Is The Erdoǧan Era in Turkey Drawing To A Close? Maybe. Maybe Not.

 

Maybe, just maybe, after more than 20 years in power Tayyip Erdoǧan’s iron grip on the Turkish presidency could be slipping. While the opposition parties may yet find their usual way of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, current signs indicate a major change in Turkey after the presidential and parliamentary election on May 14. The stakes are very high for both sides.

Even if the opposition wins, however, it might discover that the election was the easy part. Then what? Given the enormous domestic and international challenges facing Turkey regardless of who wins the victor will enjoy a very short ‘victory lap’ before dealing with decades of economic, administrative and judicial mismanagement.

         Beset by a weak economy, high inflation, and Central Bank with only enough money for a couple of glasses of tea, Erdoǧan was already facing a restive, angry electorate before his problems were compounded by the disastrous earthquake in southeastern Turkey that claimed about 50,000 lives and destroyed hundreds of buildings. Stories of shoddy, sub-standard construction, amnesties for contractors and abysmal emergency response from the central government have fuelled growing anger and fury among key sections of the population.

     The opposition parties have for once learned something from their multiple defeats over the years. Rather than enter the elections as individual parties – none of which would ever get enough votes to topple Erdoǧan -- they have opted to form a coalition, albeit an awkward one, of six parties and unite behind a single candidate. The candidate they have chosen is long-time head of the CHP – Republican People’s Party – Kemal Kılıçdaroǧlu whose mild appearance and manner belie his surname – Son of Swordsman.

Can Kılıçdaroǧlu pull off the biggest win of his career?

    Some say the 73-year-old Kılıçdaroǧlu lacks the charisma and forceful character that draw many to Erdoǧan. Others opine that many in the country are sick and tired of Erdoǧan’s bombast and hope for quiet competence over aggressive incompetence. Whether that long-desired competence would be forthcoming with new leadership remains to be seen.

     However, and it is a huge ‘however’, one should be very careful about writing Erdoǧan’s political obituary. The political waste land is filled with people who underestimated him. He is a formidable campaigner and his party, AKP, has proven to be a well-oiled election machine. He has an intensely loyal voter base including thousands who are desperate to hang onto the positions and favours they have gained over more than two decades. The vast majority of the media is in Erdoǧan’s control, and they face financial disaster if he loses and their lucrative subsidies disappear. The security services and courts are also firmly in his hands. He will also throw vast amounts of money at key blocks of voters to keep them on his side.

One should never underestimate Erdoǧan's political skills

 In short, he has all the tools to try and bend the results in his direction. This doesn’t necessarily mean simply stuffing ballot boxes. For example, Kılıçdaroǧlu is an Alevi – a distinct type of Islam considered by some orthodox Sunni Moslems to be similar to the despised Shiites. Erdoǧan or his acolytes could fan those differences in an attempt to keep the hard-line Sunnis from voting for Kılıçdaroǧlu. There could also be a manufactured international event to keep the secular nationalists on his side. But with less than two months to go until the election Erdoǧan’s room for maneuver is beginning to shrink.

Kurds, the largest minority group in Turkey with about 15% of the population, make up the absolutely critical block of voters – literally the king makers. If they stay unified – always a question – they have the ability to swing the election to their favoured candidate. Conventional wisdom is that they will support anyone who opposes Erdoǧan and who promises to make their life a little easier. However, the opposition coalition is not united on this issue. For example, one of the coalition parties contains hard-core nationalists who tend to view the Kurds as a threat to the unity of Turkey. You can be sure that Erdoǧan will do everything in his power to fracture the opposition coalition and he is not above using the Kurds to do just that.

Selahattin Demirtaş, imprisoned leader of the Kurdish political party

 Let’s assume for a moment that the opposition wins and Kılıçdaroǧlu becomes president. A first, millions will be thrilled that Erdoǧan is gone. When that wears off things very quickly get interesting and unpredictable. The opposition coalition has promised to change the governing system from a strong president and weak parliament and return to the previous system where parliament was supreme and the president had little power. The ability of the new government to implement major changes will depend on the make-up of the new parliament and which party has the most seats. I anticipate ‘vigorous’ bargaining among the parties and a constant series of changing voting blocks depending on the legislation being considered.

 Spare some pity for the person put in charge of the economy. His in-box will be overflowing. What will he do with interest rates? How will the currency react? How, exactly, will he tame inflation without hitting living standards even more? Where will he get the money for all this economic restructuring? Will he turn to the IMF? And on, and on, and on.

 What about international relations? My guess is that there won’t be much change. Probably a little less confrontational, especially with the West. After all, that’s where most of the economic assistance could come from. But the underlying delicate balancing act with Russia will most likely continue. Who knows what Putin will do if his buddy Erdoǧan loses. He could demand immediate payment for the previously delayed gas payments. Russia is rumoured to have deposited more than $20 billion in Turkish state banks. That could be quickly withdrawn. Sweden would probably, somewhat grudgingly, be allowed to join NATO – especially if the Americans go ahead with upgrades to the F-16 fighter jets. The volume and tone of the exchanges with Greece could change. Turkey would still harbour a grudge about issues involving maritime territorial rights or exploration rights for natural gas, but the temperature of those complaints could be dialled down.

 I have followed Turkish elections for more than 30 years, and this is by far the most interesting, as well as the most important, one. The pieces of the puzzle are constantly moving and only a fool would try to predict the outcome at this point.