It
would be nice to think that Turkey’s abrupt about-face on joining the war
against ISIS was solely the result of President Tayyip Erdoğan’s long-delayed
and agonized conclusion that the barbaric Sunni Islamic terrorist group was a
threat to Turkey as well as Iraq and Syria. Alas, things in Turkey are never
that simple or straight-forward.
Ever since ISIS appeared on the
scene Erdoğan has been reluctant to commit his massive armed forces to stopping
ISIS or allowing American fighters to use the large Incirlik air base in
southern Turkey. His refusal to help the beleaguered town of Kobani last winter
sent a message to the Kurds that he preferred ISIS to Kurdish control of
northern Syria.
What happened to change his mind? Why
did he suddenly see the light? Now, about six months after the successful
Kurdish and American defence of Kobani, the proximate cause for his change of
heart was the July 20 suicide bombing in the Turkish town of Suruç where at
least 31 people – most of them Turkish Kurds -- were killed. The bombing was
attributed to ISIS and finally caused Turkish policy makers to get off the
fence and join the fight. So goes the Turkish government narrative.
The reality is a bit more
complicated. It is not lost on many people in Turkey that this change of heart coincides
with a nasty bit of domestic politics. Erdoğan and the AKP suffered a major
set-back in the June 7 parliamentary elections. AKP, thanks in large part to
the predominantly Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) that polled far better than anyone
suspected, failed to secure enough votes to form a government by itself for the
first time since 2002. This dealt a severe blow to Erdoğan’s dream of changing
the constitution to make the presidency a strong, unchecked, unchallenged
position. Any coalition resulting from the elections would never allow that development.
This
is unacceptable to Erdoğan. Few people doubt that he now spends more time
plotting an early election this fall than working to form a strong coalition
government. In order to get better results for the AKP he has do something to reduce
the votes for the HDP that, in addition to the Kurds, is also supported by much
of what is left of the Turkish liberal intelligentsia.
Bear with me while we do a little
election math here. In order for any single party in Turkey to form a
government it must win at least 276 of the 550 seats in parliament. AKP easily
accomplished this in every election from 2002 – 2015. This year, however, a new
party (HDP) entered the elections and had a real chance to win at least 10% of
the total vote, a requirement to send any
MPs to parliament. HDP surprised everyone by winning more than 13% of the
vote and sending 80 MPs to parliament, thus depriving AKP of its controlling majority
as it won only 258 MPs. This was a very unpleasant surprise for Erdoğan who was
now faced with the real possibility that a coalition government would restrict
his powers. Worse, such a coalition government could even start seriously
investigating corruption charges against former ministers and Erdoğan’s friends
and family.
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| The Kurdish-based HDP won a solid hold on the southeast and east parts of Turkey |
Ever since the election Erdoğan and
his anointed successor as prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, have dragged their
feet on forming a coalition government. Erdoğan at least would much prefer to
take his chances on a second election this fall in hopes that AKP would get
more than 276 MPs.
The only real way for this scenario
to work would be to somehow drive HDP below the 10% threshold and for AKP to
reclaim those 80 MPs. There were a total of just over 46 million votes cast in
the June election, and HDP won more than six million of those votes. Driving
HDP under the 10% barrier would require a swing of almost two million votes away from HDP. It’s difficult to see any
of the Kurdish voters changing their votes, and I don’t believe any of the
liberals who voted for HDP would suddenly recant and send their votes
elsewhere.
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| Who are the main opponents of the large Turkish army? |
Erdoğan’s only alternative is to
play the Turkish nationalist card and accuse the HDP of being nothing more than
a front for the Kurdish guerrilla group the PKK. This entails ripping up his
loudly publicized ‘peace process’ with
the same PKK. Between now and November he would hope to drive home the image of
AKP as the only hope for stability and peace by associating HDP with instability
and terrorist violence.
By suddenly agreeing to work with
the Americans against ISIS Erdoğan also opens the door for renewed Turkish air
attacks against Kurds in northern Iraq and Syria – all in the name of
preventing the spread of allegedly Kurdish-inspired terrorism to Turkey. It’s
almost as if he is saying, “I told you so. This is what voting for the HDP gets
you.” In addition to the guilt by association strategy, there are growing calls
from Erdoğan loyalists and ultra-nationalists who loathe the Kurds to ban HDP
altogether.
But will this transparent strategy
achieve its goal? This is a very risky policy because it is not even clear that
the AKP could hold onto the votes it won in June let alone increase them. And,
unless HDP is banned, it is difficult to see its solid hold on the southeast
weakening. Furthermore, there are threats of serious cracks within the AKP as
some of the founders of the party strongly disagree with what has happened to
their party under Erdoğan’s autocratic rule. Meanwhile the inconclusive, insincere
coalition dance continues as the country faces another several months of
instability in the run-up to yet another election.
