election commission firmly under government control many people are concerned that the results will mysteriously turn out to be in AKP’s favour, regardless of the actual vote. A friend in London recalled that in the last election there were more votes cast in several districts than the total number of registered voters in those districts. There are also leaked reports of massive government efforts to ‘control’ the results. Opposition parties say they will send thousands of monitors to the polling sites, but it is not clear how effective they will be.

 

Iran faced widespread protests after the flawed 2009 election

            This is where Erdoğan has to be very careful. It is one thing if HDP legitimately fails to surpass the 10% barrier. It is quite another if the party suspects that electoral fraud kept them out of parliament. Erdoğan should remember the 2009 eruption of the Green Revolution in Iran following the disputed election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  Similar accusations in Turkey would go viral in a matter of moments leaving the so-called Kurdish ‘peace process’ in tatters. 

Erdoğan may or may not like the results of this election, But one hopes he realizes that nothing would improve Turkey’s democratic standing in this troubled region more than letting the results, whatever they may be, unfold without interference.

Maybe This Time The Opposition Has Learned Something

People in Turkey are beginning to think the previously unthinkable. President Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) that have dominated every election since 2002 may actually fall far short of their goals in the national elections scheduled for June. At this early stage it appears very difficult for AKP to get enough deputies to give Erdoğan his long-sought powerful, unchecked presidency. There is even a chance that for the first time in its history AKP will fail to get enough deputies to establish a government by itself. And, perhaps most important, for the first time I can remember  the Kurds seem to hold the trump card for this election.

            AKP, despite its almost total control of the broadcast media, is suddenly on the defensive. Party leaders have to explain away a sharply deteriorating economy. Erdoğan even has to concede the possibility of a coalition by saying such an outcome would be a ‘nightmare, the end of Turkey.’  Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was forced to copy the opposition’s opening to Turkey’s dwindling number of minorities by making sweeping promises to the Roma community. He even went so far as to say that AKP candidates include members (unnamed at this point) of the Alevi community, a branch of Islam considered heretical by the majority Sunni AKP.

            What has changed since the humiliating debacle of the presidential elections last summer when Erdoğan’s opponents couldn’t be bothered to get off their sunbeds in the holiday resorts to vote? Voter participation in that election fell to about 74%, the lowest level in 12 years. The apathy and incompetence of the opposition allowed Erdoğan to win just enough votes on the first ballot to win. What gives Erdoğan’s growing number of opponents the nervous, the very cautious hope that just maybe this time is different?

 

Is his appeal fading fast?

            In addition to the fatigue factor involved in listening to Erdoğan’s inflated bombast for so many years, the economy on which he based much of his political success is sliding rapidly downhill. The Turkish lira has lost almost 16% this year, and now trades close to a record low. GDP growth has stalled, inflation is up, unemployment has climbed to about 11%, and foreign direct investment has slowed down dramatically. Some voters are beginning to make the connection between the AKP’s policies and the economic decline. The AKP swept into power on the back of an economic collapse, and some people are openly repeating an old Turkish saying, ‘They will go as they came.’

            Then there are the political mistakes that the usually sure-footed AKP has made. In hindsight, the first mistake may have been Erdoğan’s decision to run for president. This decision could wind up isolating him in his new, huge presidential palace. The Turkish presidency is largely a ceremonial position with limited political power. The president is supposed to be above partisan politics and refrain from active involvement in government affairs. Erdoğan of course paid no attention to these constitutional constraints, and was deeply involved in all facets of party and government work. In order to justify these constitutionally questionable activities he was counting on the AKP winning enough deputies to change the constitution and implement a system with a politically powerful, unchecked presidency. This possibility opened cracks within the usually solid AKP. Several leading member of the party oppose his interference and the strong presidential system. They have made no secret of their opposition. The party also stuck with a rule limiting MPs to three terms in parliament. This meant that many experienced AKP deputies are being replaced on the candidate lists with novices unknown by voters.

Another challenge facing AKP is a revitalized opposition. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) has emerged from its usual torpor to run a vigorous campaign with some decent positive ideas rather than relying simply on the ‘anti-Erdogan’ vote. But the biggest surprise is the emergence of the predominantly Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) led by the young, charismatic Selahattin Demirtaş.

 

The king maker this time?

            In order to cross the barrier of winning 10% of total votes he has to extend the party’s vote beyond its traditional regional, Kurdish base. There are some signs that he is doing this. For one thing, he has a good chance of getting the votes of Turkey’s small, but vocal, liberal/intellectual constituency. This group used to vote AKP in protest against the military and authoritarian tendencies of earlier governments. Now that AKP has become even more authoritarian, this block of votes is looking for a new home. Another point is that the Kurds in general have won a great deal of sympathy for their struggle against the brutal, fundamentalist hordes of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Even my stalwart CHP friends are talking of switching their votes to

HDP. “I am definitely voting for him (Demirtaş), and I am telling all my friends to vote for him or I will beat them around the head and shoulders,” exclaimed one Istanbul matron waving her arms in a threatening manner. Dinner party conversations in smart Istanbul homes are dominated by animated opinions about the Kurds. “You must vote them,” cry most. “I will never vote for terrorists,” others insist.

Others claim there is a risk HDP will do a deal with AKP if it gets into parliament. In return for getting greater cultural and perhaps political autonomy, the argument runs, the Kurds would support Erdoğan’s presidential ambitions. “Rubbish,” responds Demirtaş. Every chance he gets he repeats that HDP will never support AKP.

HDP would have an immense impact on Turkish politics if it can cross the 10% the barrier. For one thing, Erdoğan’s presidential hopes would disappear. More than that, HDP could conceivably get enough MPs to force a coalition government for the first time since 2002. This possibility alone is making AKP very nervous. In this case even AKP’s rock-solid voter base of about 40% may not be enough to let them form a single-party government. No wonder Erdoğan is throwing all constitutional constraints aside and campaigning hard for his political life.

The Very High Stakes Turkish Election

The plots and sub-plots in the Turkish general election scheduled for June make this one of the most interesting and, undoubtedly, the most important election for years. The stakes are very high. The outcome will determine the course of this large, important country’s domestic and international policies that seem to have lost direction over the last few years.

The over-riding issue, as always, is President Tayyip Erdoğan, the man who has dominated Turkish policy for more than a decade. Erdoğan became Turkey’s first elected president last summer, and he desperately wants to transform that office into a strong executive presidency with limited parliamentary over-sight. The major road block to such a transformation is the existing constitution that puts the president above party politics and limits his role largely to ceremonial duties. Erdoğan, never one for constitutional niceties, has intervened heavily in government affairs and was active in selecting candidates for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Tayyip Erdogan, the man who would be king

 In order to change the constitution the AKP must increase its seats in parliament from 316 to 330. This has suddenly become difficult to achieve. For one thing, Erdoğan’s continued interference in the government has alienated many in his own party who are highly sensitive about anyone interfering in their parliamentary rights. This block of senior AKP officials, notably Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arınç, has made no secret of its opposition to the idea of a strong president with limited or no checks and balances. This feud between the old guard and the sycophantic Erdoğanistas could turn off many who used to vote for AKP. Few people doubt that AKP will wind up with the most deputies. But the real question is whether they will get enough to give Erdoğan his desired one-man rule. As one commentator put it perhaps the best outcome for stability is one where AKP continues to control parliament, but Erdoğan fails to get his one-man rule.

In addition to the intra-AKP issues, the most surprising development of this election season is the emergence of invigorated opposition parties. Even the venerable, sclerotic Republican People’s Party (CHP) has shown surprising innovation. Candidates in several of the party’s districts were chosen through a primary election system rather than simply being tapped by the party leaders. This led to the unexpected victory of several new faces over the tired re-treads that had dominated the CHP for years. The CHP list now includes an outspoken Turkish-Armenian woman as well as a representative of the Roma (gypsy) community. Any increase in CHP’s vote share would put a serious dent in Erdoğan’s plans.

 

CHP's Kemal Kilicdaroglu wants YOU!

However, the real key to this election is not the AKP or the CHP. It’s the Kurds who appear to hold the trump card. With their young, charismatic leader Selahattin Demirtaş, the Kurdish party (HDP) is making a bold move beyond its traditional base to become a national party. It has positioned itself as the most inclusive party in Turkey in its effort to get over the barrier of 10% of the national vote required to enter parliament. It has selected as one of its candidates a German-born Yazidi woman. The Yazidis are mainly in northern Iraq and practice an ancient religion that has superficial similarities to Islam but is vastly different. The Yazidis have been in the news recently because of their brutal treatment at the hands of ISIS. Anyone who would like to learn more about the remnants of these ancient religions should read Heirs to Forgotten Kingdoms, Journeys Into The Disappearing Religions Of The Middle East by Gerard Russell. Given the complicated mathematics of the Turkish election system, if Demirtaş can lead his party over the 10% barrier Erdoğan’s chances of getting enough parliamentary seats would just about disappear.

Demirtas seems to hold the trump card

Then there is also the intriguing question of former president Abdullah Gül. What exactly, if anything, is he up to? Since leaving office last summer and being dramatically snubbed by the AKP party he helped to found, Gül has played a very cautious game. He has made no secret of his dislike for the strong presidential system, and he has always portrayed himself as the ‘soft’ side of AKP in contrast to the shrill, divisive, bombast of Erdoğan. But he has been careful to avoid any public confrontation with his former colleague. There is quite a bit of speculation that he is very active behind the scenes, gathering support in the event Erdoğan fails in his attempt to change the constitution. If that happens, according to current speculation, he will return and try to take control of the AKP. In this event, Erdoğan would be well and truly isolated in his ridiculous new palace. Gül would make sure that Erdoğan sticks to his extremely limited constitutional role.

 

What is former president Gul up to?

It is very, very difficult to see Erdoğan gracefully, or any other way, accepting such a role. How can a man who has dominated every aspect of Turkish life for so long retire to the warm milk and slippers of a figure-head president? It simply does not compute. Turkey has been rocked by several violent incidents in recent weeks. Many people think this is a dangerous prelude as political passions get played out in the streets in the run-up to the most critical election in recent Turkish history.

However, despite all the noise and chaos of this election campaign, it is heartening to see that at least one country in this troubled region has a vibrant democratic streak that will not be suppressed. Even if Erdoğan gets his way with the constitution, it’s hard to see him stuffing this democratic genie back into the bottle.

Has The Post-Erdoğan Era Begun In Turkey?

Are the wheels starting to come off the Turkish wagon? The political stability and economic growth that have characterized Turkey since 2002 are beginning to fray at the edges just before critical general elections in June that could determine the country’s political direction for years to come.

            These elections will go a long way to determining whether President Tayyip Erdoğan will achieve his goal of complete control or be hampered by the current constitutional restraints on the president’s power. He runs the risk of being politically and legally isolated in his extravagant new palace unless the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins enough seats to unilaterally change the constitution the way he wants. Not content with the current largely ceremonial role of president, Erdoğan desperately wants a new constitution to enshrine his vision of a powerful, unchecked, unfettered presidency.

Is Prime Minister Davutoglu's Patience Running Out?

            A toxic combination of international and domestic problems is making this task more difficult than it was just a few years ago. On top of this a growing sense of ‘Erdoğan fatigue’ seems to have gripped even some members of his own party. Maybe they’re getting tired of 12 years of bombast. How much longer is Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu going to put up with Erdoğan’s constant – and unconstitutional – interference? Furthermore, many rank-and-file AKP members have shown little enthusiasm for a change in Turkey’s governing structure.

            In order to unilaterally change the constitution the AKP must increase its members of parliament from the current 316 to 330. This is not an easy task in the best of times, and these are not the best of times.

            The AKP can no longer count on strong economic growth to support its election campaign. For several years the party would loudly trumpet the impressive growth figures and strong currency as confirmation of its ‘brilliant’ policies. Now it is reduced to finding excuses for below-forecast growth, a rapidly depreciating currency, declining exports, and stubbornly high unemployment.

The currency has depreciated more than 10% so far this year, unemployment has risen to 10% and is much higher in the volatile south eastern region, exports are declining, and president is hammering the Central Bank to lower interest rates. The cacophony and mixed signals over Turkey’s economic policies are making investors very nervous. The prime minister and his top economic aides were in New York last week in an apparently futile mission to calm these nerves.

This is very difficult to achieve when the president insists that the theoretically independent Central Bank lower interest rates in hopes of stimulating the economy and reviving the critical construction industry that has created so many millionaires during Erdoğan’s reign. Ali Babacan, the minister in charge of the economy for the last 12 years, understands finance and economics very well. He has done a masterful job keeping the country on the rails so far, but it remains to be seen just how long his rational policies will survive the onslaught of Erdoğan and his comical presidential ‘advisors’.

On top of the economic problems there are the Kurds. No one knows precisely how many Kurds live in Turkey, but common assumptions are about 15% of the total population, or roughly 12 million people. Kurdish guerrillas, the PKK, have been fighting a low-intensity war against the Turkish state for years. In an effort to end the violence and integrate the Kurdish population more completely into Turkish society the government has begun long, drawn-out ‘peace process’. While many applaud this effort, cynics accuse the government of simply trying to buy off the Kurds to gain votes in the upcoming election.

Regardless of the ultimate reason, the Kurds may well hold the key to the June election. Bear with me for a little background on the convoluted Turkish election system. In order to enter parliament a political party must gain at least 10% of the total votes cast. In the past the Kurdish political party did very well in the Kurdish districts of the south east, but failed to cross the 10% national barrier. In the event that a party fails to get the required 10% on the national level all that party’s votes are given to the runner-up in the districts in question. In the vast majority of cases this runner-up was the AKP candidate.

In order to circumvent this rule Kurdish candidates previously would enter the elections as independents who only had to win their districts to enter parliament. This time, however, the young, charismatic leader of the Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Party (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş, has decided to risk everything by entering these elections as a party, subject to the 10% threshold. If he wins the Kurds will gain a powerful voice in parliament. If he loses the AKP will pick up several additional members of parliament – perhaps enough to take them over the 330 needed to change the constitution.

Is Kurdish Leader Selahattin Demirtas The Country's New Hope?

The real question is whether Demirtaş can broaden the party’s appeal to the non-Kurdish segments of the population. He has been helped positive images of Kurds in Iraq and Syria defying the barbarians of ISIS. He may also get some help from what is left of the disaffected, alienated liberal bloc as well as from those who dislike Erdoğan so much they will vote for the Kurdish party. “My deepest apologies to my grandfather who is turning over in his grave, but I will vote for the Kurds this time. Just to block Erdoğan,” said a typical ‘tactical’ voter.

Turkey is in for a very bumpy ride until the June elections. Then we shall see if Erdoğan gets his heartfelt wish for an imperial presidency, or whether is left roaming around his enormous new palace looking vainly for something to fill his days.