Turkey's Real Contribution To The Middle East

Two recent long stories in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal note Turkey’s increasing diplomatic profile in the Middle East. The country’s peripatetic foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu has injected himself deeply into the region’s well known problems trying to make Turkey the facilitator, the catalyst for agreement among parties with seemingly intractable differences.


Both these stories point out that Turkey’s efforts so far have yielded very little in the way of concrete results. The efforts to mediate between Iran and the West have fallen flat with considerable collateral damage to Turkey’s image as a solid Western ally. Efforts to arbitrate the Palestinian/Israeli/Syrian quagmire blew up with Turkey’s bombastic response to Israel’s bloody Gaza incursion and the ill-fated alleged Gaza aid ship fiasco. And recently Davutoglu had to admit defeat in the Qatari/Turkish efforts to find a solution to the pending Lebanese crisis.

But what these stories missed is that Turkey’s biggest contribution to development in the region may well be in its very structure rather than in any direct action it might take. Turkey, as a functioning secular democracy with a Moslem society, is in an excellent position to serve as an example to other countries in the region that the choice of governance is not limited to dictators or Al Qaeda. There is another option, and Turkey shows just how successful it can be. The economy is growing, there are functioning political parties with sharply different visions of the country’s future, there are real elections, and there is a vibrant social life that is projected throughout much of the Arab world in extremely popular and controversial soap operas. Even in Greece one of the most of the most popular TV shows is a trashy Turkish soap opera.

But Davutoglu wants to be much more pro-active. Building on Turkey’s current economic success and his own vision put forth in his 600-page tome ‘Strategic Depth’ he strides boldly into issues that previous Turkish diplomats have steered gently around: Iran/West, Palestine/Israel, Hezbollah/Sunni/Christians in Lebanon. Whether you agree or disagree with Davutoglu you have to appreciate his intellectual dexterity and curiosity that is missing in so many other Turkish officials. A fluent English speaker and voracious bibliophile he is a frequent visitor to book fairs in Great Britain.

He believes that Turkey, as the former imperial power in the Balkans and Middle East, is ideally positioned to project its ‘soft power’ to solve the region’s problems. In this vision, Turkish products like refrigerators, processed food, and televisions will replace the elite Janissary troops that brought the Balkans and Middle East under Ottoman Turkish control centuries ago. According to this theory, few outside powers -- read the United States – have Turkey’s knowledge and historical/religious ties that allow them to project ‘soft power’ throughout this troubled region. He has even gone so far as to suggest that it might be worthwhile to create a commonwealth of former Ottoman Empire entities, naturally with Istanbul as the centre.

The trouble with this vision is that it overlooks some important historical realities, one being that the alleged unity of the Ottoman Empire is overstated. The Ottoman attitude toward the Arabs is best described in an Ottoman proverb quoted by Philip Mansel in his book Levant. The linguistic pun is missed in translation, but the proverb says that Turks would forgo all the sweets of Damascus if they could avoid seeing the face of an Arab. This attitude is slowly changing as the preferred partner European Union makes it clear it doesn’t want Turkey, but even now I encounter considerable residual distrust on both sides. The Arabs complain that they have always lost money when investing in Turkey, and the Turks complain that they can’t trust the Arabs either. About two years ago the investment banking team of our company was trying to mediate the acquisition of a Turkish company by a group of Arab investors. Given the invective about liars, cheats, thieves, procrastinators, etc. it was a very good thing they were in separate rooms with us shuttling between. It was no surprise that the deal did not happen. Another issue is that, as large Turkey's economy may be, the financial power of the region has shifted to the Gulf. Turkey's economic contribution is nice, but not really necessary.

A third problem is that some Arab countries, particularly Egypt, have made it quite clear that they do not appreciate Turkish interference in Arab affairs. They resent the growing prominence of this non-Arab country into their affairs, and pointedly remind the Turks that the days of the Ottoman Empire are over.

But perhaps the biggest problem that Davutoglu faces in convincing people that Turkey wants ‘zero problems’ with its neighbours near and far is that his boss, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, constantly launches verbal hand grenades that can shatter months of quiet diplomatic work. According to Erdogan all talk of Iran’s plans to build nuclear weapons is mere ‘gossip.’ Oops. Down goes all the credibility you’re trying to build as a serious arbitrator. All talk of genocide in Darfur is nonsense, according to Erdogan, because ‘Moslems don’t commit genocide.’ Erdogan has also loudly proclaimed that the Palestinian group Hamas is not a terrorist organization and that Israel should fire its equally combative foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman. One wonders how he would react for calls to replace certain Turkish ministers. The tendency of the prime minister to cross the street to get into a fight can only over shadow the tireless efforts of Turkey’s foreign minister.

Perhaps Turkey’s, and the region’s, interests would be better served if it could help others achieve that most difficult of tasks – building a functioning democracy from the rubble of dictatorship. As the brilliant French Arabist Olivier Roy points out in an essay in The International Herald Tribune the protestors in Tunisia are not Islamists. They are calling for democracy and elections. It is difficult to blend Islam and democracy, but this is something that Turkey has achieved. If it really wants to make a difference in the Middle East it will help others move toward this goal.

Can Lebanese Chaos Be Averted?

The downfall of long-time Tunisian strongman Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali has prompted a great deal of ink about the fate of other Arab autocrats. Is Tunisia, like Solidarity in Poland, the spark that will set off a chain reaction and freedom and democracy in the Middle East? Will other regimes use some imagination to deal with the turmoil spreading from under the rock of oppression or will they simply push down harder on the rock to make sure absolutely nothing seeps out?

Initial reactions are not promising. Other than checking the status of their get-away planes and Swiss bank accounts the autocrats’ reactions have been typical – buy off potential threats by lowering prices of key commodities rather than deal with the real underlying issues. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have quickly lowered prices of key items to pre-empt any disturbances over rising prices. Saudi Arabia may also have felt it had to do something to cut off protests after it solidified its reputation for never turning away a despot in need by granting asylum to the unpopular Ben Ali. Syria has increased its heating oil allowance by 72% to the equivalent of $33/month for a total cost more than $300 million. Even moderate Jordan has similarly announced a package of $225 million in cuts for several fuels and staples including sugar and rice rather than risk the wrath of the people. It remains to be seen if these moves are enough to contain the virus of political freedom. It will be more difficult than in the past. With Facebook, tweets, and other electronic communications channels the autocrats can no longer control the news flow as much as they did. Their people may just require more than a reduced price for bread.

While the Tunisian events have been unfolding, there is a time bomb in Lebanon steadily ticking away. The prosecutor for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has issued an indictment in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. He was killed with a huge car bomb that claimed another 22 innocent people. The indictment is being reviewed by a tribunal judge before the terms are released. But the widely held belief is that it will condemn the Iranian-supported group Hezbollah along with Syrian agents. Hariri was strongly opposed to Syria meddling in Lebanese affairs, and many believe that Syria played a key role in the assassination. The fact that 10 Lebanese politicians opposed to Syrian control have been killed since 2005 is a clue that these suspicions may not be groundless.

A further clue to Hezbollah involvement is that the group pulled its members out of the Lebanese government last week in protest about the indictment and its possible conclusions. Hezbollah wants the government to distance itself from the Special Tribunal and stop cooperating with it. The odds of this happening are not great because, among other things, the acting Lebanese government is headed by the son of the assassinated prime minister. Operating on the premise that offense is better than defence, Hezbollah is trying to discredit the tribunal and has predictably called it a tool of the United States and Israel. Hezbollah added that it will not allow any of its members to be arrested as a result of the indictment. With its heavily armed and disciplined militia that is not an idle claim.

Meanwhile representatives from just about every other country inside and outside the region are meeting to try to find a way to stop Lebanon from sliding into bloody chaos after the indictment is released to the public. Lebanon is a delicate construct of deeply incompatible religious, economic and political interests that seems to survive on nuances and deals that slither around this incompatibility without ever challenging it. There is a fear that something as direct and blunt as a United Nations-sponsored indictment rendered by the Tribunal’s Canadian prosecutor will tear these relationships apart with disastrous consequences.

Syria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and France are desperately trying to find a solution that will square the circle. Egypt is not directly involved, but there are reports its agents are busily working away in the Sunni regions of Lebanon. The result of all these meetings so far is a collection of inane statements that make Texas beauty pageant winners sound like Rhodes Scholars. The prime minister of Turkey, a relative late comer to intra-Arab affairs and included over the objections of Egypt, lets us know that he wants peace in the region. Very good. Any ideas how to achieve this? The spokesman for the Egyptian Foreign Ministry says a solution must balance stability and justice. Good luck with that, whatever that statement means.

If, as expected, Hezbollah is implicated in Hariri’s assassination it risks losing a great deal of the credibility within Lebanon that it gained as a result of its strong resistance to the disastrous Israeli invasion in 2006. Many Lebanese may not like Hezbollah, but they like the Israelis even less. Over the last few years the organization has tried to portray itself as dedicated to the welfare of Lebanon and not just a tool of its fellow Shiites in Iran. Once the indictment is made public this facade will be torn to shreds and the Sunni Moslems and Christians in Lebanon would now have a powerful weapon to use against Hezbollah.

One gets the impression that release of the indictment was delayed less for a judicial review than to give the parties involved a chance to find a solution that would avoid chaos. No one so far seems to have bothered to ask the Lebanese people just what they would like to happen once the indictment is released. Or perhaps it is felt that their wishes are far less important than the interests of the various patron states.