People
in Turkey are beginning to think the previously unthinkable. President Tayyip
Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) that have dominated
every election since 2002 may actually fall far short of their goals in the national
elections scheduled for June. At this early stage it appears very difficult for
AKP to get enough deputies to give Erdoğan his long-sought powerful, unchecked
presidency. There is even a chance that for the first time in its history AKP
will fail to get enough deputies to establish a government by itself. And,
perhaps most important, for the first time I can remember the Kurds seem to hold the trump card for this election.
AKP, despite its almost total
control of the broadcast media, is suddenly on the defensive. Party leaders
have to explain away a sharply deteriorating economy. Erdoğan even has to
concede the possibility of a coalition by saying such an outcome would be a ‘nightmare, the end of Turkey.’ Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was forced to
copy the opposition’s opening to Turkey’s dwindling number of minorities by
making sweeping promises to the Roma community. He even went so far as to say
that AKP candidates include members (unnamed at this point) of the Alevi
community, a branch of Islam considered heretical by the majority Sunni AKP.
What has changed since the
humiliating debacle of the presidential elections last summer when Erdoğan’s
opponents couldn’t be bothered to get off their sunbeds in the holiday resorts
to vote? Voter participation in that election fell to about 74%, the lowest
level in 12 years. The apathy and incompetence of the opposition allowed
Erdoğan to win just enough votes on the first ballot to win. What gives
Erdoğan’s growing number of opponents the nervous, the very cautious hope that
just maybe this time is different?
In addition to the fatigue factor
involved in listening to Erdoğan’s inflated bombast for so many years, the
economy on which he based much of his political success is sliding rapidly
downhill. The Turkish lira has lost almost 16% this year, and now trades close
to a record low. GDP growth has stalled, inflation is up, unemployment has
climbed to about 11%, and foreign direct investment has slowed down
dramatically. Some voters are beginning to make the connection between the
AKP’s policies and the economic decline. The AKP swept into power on the back
of an economic collapse, and some people are openly repeating an old Turkish
saying, ‘They will go as they came.’
Then there are the political
mistakes that the usually sure-footed AKP has made. In hindsight, the first
mistake may have been Erdoğan’s decision to run for president. This decision
could wind up isolating him in his new, huge presidential palace. The Turkish presidency
is largely a ceremonial position with limited political power. The president is
supposed to be above partisan politics and refrain from active involvement in
government affairs. Erdoğan of course paid no attention to these constitutional
constraints, and was deeply involved in all facets of party and government
work. In order to justify these constitutionally questionable activities he was
counting on the AKP winning enough deputies to change the constitution and implement
a system with a politically powerful, unchecked presidency. This possibility
opened cracks within the usually solid AKP. Several leading member of the party
oppose his interference and the strong presidential system. They have made no
secret of their opposition. The party also stuck with a rule limiting MPs to
three terms in parliament. This meant that many experienced AKP deputies are
being replaced on the candidate lists with novices unknown by voters.
Another
challenge facing AKP is a revitalized opposition. The Republican People’s Party
(CHP) has emerged from its usual torpor to run a vigorous campaign with some
decent positive ideas rather than relying simply on the ‘anti-Erdogan’ vote. But
the biggest surprise is the emergence of the predominantly Kurdish People’s
Democratic Party (HDP) led by the young, charismatic Selahattin Demirtaş.
In order to cross the barrier of
winning 10% of total votes he has to extend the party’s vote beyond its
traditional regional, Kurdish base. There are some signs that he is doing this.
For one thing, he has a good chance of getting the votes of Turkey’s small, but
vocal, liberal/intellectual constituency. This group used to vote AKP in
protest against the military and authoritarian tendencies of earlier
governments. Now that AKP has become even more authoritarian, this block of
votes is looking for a new home. Another point is that the Kurds in general
have won a great deal of sympathy for their struggle against the brutal,
fundamentalist hordes of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
Even
my stalwart CHP friends are talking of switching their votes to
HDP.
“I am definitely voting for him (Demirtaş), and I am telling all my friends to
vote for him or I will beat them around the head and shoulders,” exclaimed one
Istanbul matron waving her arms in a threatening manner. Dinner party
conversations in smart Istanbul homes are dominated by animated opinions about
the Kurds. “You must vote them,” cry
most. “I will never vote for
terrorists,” others insist.
Others
claim there is a risk HDP will do a deal with AKP if it gets into parliament.
In return for getting greater cultural and perhaps political autonomy, the
argument runs, the Kurds would support Erdoğan’s presidential ambitions.
“Rubbish,” responds Demirtaş. Every chance he gets he repeats that HDP will
never support AKP.
HDP
would have an immense impact on Turkish politics if it can cross the 10% the
barrier. For one thing, Erdoğan’s presidential hopes would disappear. More than
that, HDP could conceivably get enough MPs to force a coalition government for
the first time since 2002. This possibility alone is making AKP very nervous.
In this case even AKP’s rock-solid voter base of about 40% may not be enough to
let them form a single-party government. No wonder Erdoğan is throwing all
constitutional constraints aside and campaigning hard for his political life.