Maybe,
just maybe, after more than 20 years in power Tayyip Erdoǧan’s iron grip on the
Turkish presidency could be slipping. While the opposition parties may yet find
their usual way of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, current signs
indicate a major change in Turkey after the presidential and parliamentary
election on May 14. The stakes are very high for both sides.
Even
if the opposition wins, however, it might discover that the election was the
easy part. Then what? Given the enormous domestic and international challenges
facing Turkey regardless of who wins the victor will enjoy a very short ‘victory
lap’ before dealing with decades of economic, administrative and judicial
mismanagement.
Beset by a weak economy, high
inflation, and Central Bank with only enough money for a couple of glasses of
tea, Erdoǧan was already facing a restive, angry electorate before his problems
were compounded by the disastrous earthquake in southeastern Turkey that claimed
about 50,000 lives and destroyed hundreds of buildings. Stories of shoddy,
sub-standard construction, amnesties for contractors and abysmal emergency response
from the central government have fuelled growing anger and fury among key sections
of the population.
The
opposition parties have for once learned something from their multiple defeats
over the years. Rather than enter the elections as individual parties – none of
which would ever get enough votes to topple Erdoǧan -- they have opted to form
a coalition, albeit an awkward one, of six parties and unite behind a single
candidate. The candidate they have chosen is long-time head of the CHP –
Republican People’s Party – Kemal Kılıçdaroǧlu whose mild appearance and manner
belie his surname – Son of Swordsman.
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| Can Kılıçdaroǧlu pull off the biggest win of his career? |
Some
say the 73-year-old Kılıçdaroǧlu lacks the charisma and forceful character that draw many
to Erdoǧan. Others opine that many in the country are sick and tired of Erdoǧan’s
bombast and hope for quiet competence over aggressive incompetence. Whether
that long-desired competence would be forthcoming with new leadership remains
to be seen.
However,
and it is a huge ‘however’, one should be very careful about writing Erdoǧan’s political
obituary. The political waste land is filled with people who underestimated
him. He is a formidable campaigner and his party, AKP, has proven to be a
well-oiled election machine. He has an intensely loyal voter base including
thousands who are desperate to hang onto the positions and favours they have
gained over more than two decades. The vast majority of the media is in Erdoǧan’s
control, and they face financial disaster if he loses and their lucrative
subsidies disappear. The security services and courts are also firmly in his
hands. He will also throw vast amounts of money at key blocks of voters to keep
them on his side.
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| One should never underestimate Erdoǧan's political skills |
In short,
he has all the tools to try and bend the results in his direction. This doesn’t
necessarily mean simply stuffing ballot boxes. For example, Kılıçdaroǧlu is an
Alevi – a distinct type of Islam considered by some orthodox Sunni Moslems to
be similar to the despised Shiites. Erdoǧan or his acolytes could fan those
differences in an attempt to keep the hard-line Sunnis from voting for
Kılıçdaroǧlu. There could also be a manufactured international event to keep
the secular nationalists on his side. But with less than two months to go until
the election Erdoǧan’s room for maneuver is beginning to shrink.
Kurds,
the largest minority group in Turkey with about 15% of the population, make up
the absolutely critical block of voters – literally the king makers. If they
stay unified – always a question – they have the ability to swing the election
to their favoured candidate. Conventional wisdom is that they will support
anyone who opposes Erdoǧan and who promises to make their life a little easier.
However, the opposition coalition is not united on this issue. For example, one
of the coalition parties contains hard-core nationalists who tend to view the
Kurds as a threat to the unity of Turkey. You can be sure that Erdoǧan will do
everything in his power to fracture the opposition coalition and he is not
above using the Kurds to do just that.
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| Selahattin Demirtaş, imprisoned leader of the Kurdish political party |
Let’s
assume for a moment that the opposition wins and Kılıçdaroǧlu becomes
president. A first, millions will be thrilled that Erdoǧan is gone. When that
wears off things very quickly get interesting and unpredictable. The opposition
coalition has promised to change the governing system from a strong president
and weak parliament and return to the previous system where parliament was
supreme and the president had little power. The ability of the new government
to implement major changes will depend on the make-up of the new parliament and
which party has the most seats. I anticipate ‘vigorous’ bargaining among the
parties and a constant series of changing voting blocks depending on the
legislation being considered.
Spare
some pity for the person put in charge of the economy. His in-box will be
overflowing. What will he do with interest rates? How will the currency react?
How, exactly, will he tame inflation without hitting living standards even
more? Where will he get the money for all this economic restructuring? Will he
turn to the IMF? And on, and on, and on.
What
about international relations? My guess is that there
won’t be much change. Probably a little less confrontational, especially with
the West. After all, that’s where most of the economic assistance could come
from. But the underlying delicate balancing act with Russia will most likely
continue. Who knows what Putin will do if his buddy Erdoǧan loses. He could
demand immediate payment for the previously delayed gas payments. Russia is
rumoured to have deposited more than $20 billion in Turkish state banks. That
could be quickly withdrawn. Sweden would probably, somewhat grudgingly, be
allowed to join NATO – especially if the Americans go ahead with upgrades to
the F-16 fighter jets. The volume and tone of the exchanges with Greece could
change. Turkey would still harbour a grudge about issues involving maritime
territorial rights or exploration rights for natural gas, but the temperature
of those complaints could be dialled down.
I
have followed Turkish elections for more than 30 years, and this is by far the
most interesting, as well as the most important, one. The pieces of the puzzle
are constantly moving and only a fool would try to predict the outcome at this
point.
