After
the landslide victory of Ekrem Imamoǧlu in Istanbul’s mayoral election and the
general resurgence of the long-suffering Republican People’s Party (CHP) throughout
the country the question of the hour is what all this means for President
Tayyip Erdoǧan and his AKP party. Is the iron grip that Erdoǧan has maintained
on the AKP and the country at large for more than 20 years, a grip that was
reinforced only 10 months ago in the presidential election, starting to slip?
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Huge crowds greeted Imamoglu's victory |
While
it’s too early to write Erdoǧan’s political obituary, one can draw a few
conclusions from Sunday’s elections. The individual candidate is extremely
important. When Erdoǧan himself is on the ballot he has almost been assured of
victory. He is one of the most effective, charismatic campaigners I have ever
seen and has an intuitive sense of what the crowds want. It is a different
story when he is merely campaigning for someone else.
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Voters didn't want Erdogan's chosen candidate |
Murat
Kurum, Erdoǧan’s hand-picked candidate for mayor of Istanbul seems like a nice,
decent person. But he couldn’t compete with the flair and almost pop star
personality of Imamoǧlu. Erdoǧan campaigned hard for his man and even sent 17
cabinet ministers to help rally the faithful in Istanbul. But it was all to no
avail. Voters could tell the difference between the real item and his chosen
puppet. When Erdoǧan himself was on the ballot he could make voters temporarily
suspend their anger at the ruinous state of the economy and the shoddy
construction that led to so many deaths in last year’s earthquake. When Erdoǧan
is not on the ballot, voters are less willing to forgive and forget. Although these were local elections they were a sharp reminder to Erdoǧan that people are really struggling and so far he has not provided any solutions.
One also
got a glimpse of post-Erdoǧan Turkish politics. With two consecutive victories
in the country’s largest and most important city Imamoǧlu has certainly boosted
his claim to challenge for the presidency in 2028. Like Erdoǧan, he is an
effective and charismatic campaigner and would be a serious candidate. Unlike
Erdoǧan he does not enjoy an iron grip on his own party, the CHP. After so many
years in the wilderness there are sure to be many in the party who will claim
the right to run for president. Imamoǧlu’s task of convincing his fellow party
members that he is the strongest candidate will not be easy or straightforward.
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Can he ride his landslide in Istanbul to the presidency? |
And what
should one expect if CHP actually won the presidency? Perhaps there would be a
slight easing of the overtly Islamic trends of Erdoǧan’s government, but I
doubt very much there would a return to the very strict secularism of earlier
CHP governments. The CHP has also shown no signs of reducing Turkey’s strong
nationalistic tendencies. It is, after all, the party that Atatürk founded. People
anticipating something like a Scandinavian social democracy will probably be
disappointed. There may well be a return to a more parliamentary government in
place of Erdoǧan’s dominant role. But it’s also possible that once a person
gets his hands on that kind of power, he - or she - would be reluctant to give
it up.
The
Kurds showed once again that they dominate elections in the southeastern part
of the country. The Kurdish party won all those provinces and a couple of
others. And the very large block of Kurdish voters in Istanbul clearly helped
Imamoǧlu. What will the Kurds demand in return for any future support of a
possible CHP government? Tricky question, given the historical animosity
between the two groups.
And
what of Erdoǧan himself? How will he react to this defeat? He faces not only
the challenge of a revived CHP but a renewed challenge from the resurrection of
an openly Islamic party that took key votes away from AKP and won two provinces. The renewed Islamist Welfare Party is a serious challenge to Erdogan. It has a much stronger anti-Israel and anti-semitic stance than Erdogan and took 6% of the votes away from AKP. Will this make Erdoǧan double down on his nationalist and Islamic rhetoric or will be
continue the slightly – very slightly -- more moderate path we have seen
recently?
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What now for Turkey's dominant leader? |
He
has said he will not stand for election in 2028. He will be 74 in 2028 and has
run the country almost single-handedly for more than 20 years and is beginning
to look tired. He controls every decision, big or small, for the entire
government. Nothing happens without his signature or approval. Even his
opponents concede that few people work harder than he does. That takes a toll
after a while, and maybe he means it when he says he won’t run again. But it’s
much too early to take bets on that.
There
is already talk of succession, but if he interprets the recent election rout as
a sign of what may happen when he leaves, he could decide to stay for another
term. One name frequently mentioned as a
possible successor is one of Erdoǧan’s sons-in-law – 44-year-old Selcuk
Bayraktar. Educated at the Istanbul Technical University, the University of
Pennsylvania and MIT he returned to Turkey to work in the family defence company
Baykar where he developed the very successful series of Turkish UAVs, drones. He
is the company’s chief technology officer while his older brother Haluk – a
graduate of the Middle East Technical University and Columbia – is the CEO. The
Wall Street Journal recently had a long feature on Selcuk that mentioned
the possibility of a future political role for him.
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Will the son-in-law ultimately take over? |
He
seems well liked and respected across a wide spectrum of domestic and
international opinion but, so far, he has deflected all mention as a possible
successor to his father-in-law. He is wise to do so. Turkish politics is a
blood sport. Once it becomes apparent that Erdoǧan is serious about leaving, the
competing factions within AKP, each with its own powerful baron and prince,
could easily pull the party apart. Until now Erdoǧan has been able to control the
centrifugal forces within AKP. But if he is out of the picture the very future
of AKP is in some question. One of the major challenges any possible successor
faces is controlling those forces with their ambitious, hungry personalities.
Given
the critical role of Bayrak in Turkey’s burgeoning defence industry it seems to be a fair question whether the younger Bayraktar really wants or needs to follow
his father-in-law. But given Erdoǧan’s legendary powers of persuasion nothing
should be ruled out. There will be a great deal of very sharp-elbowed jockeying
within both major parties during the next couple of years and only a very brave
– or foolish – person would predict an outcome now.