Are The Elections Enough To Restore Stability In Turkey?

The election results this weekend in Turkey will resonate far beyond the borders of this country that finds itself at a critical fork in the road. Will Turkey continue to be a country aspiring to establish a real rule of law and a vital democracy with normal checks and balances? Or will it take the well-travelled authoritarian road used by most countries in the region, the road that tolerates no dissent and no challenge to unbridled power?

Most of the polls indicate that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will fail once again in its attempt to win enough deputies to form a single-party government, frustrating President Tayyip Erdoğan’s goal of creating an all-powerful presidency. Normally such an outcome would result in a new government being formed as a coalition of two or more parties. But these are not ‘normal’ times, and there is real doubt that Erdoğan would be any more amenable to a coalition now than he was in June. The personal and political stakes are too high for him to surrender easily the total control he has exercised for the past 13 years.

In large part the election hinges on the success of Erdoğan’s efforts to demonise the Kurds inside and outside Turkey as the main threat to the country’s stability. As Turkish journalist Cengiz Çandar noted last night in a lecture at the Middle East Centre of St. Antony’s College Oxford, Erdoğan blames the Kurds for blocking an absolute AKP majority and thwarting his goal of a strong presidency. The Kurdish-based HDP party won 13% of the vote in June, capturing not just its base of about 8% but also much of the Kurdish vote that had previously gone to the AKP.  Analysts estimate that what’s left of the Turkish liberal intelligentsia added another 1% - 1.5% of the HDP total.

Since the June elections Erdoğan has done everything he can to blame Kurds in general for the dramatic increase in violence since then. Forget the inconvenient fact that two of the major atrocities killing more than 100 people in Suruç and Ankara were caused by ISIS elements within Turkey where Kurds were the targets, not the instigators. This strategy might not win him many more Kurdish votes but it might help him win back enough of the nationalist votes to attain his absolute majority.

Violence in Syria comes to Turkey

   As Çandar pointed out, the Turkish Kurdish problem is complicated by the coexistence of the legal, political HDP and the long-standing Kurdish guerrilla movement called the PKK. Until recently the Turkish government was engaged in a so-called peace process with PKK aimed at ending decades of violence. These negotiations fell apart when the HDP emerged as a serious threat to Erdoğan’s political goals. The PKK says it resumed its military activities in response to attacks by the state. Other analysts say the PKK’s resumption of violence is a message to the HDP as well as the Turkish state. “Don’t forget that the road to peace in this region goes through Kandil,” the mountain in south eastern Turkey that is the symbolic home of the PKK. This is just a hint of some of the intra-Kurdish issues frustrating anyone trying to understand the Kurdish problem, let alone resolve it.

The Kurdish question has been further complicated by the emergence just across the border of a strong Syrian Kurdish group receiving international support for its fight against ISIS. The Turkish state sees the potential development of an autonomous Kurdish region next door in Syria as a threat to the very concept of a unitary Turkish nation state because of its links to Turkey’s own Kurds. This fear of a large Kurdish autonomous region encompassing Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iraq causes many sleepless nights in Ankara and explains in part why Turkey is much more interested in stopping the Kurds than in fighting ISIS. This anxiety is only increased as Turkish leaders recognize that they may not have much say in the matter if an autonomous Syrian Kurdish region is accepted by the international community as part of any resolution of the Syrian civil war.

Sunday’s election has been played out in the context of this increasing instability with ordinary citizens avoiding large crowds for fear of another bomb. These incidents used to be limited to places like Baghdad or war-torn Syria. Now they are closer to home as the mess in Syria spills over into Turkey. Erdoğan has been successful in turning this election away from normal political issues and into a question of Turkey’s security and stability. The question is who will the voters blame for the widening divisions.

Erdoğan is doing everything he can to lay the blame at the feet of what he calls a cocktail of terrorist groups – the PKK, the Syrian Kurds and ISIS. The underlying message is that any vote for the HDP is a vote for this volatile cocktail, and that the only way to guarantee the safety and security of Turkey is to return AKP – and himself -- to absolute power.

The opposition lays the blame at the divisive, authoritarian figure of Erdoğan himself and blames the instability on AKP’s failed domestic and international policies – especially its muddled Syrian policy. The way forward, according to the opposition, is to create a more democratic, open Turkey that relies on a real rule of law rather than the rule of one man.

Sunday’s election might answer the immediate question of who is to govern the country. But resolving the longer term question of how to reconcile the diverse groups within Turkey will require far more statesmanship than the bombast we have been hearing for several years.

Is Erdoğan Helping Or Hurting His Party In The Election Re-Run?

Something is missing from the early days of this re-run of the Turkish elections scheduled for Nov. 1. Maybe it’s the extended Islamic holiday, but the election seems somehow anti-climactic. All the polls indicate that, barring some major cataclysm or massive vote fraud, the results will not change very much from the first election in June.

            The ruling Justice and Development Party will once again fail to win enough deputies to form a single party government. The up-and-coming Kurdish-based Peoples’ Democratic Party will once again pass the 10% threshold to enter parliament. And the most likely coalition option remains as it was in June -- between AKP and the Republican People’s Party (CHP).

            So just why are the Turkish people being put through this trial yet again? Why have all key economic, foreign policy, and security issues been allowed to drift in a chaotic and dangerous fashion at a time when real leadership is required?

            Basically it’s because President Tayyip Erdoğan could not accept the fact that his fervent wish for a change of the constitution allowing him to become an all-powerful, unchecked president was simply not going to happen. No coalition government would ever allow that. Erdoğan could not accept this, and he scuttled all efforts to form a coalition in June. Better, he thought, to take his chances with a new election in November when the voters would be given a chance to correct the errors of their ways.

            But something strange is happening on the way to these elections. At one time it was unthinkable, but has Erdoğan’s once iron grip on the Turkish electorate  slipped a bit? Oh yes, he still rants and raves, and his house media still paints him as the modern equivalent of Suleiman the Magnificent. His circle of sycophants still lashes out at all dissenters. The large rent-a-crowds at his election rallies will give a misleading impression of deep support. But his Teflon coating seems to have become chipped. His version of reality was once unchallenged. No longer.

            If he is to have any chance at all he must push the HDP votes below the key 10% threshold. In the June elections the AKP was obliterated in the once-sure regions of the south-east and east as the insurgent HDP swept all the Kurdish votes that used to go to Erdoğan’s party. His tactic so far has been to whip up nationalist suspicion of all things Kurdish. He has tried to blame the HDP for the upsurge in violence that has cost dozens of lives.  According to Erdoğan’s rhetoric the HDP is merely a front for the outlawed PKK.  But according to the polls more people are holding him and the AKP government responsible for the violence. Funerals of slain soldiers and police officers are filled with people blaming the government, not the HDP, for this chaos. In this environment is hard to see AKP getting many of the vital Kurdish votes.

            His claims of a strong economy are also falling on deaf ears. The currency has depreciated almost 31% this year, growth is down, unemployment and inflation are up. Ayşe hanım may not grasp the finer points of macro-economic analysis but she knows very well when the prices of tomatoes and shoes for her kids keep going up. She also gets angry when her husband can’t find a job. Typically Ayşe and her friends take out their frustrations on the government in power.

            Erdoğan’s attacks on the few remaining independent media outlets have picked up steam. Thugs from the AKP attacked the daily Hürriyet building because of its alleged anti-Erdoğan stance. The leader of that mob was later elected to the ruling body of the AKP. Journalists critical of Erdoğan continue to be detained, and the hunt continues for anyone even vaguely associated with Fetullah Gülen, the Islamic scholar who was once close to Erdoğan but is now sharply opposed.

            Again, none of this so far seems to be having the usual impact of increasing AKP votes. Quite the contrary, many polls show declining support for the party. Not only has he lost the Kurdish vote, but an increasing number of anti-Erdoğan Turks are supporting the HDP. These polls may well be unreliable, but the widespread, uncritical popular support Erdoğan used to enjoy seems to be lacking.

            People are now starting to ask what happens after the election. Will there be a coalition? Will Erdoğan allow one this time? And what of the enigmatic figure of former president Abdullah Gül? So far he has disappointed those who had hoped he would take a stronger, more visible stance against Erdoğan and become an alternative leader of the party.  Cynics respond that such hopes are in vain because there is not that much daylight between Gül and Erdoğan, and that he never opposed Erdoğan when he had the chance as president.

Instead of taking an openly critical stance against his former colleague he has remained firmly on the fence by limiting his activities to almost dainty sentiments about how he would have done things differently, how he would have preferred to see more of an effort to bring people together rather than foster divisions. Nice words to be sure. But in the rough, hand-to-hand combat of Turkish politics they don’t count for very much. Will he abandon his Hamlet imitation and get directly involved to reclaim the party that has been taken over by the ‘Erdoğanistas?’

But the key question is how quickly after the election any new Turkish government can turn its attention to the country’s real problems of a declining economy, rapidly unravelling foreign policy, and restoring sustainable internal security.

Erdoğan Doubles Down With Another Electoral Gamble

Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan reminds me of desperate gamblers who have lost their original stake and now are putting everything they have -- the kids' college funds, the rent, family shopping money -- into one more spin of the wheel, one more roll of the dice in hopes of recouping all their losses.

Not satisfied with the results of the June 7 where his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost sole control of government he has spent the intervening two months maneuvering to force another election – an election where voters will be sharply encouraged to correct the errors of their ways.

Half-hearted talks about a coalition government with the main opposition Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) broke down last week, and the only question now is who will run the country until elections in November.

These elections are a huge gamble for Erdoğan, and an even bigger gamble for the country as a whole. But this is a gamble he has to take if he ever wants to realize his dream of a strong, unfettered presidency. The stakes could not be higher. He has already said the he is a de facto strong president and that a new constitution would merely ratify this new reality. Others differ -- strongly. Yes, the AKP may pick up enough additional MPs to form a single party government and reinforce his authoritarian rule. But, just as easily, the plan could back-fire badly and leave the AKP with even fewer MPs. This would create the scenario for another attempt at a coalition government with a partner who would force the president to operate within the tightly limited restrictions of the present constitution.

Not accepting a coalition, he rolls the dice on another election

It is not at all clear just what Erdoğan would do if he fails a second time to get his required majority. It is difficult to see him going quietly into the night. Therefore, he cannot afford to leave the campaign to his handpicked, low key prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu. He will play a dominant role in the campaign, circumventing constitutional restrictions by appearing at ‘opening ceremonies’ from one end of the country to other. This tactic is also a gamble because post-election polls in June showed that his polarizing personality alienated a large number of voters. Furthermore, voters might just hold him responsible for the collapse of coalition talks and dragging the country through more uncertainty.

He is also gambling with critical issues like the economy that will drift aimlessly as the president and the ruling party focus exclusively on the election in a fight for their political lives. The possibility of at least three more months of political instability has already driven the Turkish Lira to record lows against the US dollar. Turks have developed extremely sensitive antennae for political troubles and react at warp speed by buying foreign currency at the first sign of instability. Retailers and other merchants report that business is stagnant at best as people conserve their cash and while waiting for further developments.

For Erdoğan this will be a one-issue campaign – national security. He will never forgive the Kurdish-based People’s Democratic Party (HDP) for winning enough votes to drive the ruling party below the number of MPs required for a single-party government. In the June elections HDP won 13% of the vote and sent 80 members to parliament, 80 members that used routinely to go to AKP. The charismatic leader of the HDP also committed the unforgiveable sin of proclaiming loudly that his party would never make Erdoğan the strong president he so strongly covets.

Can the HDP repeat its June electoral success?

Therefore Erdoğan is doing everything in his power to win additional nationalist votes by attempting to tie HDP to the outlawed Kurdish guerrilla group, the PKK. If he is going to win he must eliminate the HDP members of parliament by driving HDP votes in any new election below the barrier of 10% of total votes cast required for sending MPs to parliament. The other strategy would be to ban the party altogether on the very tenuous grounds of its alleged links to the PKK. Both of these strategies, however, promise to re-kindle tensions that many Turks had hoped were long buried.

It is no coincidence that the level of violence in Turkey has picked up dramatically since the election with almost daily clashes between government security forces and an eclectic group of terrorists. The deadly bombing in the town of Suruç was blamed on the barbarians from ISIS, a bizarre group of anarchists was blamed for the hapless attack with a few shots fired at the fortress-like American consulate in Istanbul, and then the PKK has stepped up its attacks against police and the army. 

The PKK, for its part, is playing right into Erdoğan’s hands with the revival of its militant tactics that caused so much bloodshed over the years. The head of the Kurdish-based political party HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, must be tearing his hair in despair. Just as the Kurds had achieved their long-desired political break through with strong parliamentary representation the guerrilla group threatens to undo all those gains with its renewed violence.

Even with the renewed violence, a number of pieces have to fall into place for Erdoğan’s gamble to pay off.

1.      Closing the HDP  - ironically this has been made more difficult by changes instituted by Erdoğan’s own political party. The closure could happen, but it would be difficult. Would infuriate a significant portion of the Turkish population.

2.      Drive HDP votes below the 10% threshold. Very difficult. Hard to see the Kurds switching their votes back to the AKP. HDP might get less than 13%, but will still pass the 10% threshold.

3.      Attract more nationalist votes to AKP – Possible. Votes lost to the nationalist MHP party could swing back to the AKP.

4.      Reduce the number of non-Kurds voting for the HDP – Very difficult. These voters dislike Erdoğan intensely and will vote for anyone who promises to derail his ambitions.

5.      AKP must remain united behind Erdoğan – This is not a given. There are a significant number of original AKP members unhappy with Erdoğan’s increasingly autocratic tendencies. It’s not at all clear how this faction will vote. Also not clear if former President Abdullah Gül will finally get off the fence and openly declare his opposition to Erdoğan. So far he seems to prefer issuing vague pronouncements while seated firmly on the fence ready to go in any direction.

My prediction is that unless HDP is shut down the election results will not differ very much from June. Even if AKP scrapes in with just enough votes to form a single-party government it will not have enough MPs to change the constitution the way Erdoğan wants. Meanwhile the economy will stutter along and internal security threats will raise their ugly head again. It’s one thing to gamble with one’s own political life. It’s quite another to include the entire country in that throw of the dice.

What Caused Turkey's Sharp Reversal On The Fight Against ISIS?

It would be nice to think that Turkey’s abrupt about-face on joining the war against ISIS was solely the result of President Tayyip Erdoğan’s long-delayed and agonized conclusion that the barbaric Sunni Islamic terrorist group was a threat to Turkey as well as Iraq and Syria. Alas, things in Turkey are never that simple or straight-forward.

            Ever since ISIS appeared on the scene Erdoğan has been reluctant to commit his massive armed forces to stopping ISIS or allowing American fighters to use the large Incirlik air base in southern Turkey. His refusal to help the beleaguered town of Kobani last winter sent a message to the Kurds that he preferred ISIS to Kurdish control of northern Syria.

            What happened to change his mind? Why did he suddenly see the light? Now, about six months after the successful Kurdish and American defence of Kobani, the proximate cause for his change of heart was the July 20 suicide bombing in the Turkish town of Suruç where at least 31 people – most of them Turkish Kurds -- were killed. The bombing was attributed to ISIS and finally caused Turkish policy makers to get off the fence and join the fight. So goes the Turkish government narrative.

            The reality is a bit more complicated. It is not lost on many people in Turkey that this change of heart coincides with a nasty bit of domestic politics. Erdoğan and the AKP suffered a major set-back in the June 7 parliamentary elections. AKP, thanks in large part to the predominantly Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) that polled far better than anyone suspected, failed to secure enough votes to form a government by itself for the first time since 2002. This dealt a severe blow to Erdoğan’s dream of changing the constitution to make the presidency a strong, unchecked, unchallenged position. Any coalition resulting from the elections would never allow that development.

This is unacceptable to Erdoğan. Few people doubt that he now spends more time plotting an early election this fall than working to form a strong coalition government. In order to get better results for the AKP he has do something to reduce the votes for the HDP that, in addition to the Kurds, is also supported by much of what is left of the Turkish liberal intelligentsia.

            Bear with me while we do a little election math here. In order for any single party in Turkey to form a government it must win at least 276 of the 550 seats in parliament. AKP easily accomplished this in every election from 2002 – 2015. This year, however, a new party (HDP) entered the elections and had a real chance to win at least 10% of the total vote, a requirement to send any MPs to parliament. HDP surprised everyone by winning more than 13% of the vote and sending 80 MPs to parliament, thus depriving AKP of its controlling majority as it won only 258 MPs. This was a very unpleasant surprise for Erdoğan who was now faced with the real possibility that a coalition government would restrict his powers. Worse, such a coalition government could even start seriously investigating corruption charges against former ministers and Erdoğan’s friends and family.

 

The Kurdish-based HDP won a solid hold on the southeast and east parts of Turkey

            Ever since the election Erdoğan and his anointed successor as prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, have dragged their feet on forming a coalition government. Erdoğan at least would much prefer to take his chances on a second election this fall in hopes that AKP would get more than 276 MPs.

           

            The only real way for this scenario to work would be to somehow drive HDP below the 10% threshold and for AKP to reclaim those 80 MPs. There were a total of just over 46 million votes cast in the June election, and HDP won more than six million of those votes. Driving HDP under the 10% barrier would require a swing of almost two million votes away from HDP. It’s difficult to see any of the Kurdish voters changing their votes, and I don’t believe any of the liberals who voted for HDP would suddenly recant and send their votes elsewhere.

 

Who are the main opponents of the large Turkish army?

            Erdoğan’s only alternative is to play the Turkish nationalist card and accuse the HDP of being nothing more than a front for the Kurdish guerrilla group the PKK. This entails ripping up his loudly publicized ‘peace process’ with the same PKK. Between now and November he would hope to drive home the image of AKP as the only hope for stability and peace by associating HDP with instability and terrorist violence.

            By suddenly agreeing to work with the Americans against ISIS Erdoğan also opens the door for renewed Turkish air attacks against Kurds in northern Iraq and Syria – all in the name of preventing the spread of allegedly Kurdish-inspired terrorism to Turkey. It’s almost as if he is saying, “I told you so. This is what voting for the HDP gets you.” In addition to the guilt by association strategy, there are growing calls from Erdoğan loyalists and ultra-nationalists who loathe the Kurds to ban HDP altogether.

            But will this transparent strategy achieve its goal? This is a very risky policy because it is not even clear that the AKP could hold onto the votes it won in June let alone increase them. And, unless HDP is banned, it is difficult to see its solid hold on the southeast weakening. Furthermore, there are threats of serious cracks within the AKP as some of the founders of the party strongly disagree with what has happened to their party under Erdoğan’s autocratic rule. Meanwhile the inconclusive, insincere coalition dance continues as the country faces another several months of instability in the run-up to yet another election.

The Greek Crisis Has Some Dreaming Of Independence -- From Athens

The only funny thing about the sad situation in which Greece finds itself is reading essays about what the Greek people ‘must’ or ‘must not’ do from renowned economists and leading academics writing comfortably from their offices thousands of miles from the turmoil. They are not the ones lurching from crisis to crisis worrying about when the money runs out, when the pharmaceuticals run out, when their pensions run out, or even if the food runs out.

Even Nobel Prize-winning economists like Paul Krugman urge the Greek people to rejectthe latest proposal from the creditors and risk leaving the Euro and returningto the drachma. Surely, he opines, this would be better than submitting to the even greater ‘austerity’ required by the creditors. Greece would be free of the creditors’ shackles and resume growth quickly. Nothing demonstrates the dangers of long-range analysis better than this.

In a perfect world Krugman might be right. If, and it is an enormous ‘if’ Greece had a smoothly functioning bureaucracy, a government determined to institute sweeping reforms, a political class not wedded to corruption and cronyism, and no deeply entrenched groups from  protected business interests to pampered public service employees with a strong interest in preserving the dysfunctional status quo such a recipe might work. But, alas, we are dealing with the reality of modern Greece and not some theoretical classroom exercise. And that sad reality is that without those sweeping reforms what remains of the Greek economy, regardless of the currency in use, will most certainly contract further.

Syriza could have been an agent of change. It could have instituted long-overdue reforms and, in the process, generated the revenue to improve the welfare of the people. Instead, it has proven to be nothing more than an extension, a particularly incompetent extension, of the failed political system that has decimated Greece over the last several decades. And the sad thing is if it had committed to these reforms it could have minimized the hated ‘austerity’. And the really sad thing is that the price of this intransigence is being borne by the very people Syriza said it wanted to help – the poorest sectors of the Greek population.

It chose instead to implement its school-boy theories, which by the way have not worked anywhere in the world, and substitute revolutionary rhetoric for real achievement. In the process their hypocrisy and deceit have succeeded only in alienating just about everyone who was in position to help. It would have been interesting to see, for example, if the creditors would have taken a softer tone if the government had moved aggressively on revenue producing reforms like privatization or breaking the stranglehold of protected businesses. But all we heard were thunderous pronouncements against such steps. One could almost hear the Euro Group, the IMF and the IMF pleading with Syriza to ‘give us something to work with.’ But the only thing that emerged were half-baked demands for debt reduction. Fine, but in return for what – precisely? I can imagine Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, asking the Greek government what it would do to help itself.

One can argue that the European institutions made a serious error a few years ago by bailing out the private banks that had recklessly loaned massive amounts to Greece. How often should tax payers be required to rescue private banks that should have known better? When do they these banks have to pay the price for their mistakes? Wouldn’t it have been much better to force those foolish banks to take the necessary hair-cut to reduce Greek debt to manageable levels? The problem was only compounded when public institutions assumed that debt. All this may be true. But, as The FinancialTimes Martin Wolf puts it, those are now ‘sunk costs’ and it is time to move on.

Meanwhile the drama is played out on the streets of Greece as most economic activity grinds to a halt pending the outcome of Sunday’s so-called referendum called by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. The 72-word question is a ridiculous summation of complicated financial discussions that very few people can possibly understand. The legal grounds for the referendum are not even clear, because currently there is NO deal on the table. What, exactly are people voting on? Whatever the stated question may be, most people seem to understand that the real issue in this referendum is Greece’s position not only in the Eurozone but in the European Union itself.

A friend on the island of Andros had an interesting solution to his anger at the government and the uncertainty of the current situation – independence. “We should immediately declare independence from the oppressive, idiotic regime in Athens! We could build a real economy here based on out maritime history, but including other centers of excellence such as financial and health care.” All it needs now is a Declaration of Independence. We are, after all, close to July 4^th.