Who Will Be The Lucky (?) Person To Win The Turkish Election?

 

One can get a headache focusing on all the conflicting Turkish election polls. According to various polls President Tayyip Erdoǧan or his main challenger Kemal Kılıçdaroǧlu is a) going to win easily, b) lose in a tight race in the first round, c) win handily in the second round. Take your pick.

 Meanwhile headlines scream about election alliances being formed and broken. Little-known  politicians who will soon sink into their well-deserved obscurity claim their support is crucial for anyone who wants to win. This is their moment in the sun, and they are milking it for all it’s worth. These fringe party candidates can only hope that even though they will be lucky to get 3% of the total votes that will be enough to deny either Erdoǧan or Kılıçdaroǧlu victory in the first round where the winner has to get 50%+1. Then their small votes become extremely valuable and can be sold at a high price in a run-off vote.

 In reality, I doubt anyone has a clue about the outcome. While it’s clear that Erdoǧan is facing severe headwinds – economy, earthquake response, voter fatigue with his bombast, etc. – it is not at all clear that the alliance of six parties backing Kılıçdaroǧlu can generate enough excitement to beat him. There’s no doubt that a large part of the voters would be happy to see the end of Erdoǧan’s 20-year rule that has seen the once-promising economy crumble and concepts like the rule of law casually thrown out the window. But is that enough to get them to vote for Kılıçdaroǧlu? No doubt he is a nice, honourable person. But, sadly, such people have a hard time in the full contact sport of Turkish politics. Can Kurdish voters push him across the finish line? Will the Kurdish support push the nationalists back toward Erdoǧan?

 

Who knows which way their votes will go?

What about fears that Erdoǧan will try to rig the elections if he thinks he is losing? More easily said than done. The usual ‘retail’ method of vote rigging by stuffing the ballot boxes is difficult because of all the observers at each polling place. Also, it’s difficult to stuff enough votes at that level to make much of a difference. If Erdoǧan does anything it will likely be at the ‘wholesale’ level of forming alliances with some very strange partners. He is already doing this with Hezbollah look­-alikes and other stray cats and dogs. He certainly has enough money to buy additional support. There are many, many businesses – mainly construction – who made billions during his reign and are nervous about their future contracts should Erdoǧan lose. They would gladly contribute whatever is required to keep the good times rolling.

One of these two will face severe post-election challenges

 A scenario that is discussed only in hushed, fearful voices is the possibility of staged violence disrupting the elections. While the chances are slim that mobs inspired by whatever candidate appears to be losing could ruin the election some observers think those chances are not zero. It is unfortunately fairly easy to organize a rent-a-mob in Turkey, and some people will be anxiously holding their breath on election day and its immediate aftermath.

 One big problem Erdoǧan faces is the changing nature of the Turkish electorate. He used to rely heavily on votes from rural areas and smaller Anatolian cities to help him overcome the so-called urban elite he claimed was closer to Paris than to the ‘authentic’ Turkish homeland of Anatolia. Now rural Anatolia has largely disappeared after waves of migration to Turkey’s largest urban areas like Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Adana, Mersin, Eskișehir, Bursa, and many others. As we saw in the latest municipal elections most of these huge urban agglomerations are now firmly in the control of Erdoǧan’s main opposition, the Republican People’s Party. Erdoǧan may have retained the loyalty of the first generation of Anatolians who moved to the cities, but their children and grandchildren have become used to big city life and are less impressed by Erdoǧan’s rants and raves than their elders.

 Then there is the question of what Erdoǧan will do if he, by some chance, actually loses. Will he and his desperate supporters go quietly into the night? Will he go Full Donald Trump and say the election was stolen from him? Will the winner -- aware of troubles a resentful, angry Erdoǧan could cause – make some sort of deal with him?

 If Erdoǧan wins the post-election political scenarios are clear. Anyone, within his own party or without, who showed the slightest reluctance to re-elect him will be cast into the political and financial wilderness.

 Less clear is the post-election outlook for the country regardless of who wins. Unfortunately, it will be extremely difficult to restore the economic balances easily. How do you bring interest rates, the currency and inflation to acceptable levels without further disruption? How do you restore issues like the real rule of law, transparency, and, perhaps most important, hope for the thousands of young people who now believe their best opportunities lie outside Turkey. One doesn’t know whether to congratulate the winner or commiserate with the challenges he will face.