One can get a
headache focusing on all the conflicting Turkish election polls. According to
various polls President Tayyip Erdoǧan or his main challenger Kemal
Kılıçdaroǧlu is a) going to win easily, b) lose in a tight race in the first
round, c) win handily in the second round. Take your pick.
Meanwhile
headlines scream about election alliances being formed and broken. Little-known politicians who will soon sink into their
well-deserved obscurity claim their support is crucial for anyone who wants to
win. This is their moment in the sun, and they are milking it for all it’s
worth. These fringe party candidates can only hope that even though they will
be lucky to get 3% of the total votes that will be enough to deny either
Erdoǧan or Kılıçdaroǧlu victory in the first round where the winner has to get
50%+1. Then their small votes become extremely valuable and can be sold at a
high price in a run-off vote.
In reality, I
doubt anyone has a clue about the outcome. While it’s clear that Erdoǧan is
facing severe headwinds – economy, earthquake response, voter fatigue with his
bombast, etc. – it is not at all clear that the alliance of six parties backing
Kılıçdaroǧlu can generate enough excitement to beat him. There’s no doubt that
a large part of the voters would be happy to see the end of Erdoǧan’s 20-year
rule that has seen the once-promising economy crumble and concepts like the
rule of law casually thrown out the window. But is that enough to get them to
vote for Kılıçdaroǧlu? No doubt he is a nice, honourable person. But,
sadly, such people have a hard time in the full contact sport of Turkish
politics. Can Kurdish voters push him across the finish line? Will the Kurdish
support push the nationalists back toward Erdoǧan?
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| Who knows which way their votes will go? |
What about fears
that Erdoǧan will try to rig the elections if he thinks he is losing? More
easily said than done. The usual ‘retail’ method of vote rigging by stuffing
the ballot boxes is difficult because of all the observers at each polling
place. Also, it’s difficult to stuff enough votes at that level to make much of
a difference. If Erdoǧan does anything it will likely be at the ‘wholesale’
level of forming alliances with some very strange partners. He is already doing
this with Hezbollah look-alikes and other stray cats and dogs. He certainly
has enough money to buy additional support. There are many, many businesses –
mainly construction – who made billions during his reign and are nervous about
their future contracts should Erdoǧan lose. They would gladly contribute
whatever is required to keep the good times rolling.
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| One of these two will face severe post-election challenges |
A scenario that is
discussed only in hushed, fearful voices is the possibility of staged violence
disrupting the elections. While the chances are slim that mobs inspired by
whatever candidate appears to be losing could ruin the election some observers
think those chances are not zero. It is unfortunately fairly easy to organize a
rent-a-mob in Turkey, and some people will be anxiously holding their breath on
election day and its immediate aftermath.
One big problem
Erdoǧan faces is the changing nature of the Turkish electorate. He used to rely
heavily on votes from rural areas and smaller Anatolian cities to help him
overcome the so-called urban elite he claimed was closer to Paris than to the
‘authentic’ Turkish homeland of Anatolia. Now rural Anatolia has largely
disappeared after waves of migration to Turkey’s largest urban areas like
Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Adana, Mersin, Eskișehir, Bursa, and many others. As
we saw in the latest municipal elections most of these huge urban
agglomerations are now firmly in the control of Erdoǧan’s main opposition, the
Republican People’s Party. Erdoǧan may have retained the loyalty of the first
generation of Anatolians who moved to the cities, but their children and grandchildren
have become used to big city life and are less impressed by Erdoǧan’s rants and
raves than their elders.
Then there is the
question of what Erdoǧan will do if he, by some chance, actually loses. Will he
and his desperate supporters go quietly into the night? Will he go Full Donald
Trump and say the election was stolen from him? Will the winner -- aware of
troubles a resentful, angry Erdoǧan could cause – make some sort of deal with
him?
If Erdoǧan wins
the post-election political scenarios are clear. Anyone, within his own party
or without, who showed the slightest reluctance to re-elect him will be cast
into the political and financial wilderness.
Less clear is the
post-election outlook for the country regardless of who wins. Unfortunately, it
will be extremely difficult to restore the economic balances easily. How do you
bring interest rates, the currency and inflation to acceptable levels without
further disruption? How do you restore issues like the real rule of law, transparency,
and, perhaps most important, hope for the thousands of young people who now
believe their best opportunities lie outside Turkey. One doesn’t know whether
to congratulate the winner or commiserate with the challenges he will face.
