The
rapid success of the jihadist sweep
into northern Iraq is equalled only by the speed and volume of calls by some in
the United States to ‘Do Something,
Anything’, to stop this particular domino from falling. Neocons, ignoring
the foolishness of invading Iraq in the first place in 2003, blame Obama for
prematurely withdrawing American troops. Others say the solution is to use
American military might to stop the spread of murderous thugs masquerading as
devout Sunni Moslems into Baghdad itself.
The calls for outside intervention
ignore one critical problem. The creation and initial success of these
extremist groups is an Arab-wide problem that outside intervention can slow,
but cannot stop. The removal of autocratic leaders across the region has
exposed the fragility of any underlying social contract that was never really
given a chance to develop since the Arab countries were carved out of the
desert 100 years ago by bureaucrats in London, Paris and Rome.
It’s
not so much a question of failed states,
because many of these countries never really developed into states per se in the common sense of the
word. Too many of them were run by loose affiliations of families, tribes,
sects whose only object was to protect their own interests. Well-meaning democrats
interested in social cohesion are a little thin on the ground in the Middle
East.
RamiKhouri, the astute columnist for the Daily
Star in Beirut, gets to the root of the problem in two recent columns.
“The open warfare and
shaken statehood that characterize Syria, Iraq and Libya are the painful commemoration of the Arabs’
own 100 Years War for stable, legitimate statehood.
“Syria, Libya and
Iraq are only the most dramatic examples of countries suffering from serious
sectarian and other forms of warfare that could easily lead to the fracturing
of those states into smaller ethnic units. Similar but less intense tensions
define most Arab states. With the exception of Tunisia, the citizens of every
Arab country have always been denied any say in defining the structure, values
or policies of their state.
“It is no surprise,
therefore, that Syria, Iraq and Libya should be at once so violent, fractious
and brittle. The capture of cities and territory across northern Iraq by the
Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) symbolizes a common aspect of the
fragmented nature of many Arab countries: the ruling party or family that runs
the government is at war with well-armed non-state actors that reflect
widespread citizen discontent with the power and policies of the central state.
The brittle Arab state is not simply melting away, as happened in Somalia over
the last two decades; rather, the state in many cases has become just one armed
protagonist in a battle against several other armed protagonists among its own
citizens. . .
“Drone attacks and
troops from the United States or Iran or any other foreign source will not have
any significant impact on the multiple forces that drive the fighting and
fragmentation in many Arab countries, and would probably only aggravate the
violence.
“The popular
uprisings that erupted three-and-a-half years ago have exposed the lack of
foundations for coherent statehood in several Arab countries, and in some cases led to a vacuum that
has been filled by various fighting forces in Syria, Iraq and Libya.”
In another column Khouri notes that the
“underlying Arab-made structural problems
include corrupt and incompetent governance, weak citizenship, brittle
statehood, and a severe lack of cohesion among different ethnic and sectarian
groups within countries.”
The expansion of the ISIS is not a sign
of the future, according to Khouri. “These
extremists have no base of support in the region . . . In more normal
conditions, they have never had any serious support in Arab countries.”
So, what is the answer to these
fractured societies attracted, at least in the short term, to the call of the
extremists? Alas, there is no short-term solution. American politicians seem to like problems that can be solved with
a single stroke – military action or massive economic aid, much of which winds
up in Swiss bank accounts. But a solution to the problems in the Middle East
requires decades, not days.
“The
only lasting antidote to the problems we are witnessing in Syria and Iraq, and
in less intense forms in Bahrain, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, requires many years
to take shape. That antidote is more democratic and inclusive government
coupled with growing economies. . . when citizens suffer both police
state-style governments with stagnant economies that mostly favour a small
number of families close to the ruling regimes, we end up with situations like
the ones in Syria and Iraq,” Khouri writes.
“ISIS
is frightening, to be sure, but not because it portends our future; it is
frightening because it reminds us of the criminal incompetence of ruling Arab
regimes during the past half-century, and as such it clarifies what must be
done to bring Arab societies back to some semblance of normal life. This will
be a long and hard struggle, but we have no other options.”
Western statesmen would be well advised
to pay close attention to these points before doing anything, like
ill-considered military strikes, to make the problems worse.
