Something
is missing from the early days of this re-run of the Turkish elections
scheduled for Nov. 1. Maybe it’s the extended Islamic holiday, but the election
seems somehow anti-climactic. All the polls indicate that, barring some major
cataclysm or massive vote fraud, the results will not change very much from the first election in
June.
The ruling Justice and Development
Party will once again fail to win enough deputies to form a single party
government. The up-and-coming Kurdish-based Peoples’ Democratic Party will once
again pass the 10% threshold to enter parliament. And the most likely coalition
option remains as it was in June -- between AKP and the Republican People’s
Party (CHP).
So just why are the Turkish people being
put through this trial yet again? Why have all key economic, foreign policy,
and security issues been allowed to drift in a chaotic and dangerous fashion at
a time when real leadership is required?
Basically it’s because President
Tayyip Erdoğan could not accept the fact that his fervent wish for a change of
the constitution allowing him to become an all-powerful, unchecked president
was simply not going to happen. No coalition government would ever allow that. Erdoğan could not accept this, and he scuttled all efforts to form a
coalition in June. Better, he thought, to take his chances with a new election
in November when the voters would be given a chance to correct the errors of
their ways.
But something strange is happening
on the way to these elections. At one time it was unthinkable, but has Erdoğan’s once iron grip on the Turkish
electorate slipped a bit? Oh yes, he still rants and raves, and
his house media still paints him as the modern equivalent of Suleiman the
Magnificent. His circle of sycophants still lashes out at all dissenters. The
large rent-a-crowds at his election rallies will give a misleading impression
of deep support. But his Teflon coating seems to have become chipped. His
version of reality was once unchallenged. No longer.
If he is to have any chance at all
he must push the HDP votes below the key 10% threshold. In the June elections
the AKP was obliterated in the once-sure regions of the south-east and east as
the insurgent HDP swept all the Kurdish votes that used to go to Erdoğan’s
party. His tactic so far has been to whip up nationalist suspicion of all
things Kurdish. He has tried to blame the HDP for the upsurge in violence that
has cost dozens of lives. According to
Erdoğan’s rhetoric the HDP is merely a front for the outlawed PKK. But according to the polls more people are
holding him and the AKP government responsible for the violence. Funerals of
slain soldiers and police officers are filled with people blaming the
government, not the HDP, for this chaos. In this environment is hard to see AKP
getting many of the vital Kurdish votes.
His claims of a strong economy are also
falling on deaf ears. The currency has depreciated almost 31% this year, growth
is down, unemployment and inflation are up. Ayşe hanım may not grasp the finer
points of macro-economic analysis but she knows very well when the prices of
tomatoes and shoes for her kids keep going up. She also gets angry when her
husband can’t find a job. Typically Ayşe and her friends take out their
frustrations on the government in power.
Erdoğan’s attacks on the few remaining
independent media outlets have picked up steam. Thugs from the AKP attacked the
daily Hürriyet building because of
its alleged anti-Erdoğan stance. The leader of that mob was later elected to
the ruling body of the AKP. Journalists critical of Erdoğan continue to be
detained, and the hunt continues for anyone even vaguely associated with
Fetullah Gülen, the Islamic scholar who was once close to Erdoğan but is now
sharply opposed.
Again, none of this so far seems to
be having the usual impact of increasing AKP votes. Quite the contrary, many
polls show declining support for the party. Not only has he lost the Kurdish
vote, but an increasing number of anti-Erdoğan Turks are supporting the HDP. These
polls may well be unreliable, but the widespread, uncritical popular support
Erdoğan used to enjoy seems to be lacking.
People are now starting to ask what
happens after the election. Will there be a coalition? Will Erdoğan allow one this
time? And what of the enigmatic figure of former president Abdullah Gül? So far
he has disappointed those who had hoped he would take a stronger, more visible
stance against Erdoğan and become an alternative leader of the party. Cynics respond that such hopes are in vain
because there is not that much
daylight between Gül and Erdoğan, and that he never opposed Erdoğan when he had
the chance as president.
Instead
of taking an openly critical stance against his former colleague he has remained
firmly on the fence by limiting his activities to almost dainty sentiments
about how he would have done things
differently, how he would have preferred
to see more of an effort to bring people
together rather than foster divisions. Nice words to be sure. But in the
rough, hand-to-hand combat of Turkish politics they don’t count for very much. Will
he abandon his Hamlet imitation and get directly involved to reclaim the party
that has been taken over by the ‘Erdoğanistas?’
But
the key question is how quickly after the election any new Turkish government
can turn its attention to the country’s real problems of a declining economy,
rapidly unravelling foreign policy, and restoring sustainable internal
security.
